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Abstract
The rise in female labour supply in developed economies has stimulated research on the 
combination of family and work. The aim of this thesis is to provide some empirical 
evidence on the factors driving family formation and mothers’ employment across Europe 
over the period 1960-2000.
After the Introduction, Chapter 2  describes a theory to explain the elements (e.g. public 
provided childcare, taxation system, subsidies to childcare, flexi-time at work, and un­
employment rates) that affect the sign of the correlation between fertility and employment.
The two subsequent chapters are both divided into two core sections: a Spanish case 
and a comprehensive European comparison (Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden). Chapter 3 analyses how the labour market affects individual fertility decisions 
(i.e. marriage/cohabitation, first, second and third birth) using a Cox hazard approach. 
Results suggest that if we would like to reverse the declining path in fertility in Spain, we 
need to accomplish three main things: overturn the negative impact of female employment 
on childbearing through policies that facilitate reconciliation of work and family, reduce 
the instability of working patterns, and implement policies that raise male employment. 
Interestingly, the cross-country comparison reveals that Sweden is the only country where 
being employed encourages earlier childbearing.
Chapter 4 investigates transitions from employment to non-employment around child­
bearing and its evolution across time. The European comparison suggests that the prob­
abilities of staying-on employed are different across countries and these have changed 
substantially over the period 1973-93. This evolution is mainly explained by the taxation 
system (joint vs. separate), the removal of barriers to part-time work and the increase in 
education.
Chapter 5 focuses on female employment in the UK between 1974-2002. A first sec­
tion aims to quantify how much of the rise in female participation is due to changes in 
the structure of the female population and how much is caused by changes in behaviour. 
A second section investigates the rise in the employment of married mothers. We isolate 
those birth cohorts whose mothers experienced significant increases in employment and 
relate those to changes in policies (maternity rights, taxation and childcare). Maternity 
rights have induced a change in behaviour toward returning to work in the first year 
post-birth, mostly among better-educated and higher-paid mothers.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Topic and Relevance
Over the period 1960-2000, cross-country correlations between female labour supply and 
fertility in developed economies have moved from negative to positive. This phenomenon 
has been achieved because some countries (with high female participation rates) have 
passed new laws that facilitate combining family and work, whereas others (with rising 
female participation rates) have not. Besides, countries differ in their economic patterns 
(i.e. unemployment rates and fixed-term contracts) and social behaviour.
Nowadays, women in industrialised countries are more attached to the labour force and 
it is important to know how they fit their births into their careers. In the relationship 
between family and work there are several connections to investigate. This thesis focuses 
mainly on two. First, decisions on the timing of childbearing and, second, decisions on 
employment amongst mothers.
Current public debates in the EU suggest that it is necessary to simultaneously accom­
plish the following: more women in paid work and more children. Some countries have 
been more successful than others in attaining this looked-for outcome. This thesis exploits 
country comparison to find out which economic structures and policies are required to al­
low high female employment rates and reasonable fertility rates to co-exist. In particular, 
our work analyses six European countries (Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK).
This thesis contributes to the social science topic of combining family and work in the 
following main aspects. First, it provides a deep analysis of Spain, where both low fertility 
and female participation offered scope for further investigation at the start of this work.
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Second, it studies policy relevant issues for the timing of childbearing and post-birth em­
ployment in a comparative and harmonised perspective. Third, it analyses which mothers 
with newborns in the UK work, when they started to do so and how the latter is linked 
to new maternity rights.
1.2 Data
For most of the empirical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4, we have constructed fertility 
and work history files with the ‘Family and Fertility Survey’ (FFS). This has been done 
for Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Using the same data facilitates a 
comprehensive comparison across these countries. For the Spanish case in Chapter 4, we 
have also used the ‘Encuesta de Poblacion Activa’ (EPA) and the ‘European Community 
Household Panel’ (ECHP). Finally, the British study in Chapter 5 has been undertaken 
with the ‘Labour Force Survey’ (LFS) and the ‘General Household Survey’ (GHS).
1.3 Outline
Before the empirical analysis is made, Chapter 2 , following the model proposed by Apps 
and Rees (2001), describes a theory to highlight the factors that are relevant for the sign 
of the correlation between fertility and employment. Some of these elements are public 
provided childcare, the taxation system (joint vs. separate), subsidies to childcare, flexi­
time at work, and unemployment rates.
Chapter 3 analyses the timing of cohabitation, maternity and spacing of births in Bel­
gium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Postponing the demographic process will 
eventually generate low fertility rates. This chapter seeks to find those individual charac­
teristics that make it more likely that women will delay childbearing. The decision on the 
timing of births is influenced by the opportunity cost of spending some time out of the 
labour force, which is strongly affected by family-friendly policies and prospects in the 
labour market. The latter differs substantially across countries. So far, most comparison 
studies focus on different data for each country. Our work differs from them in that we 
use the same data to harmonise the cross-country comparison.
Results point out that precarious labour markets (i.e. unemployment rates and fixed- 
term contracts) put off childbearing. Furthermore, being at work delays fertility in all 
countries, except for Sweden. This is an indication that Sweden has implemented policies 
that make possible the combination of family and work.
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In Chapter 4 the following questions are answered: what are the staying-on rates in 
employment after a first birth? How do they differ across countries? Has the probability 
of staying-on at work evolved over the period 1970-90? W hat economic factors and poli­
cies explain this evolution? W hat determines whether a woman continues at work after 
a birth?
This chapter finds that high education is a requirement for a continuous career woman in 
all countries, except for Sweden. Women with high levels of education (and, consequently, 
higher earnings) are the only ones to be able to pay for private childcare. That is, unless 
public free childcare is provided (or, in some cases, childcare by relatives), staying-on at 
work will only be worthwhile for women with potential high earnings. Our study shows 
that Swedish mothers find it optimal to remain employed, no matter what their level of 
education, thanks to their public childcare system.
Chapter 4 also highlights the change from a joint to an individual taxation system as 
favouring on the increase in the probability of staying-on over time, as well as the rise in 
education levels and the removal of the constraints on part-time jobs.
Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the rising trend in female participation in the UK over the 
period 1974-2002. First, the chapter studies whether the increase in female participa­
tion has been caused by changes in those characteristics in the population that make it 
more likely that women participate or if, instead, it has been due to a changes in their 
behaviour. Results point out that the periods with higher growth in female participation 
are those years where behavioural changes have played a principal role. The introduction 
of new policies that have an effect on female participation will be accounted within the 
changes in behaviour. Our work suggests that policies were more effective in increasing 
female participation in the 80s than in the 90s.
Second, Chapter 5 focuses on married women with children, since this is the female 
group with the greatest increase in employment. Our work isolates the birth cohorts 
whose mothers had significant rises in employment, compared to a control group (married 
women without children). It aims to link these shifts to family-friendly schemes. Policies 
up to now have been successful in rising the employment of mothers with newborns, but 
only for those women with higher education.
Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the main findings.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Considerations on 
Combining Family and Work: a 
Simple M odel
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the factors that affect the relationship between fe­
male labour supply and fertility. It is interesting to point out that in developed economies, 
the correlation between female labour supply and fertility has become positive in the last 
decade. Those countries with the lowest fertility rates (i.e. Spain, Italy and Germany) 
are also those with the lowest female participation rates. This phenomenon is driven by 
differences in policies and economic patterns that allow individuals in some countries to 
better combine the task of child rearing and employment compared to others.
The paper by Ahn and Mira (2002) reports that the correlation between the total fertility 
rate and the female participation rate was negative and significant in the 70s, whereas 
became positive and significant in the 90s. The authors discuss some plausible reasons 
for the change in this relationship. For example, they argue that for sufficiently high 
levels of the female wage, further wage increases may lead to income effects prevailing 
over substitution effects and, consequently, may instigate a rise in fertility. They also 
emphasise that the latter is more likely to occur the greater the availability of market 
childcare. The link between purchased childcare and the changing effect on fertility of 
increases in women’s wages was introduced by Ermisch (1989).
Following the model proposed by Apps and Rees (2001), we comment on some of the 
factors that we believe relevant for the sign of this fertility-employment correlation. Ex­
15
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amples are public provided childcare, the taxation system (joint vs. separate), subsidies 
to childcare, flexi-time at work, and unemployment rates.
The main contribution of the model by Apps and Rees (2001J1 is to show that coun­
tries with individual rather than joint taxation are likely to have both higher female 
labour supply and higher fertility. Furthermore, it demonstrates that support for families 
is far more effective through improved availability of alternatives to domestic childcare, 
compared to direct child payments.
In this chapter, we describe the paper by Apps and Rees (2001) in Section 2.2 and propose 
further considerations in Section 2.3. We extend their research and analyse the impact 
of female unemployment, the availability of public childcare time and flexi-time hours at 
work on the correlation between number of children and female labour supply. In the last 
section, we emphasise the policies that facilitate a positive correlation between fertility 
and female participation.
2.2 A Simple M odel
As in Galor and Weil (1996), the paper by Apps and Rees (2001) is a 3-period model. In 
the first period, individuals are children and they axe cared for by their parents. In the 
second period, individuals work, take care of their children and save. In their last period, 
individuals retire and consume their savings.
The utility of the household is given by
Ut = 7  Inn* + (1 — 7 )lncf+i (2 .1 )
At time t, each household chooses the number of children nt and consumption in the
retirement period q +i , subject to several constraints. First, there is the female time
constraint,2 which take the form
z f t  +  l f t  — 1 (2.2)
where z / t is the female time spent on childcare and l f t is the female labour supply.
Second, households face the following budget constraint
1 Their work is an extension of the model by Galor and Weil (1996).
2We assume that female’s leisure is exogenous and that partners devote no time to childcare.
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St ( l — (1 Tjt)Wftlft “I- (1 Qt^t “t” Hit (2*3)
The amount of savings (st) and spending on childcare goods (xt) must be equal to the in­
come generated from work by both members, the direct child payments by the government 
(gtTit) and the external income (EIt). Note that the households receive a government sub­
sidy <jt per each unit of childcare goods they spend in the market and a payment of gt per 
child. The state also taxes labour and this produces a net wage of N W f t = (1 — Tft)(vjft) 
and NWmt = (1 — rmt)(wmt) for females and males respectively.
Third, there is the production function of childcare as follows
nt = f { z f t , zpu x t) (2.4 )
with zpt being the free public childcare time exogenously given by the government. We 
assume that this function is linear homogenous, continuously differentiable and strictly 
quasi-concave. We also consider that the three types of childcare inputs are perfectly 
substitutes with each other in the sense that mothers find them equally satisfactory.
Finally, there is the intertemporal budget constraint with form
Ct+i =  (1 +  rt+i )st (2.5)
We assume that there is a gap between female and male wages (h >  0) that makes that 
males specialise completely in labour supply (lmt = 1). Thus, the gross male wage can be 
written as w mt  =  Wft +  h.  Because of progressive taxation and male wages being higher, 
we suppose that Tft < rmt. The total net income from work in the household is then given 
by N W ?  =  (1 -  Tft)wf t ( 1 -  z f t) +  (1 -  Tmt){ wf t +  h).
The maximisation problem is solved in two stages. First, we choose the optimal dis­
tribution of childcare inputs in order to take care of one child in the cheapest manner. 
That is, we minimise the per-child unit childcare cost subject to producing sufficient 
childcare for this one child.3
min vt = (1 -  TSt)wftZjt +  (1 -  0 t)xt (2.6)
s.t. 1 =  f ( z f t , z pt , x t) (2.7)
3The homogeneity assumption allows us to divide all variables by the number of children nt in order 
to obtain a unit function.
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where zft = Zpt = %  and x t = a
The per-unit child cost is the female’s opportunity cost of spending her time on caring for 
one child ((1  — Tft)wftZft) plus the net care per child bought at the market ((1  — crt)xt). 
Solving the previous equation yields the optimal input requirements for a unit cost of 
childcare (vt), which are z / t and x t.4
The optimal total cost of childcare is vI = vt(NWft,(Tt,zpt)n* and childcare demand 
functions are z*ft  = Zft(N W f t,CFt,zpt)n*t and x^ = x t( N W f t, ou zpt)n*t .
Once we have the optimal childcare demand functions, we proceed with the second stage 
of the problem that consists of maximising the household utility function subject to the 
budget constraint.
max C/f =  7 In nf +  (1 — 7) In Ct+ i  (2.8)
s.t. [vt(NWft, (ft, zpt) — gt]nt +  — — N W ft  +  N W mt +  Elt  (2-9)
J- -r rt+ 1
In Appendix 2.5.1 we derive the solution. We assume that vt(N W f t, at, zpt) > gt and 
Ct+i =  (1 +  rt+i)st. The optimal values of fertility, consumption and savings are:
... 7  [NW/t + N W mt + B I t]
vt(NWf t ,<TUlpt) - g t (
cf+1 =  (1 +  r t+1)(l -  -rXNWft + N W mt + E I t) (2.11)
s't = ( l - i ) ( N W ft + N W mt + E I t) (2.12)
2.3 Further Considerations
The paper by Apps and Rees (2001) focuses on the effects of a joint vs. separate tax­
ation system and finds that the latter scheme facilitates a positive correlation between 
fertility and female labour supply. In this section, we use an extension of their model to 
describe the impact of other factors on the relationship between number of children and 
employment.
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2.3.1 A  Change in the Female Gross Wage
Differentiating (2.10) with respect to the female gross wage Wft gives5
dn*t _  7[(1 ~  T f t ) +  (1 -  Tm t )] ~  z*f t ( 1 -  Tf t )
(2.13)
dwft  vt (NWf t, <7*,  zpt) -  gt
(2.14)
Recall that Zjt G [0,1] and 7  is the weight of nt in the utility function. If condition in 
equation (2.14) holds, then fertility increases with female gross wages, which means that 
the pure income effect of higher female wages prevails over the greater opportunity cost
7  can be smaller for given n£, the smaller is z / t . This suggests that the preference for
zpt are substitutes). Furthermore, fulfilling equation (2.14) requires a lower preference for 
children 7 , the closer are the marginal rates for females and males, since T / t < Tm t . This
wages do not exceed male wages and, consequently, female marginal tax rates are below 
male marginal tax rates.
In this subsection, we also note the potential impact of female unemployment rates on 
fertility. Suppose that condition (2.14) is satisfied across countries so that higher female 
wages are translated into higher fertility. We therefore expect to have greater fertility on 
those countries with higher female wages. Expected or average incomes per period in the 
labour force over time can be thought of as Wft (l — Uft), so a rise in female unemployment 
has the same impact as a fall in female wages.
(through more childcare time) linked to it. To satisfy the condition in equation (2.14)
children 7  will have to be smaller, ceteris paribus, to have the same fertility and satisfy 
the condition in those countries with the highest public childcare time zpt (since Zft and
indirectly implies that increases in female wages are more likely to cause rises in fertility, 
the smaller the taxation difference between sexes. But the latter is only true while female
2.3.2 A  Change in the Female M arginal Tax R ate
Differentiating (2.10) with respect to the female marginal tax rate Tft gives
dn*t _  wf t{z*f t -  7 )
(2.15)
dr  ft vt (NWf t  ,(7Uzpt ) -  gt
dn*t
^ - < 0 ^ 7  >z*ft 
drft J
5Further details in Appendix 2.5.2.
(2.16)
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As with the effect of female wages on fertility, we find that for the same preference param­
eter 7 , you are more likely to satisfy condition (2.16) with greater public time childcare 
zpt. When we add another input into child-rearing (the free governmental time), the cost 
of the women’s time is only a proportion of the total cost of childcare. This means that it 
is more likely that increases in net wages (either through rises in gross wages or through 
drops in marginal taxes) will have an income effect that outweighs the opportunity cost 
accounted in the price of childcare and will lead to a rise in fertility.
Under a joint taxation system, women typically face a higher marginal tax rate for their 
work earnings compared to a separate taxation system. This is because they are eligible 
to the tax rate that corresponds to the sum of the wages of both members of the couple, 
which is generally higher. Imagine that a country shifts from a joint to an individual 
scheme. This immediately implies a decrease in womens’ marginal tax rate (t/*). If con­
dition (2.16) is fulfilled, then we expect that the move from joint to separate taxation 
system increases fertility.
In their paper, Apps and Rees (2001) rewrite the previous equation to provide further 
intuition. They find that increases in female net wages (thus, drops in their marginal 
rates) are more likely to lead to a rise in fertility, the smaller the gap between male’s and 
female’s wages (h) is. They also show that changes in the male’s marginal tax rate (in 
this framework in which husbands do not participate in childcare time) have only income 
effects.
2.3.3 A Change in the Public Childcare Tim e
Previously, we pointed out that greater zpt means that we are more likely to see increases 
in female wages resulting in higher fertility (both conditions (2.14) and (2.16) are satisfied 
with higher probability). Equation (2.17) looks at the direct impact of zpt on the number 
of children.
f t*
dzpt (vt(N W j t, <T(, zpt) -  gt)(vt(N W ; t, at, zpt) -  gt) 
dn*t dvt . . .F
(2.17)
> 0  (2 1 8 )
If W f , which is the full income in the household ( W f  = (1 — Tft)wft +  (1 — rmt)(wft +  
h) +  E I t) is positive, and is negative, then increases in zpt unambiguously leads to a 
rise in fertility, as expected.
CHAPTER 2. THEORY ON COMBINING FAMILY AND WORK 21
2.3.4 The Effect of Flexi-hours at Work
In these models, it is usually assumed that individuals can choose any time devoted to 
work (Ift = 1 — Zft), which also means that they face flexibility on the amount of hours 
devoted to childcare. However, in some countries women face a constraint that forces 
them to work a minimum number of hours if they decide to be employed (l f t > l/t or 
Zft < 1 — I ft). Those women who find it optimal to work below the minimum number of 
hours allowed, may not be employed in an economy where this is not permitted. There­
fore, those countries with tighter constraints on the choice of the number of hours will 
have less female employment.
Aside from hours flexibility, the time of day when you actually work is important, es­
pecially for combining family and work. For example, getting to work later to bring 
children to school or leaving early because of child illness. Families can definitely organise 
themselves better if both members are not subject to strict timetables. This ‘freedom’ is 
a bonus for working since it adds quality to the job. We call it (3. Since in our framework, 
we do not have labour directly specified in our utility function, we incorporate this extra 
utility of work into the model in a different manner. This 0  > 1 multiplies gross wages as 
if the extra utility were a subsidy for work. That is, the utility provided by the flexibility 
is directly translated into a monetary premium. We next rewrite problem (2.6) with a 
new parameter that accompanies the gross wages, which is perceived by the individual 
as something that raises the opportunity cost of devoting time to childcare. As it is set 
out in equation (2.19), the bigger 0  is, the higher the quality at work and the greater the 
bonus.
mini;* =  (1 -  Tft)wftZft0 +  (1 -  at)xt (2.19)
s.t. 1 =  f ( z f t, zpt, x t) (2 .2 0 )
The optimal inputs for one unit of childcare and cost of childcare now depend also on this 
extra parameter (3. The optimal total cost of childcare is =  vt(N W f t, at, zpt, (3)n*t and 
childcare demand functions are Zjt = Zft( N W f t , Gt, zpt, 0)n* and x^ = x t(N W f t, crt, zpt, /3)n*
(3 does not affect the requirements needed to make increases in wages have a positive 
impact on fertility (condition (2.22) is equal to (2.14)).
dn* = Ph[(l  ~  Tft) +  (1 -  Trnt)] ~  Z*f t (l -  Tf t )]
dwjt vt{NWft,  at, zpt, (3)- g t
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®nt ^ r» ^  ^ (1 Tf t )  * fo | (‘Tf t Tmt) 1-1 /r> oo\
> 0 O 7 > ^ ( l - r / t )  +  ( 1 - r m t ) - ^ [ 2  +  n ^ r ]  ( 2 '2 2 )dwft
The next equation specifies the condition for increases in (3 to lead to more fertility.
dr£ = 7  {NWft + N W mt) - N W ftz)t 
d(3 vt (N W f t , at , zpt , (3) -  gt
(2  24^1&p >  0 7  > +  NWmt (2.24)
Condition (2.24) sets out that an increase in the quality (3 is more likely to increase fertility 
for given preference 7 , the smaller is jv^+Jvvvmt • This occurs when N W f t is tinier and 
when the gap between the two partners’ income is greater. This means that flexibility (3 
will rise fertility with higher probability, the bigger the gap between male and female’s net 
wages. Thus, increasing flexibility will tend to raise fertility, especially in those countries 
with big wage gaps.6
2.4 Policy Implications
There is a general consensus that female labour supply respond positively to increases 
in net wages. Moreover, female wages are increasing over time in developed economies. 
This means that the less strongly negative is the fertility elasticity with respect to the 
wage, the weaker will be the inverse correlation between female employment and fertility. 
That is, those countries that implement policies that make it more likely that rises in 
female wages increase fertility (or at least, reduce it less) will experience a positive (or 
weaker negative) association between female labour supply and number of children. In 
this chapter we highlight some of the policies that make the latter more likely to occur. 
For example, this could be achieved by higher subsidies for bought-in childcare (o-f), sep­
arate taxation and provision of free childcare time (zpt).
The availability of public childcare has an immediate direct effect on rising fertility, ceteris 
paribus. More free childcare time also makes it more likely that the condition for positive 
fertility elasticity with respect to female wages holds (either because of increases in gross 
wages or by reductions in the marginal tax rates).
Furthermore, a positive correlation between female wages and fertility is more likely to
6If we repeat this exercise with (3 given only to females we find that condition (2.24) is 7  > z*jt . This 
requires greater preference for children 7  to fulfill the condition that an increase in (3 leads to higher 
fertility. Thus, flexibility should be given to both males and females since it is then more likely to have 
a positive impact on fertility.
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occur, the smaller the gap between female and male wages.
Finally, the increase in work flexibility ((3) as modelled here does not affect the require­
ments for a positive relationship between female wages and number of children. However, 
more flexibility is more likely to be translated to rises in fertility, ceteris paribus, the 
smaller are female net wages and the greater is the pay gender gap. Thus, flexibility 
potentially facilitates increasing fertility in those countries with bigger wage differentials.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Solution to  the M axim isation Problem
We substitute c*+i =  (1 +  rt+i)st on the utility function and budget constraint and 
rearrange terms.
max Ut = 7  In nt +  (1 -  7 ) ln(l +  rt+i) +  (1  -  7 ) In st (2.25)
s.t. st = N W ft  +  N W mt +  E It -  [vt(NW fu  ot, zpt) -  gt]nt (2.26)
jp -  =  7 — +  (1 -  7 )—jp -  =  0 (2.27)ont nt st ont
Since
we isolate
r\
= - ( vt(N W f t , <7t , Ipt) -  gt) (2.28)
nt = ~-, \ TjXr 5-v st (2.29)1 - 7  vt{N W ft, <ru zpt) -  gt
By plugging in the value of st and arranging terms for nt, we find the optimal
=  , [ N W ^ N W T t  + E I t] 
vt(N W ftj at, zpt) — gt
Then, it is straightforward to find the optimal values of consumption c*t +i and savings s£.
2.5.2 Com parative Statistics
We call full income in the household the sum of the after tax income it would earn if all 
time was used for market labour supply and the external income. This is defined as
W f  = (1 -  Tf t)wft +  (1 -  rmt)(wf t +  h) +  E I t,
which means that n(* =  MNW] Z U p,)-9t-
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0nf 7[(1 ~  Tf t ) +  (1 -  Tmt)\(vt{NWft,  <ru Zpt) ~  9t) ~  [m& jl 
dwft (vt(N W f t, (JU Zpt) -  9t){vt{NWju °u zPt) -  9t)
dn*t = 7[(1  ~  Tft) +  (1 -  Tmt)]{vt{NWfU au zpt) -  gt) ~[{zf t )(l -  rf t ) \ ^W[  
dwft (vt(NWf t, <JU Zpt) -  gt)(vt(NWft, au zpt) -  gt)
Using that Zjt = Zf t n*t and rearranging terms
dn* =  7[(1 ~  Dt) +  (1 ~  Tm t )] -  z*f t { 1 ~  Tft) 
dwft vt(N W f t , crt, Zpt) -  gt
A Change in the Female Marginal Tax Rate
dn*t = 'ywf t (- l ){v t (NWfj ,  ort , zpt) -  9t) -  'yWtF[zf t ( - l ) w f t\ 
dr ft {vt{NWft , au zpt) -  gt){yt{NWfu ot, zpt) -  gt)
This yields
dn; _  Wf,(z}, -  7 )
drft  vt (N W f t, at, zpt) -  gt
(2.31)
(2.32)
(2.33)
(2.34)
(2.35)
Chapter 3
The Impact of the Labour Market on 
the Timing of Family Formation
3.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to show how the labour market, education and other 
characteristics affect individual decision to marry/cohabit and have children. We check 
empirically some of the ideas developed in the theory to explain family formation. Do 
higher educated women experience a greater opportunity cost of having children? Is the 
fact of being employed a constraint on having children for women? Is this constraint 
reduced if women work part-time? Do female unemployment rates and temporary con­
tracts cause a postponement of marriage and births leading to a decline in fertility? Is it 
true that high external income facilitates the expansion of the family? How do social and 
demographic variables affect the timing of marriage/cohabitation and births?
Low fertility rates have both social and economic origin. In recent history, there has 
been a negative relationship between the number of hours supplied in the labour mar­
ket and the number of children in the household across individuals. Nevertheless, there 
is some growing evidence that this association is becoming positive in some countries 
(see Section 3.5). In fact, cross-country female employment vs. fertility correlations in 
developed economies have become positive. That is, those countries with higher female 
participation rates have higher fertility rates. Female education is also linked to having 
fewer children, both through its effect on employment opportunities and on the use of 
contraceptive methods.
Although some studies have been done on this topic (see Section 3.2), this chapter has 
two main contributions. First, it devotes special attention to the Spanish case since its
26
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low fertility and female participation rates make this country an interesting one. We 
analyse two different cohorts in order to capture a potential generational change in be­
haviour in Spain. Second, we make a comprehensive comparison and harmonise research 
across countries. A complete section of Chapter 3 is based on a cross-country compari­
son between Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Although there is some 
work done for different countries, we are not aware of any complete study that makes a 
comparative analysis with the same data source. We use the Family and Fertility Survey1 
(FFS) and select those variables that are common across countries.
The rest of Chapter is organised as follows: in Section 3.2, we summarize the contri­
bution of other authors on this topic. In Section 3.3 we focus on the empirical model. 
The aim is to analyse the timing of family formation with a hazard approach. Section
3.4 studies in detail the Spanish case. Section 3.5 makes a comprehensive study across 
countries. We then summarise our findings and conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Literature Review
There are several studies that analyse the female decision of fertility and work from a 
theoretical point of view (e.g Becker (1981), Cigno (1991), Galor and Weil (1996) and 
Apps and Rees (2001)). Becker (1981) uses the price of children and real income to ex­
plain why rise in the female wage reduces fertility. He also introduces the idea of an 
interaction between quantity and quality of children to analyse the demand for children. 
Cigno (1991) presents various models of fertility: some deal with the decision on the total 
number of children, and others model the timing of births. He emphasises the importance 
of the accumulation of human capital to determine the optimal period of childbearing. 
There are also authors that look empirically at the impact of observable characteristics 
(mainly female employment and education) on the timing and spacing of births. We next 
summarise some of these papers.
For the Scandinavian welfare states, Hoem and Hoem (1989) analyse the impact of 
women’s employment on second and third births in Sweden. They find that the variables 
with the greatest impact on the hazard for the second birth are a woman’s employment 
status, her educational level, and whether she is cohabiting or married. When looking at 
the third birth, the following regressors are found to be important: age at first birth and 
the elapsed interval between her first two births (demographic characteristics). Their mar­
ital status seems to be minor for the third birth. Their paper emphasises the preference
xWe describe the data later in the text.
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for two children (‘two-child norm’) in modern Sweden. They also describe the role of the 
Swedish public sector, which has improved job opportunities for women and has enabled 
both partners to combine homemaking with paid employment. This has allowed 80% of 
women with children in the kindergarten to work, many of them part-time. Surprisingly, 
they find no significant difference on the effect of working full or part-time on the haz­
ard. One initially would think that more family oriented women tend to work part-time. 
They justify the result by an income explanation. Couples with women working full-time 
have a higher income and can afford to have more children. Heckman and Walker (1990) 
focus on the impact of wages on the timing and the number of conceptions in Sweden. 
They find that, whereas the female wage increases the time between, and reduce the total 
numbers of births, the male wage has the opposite effect. More recently, Kravdal (2000) 
studies the effect of unemployment, both at micro and macro level, on fertility in Norway 
between 1991 and 1998. She finds that unemployment has had a weak impact on births, 
which might be due to the fact that people are supported by a generous welfare system.
There are also studies for market-oriented economies. The paper by Harvey (1996) anal­
yses the effect of female employment on the likelihood and timing of second and higher 
order pregnancies for the US. The author uses pregnancy as the unit of measure since he 
thinks that it is pregnancy and not birth that employed women try to avoid. The paper 
finds an important negative impact of full-time2 employment on fertility for the second 
and fourth pregnancies, but not so for the third pregnancy. This suggests that something 
other than employment may be more crucial in determining the probability of a third 
than a second or fourth pregnancy for women who work full-time.
Also for the US, Hodson and Mooney (1981) write about the effects of the timing of 
marriage and first birth on the spacing of subsequent births. There are several factors 
that relate age at marriage with fertility. For example, fecundity has its peak at early 
ages and contraceptive methods will be expected to be used more effectively by older 
couples since they are more mature. The authors point out some aspects that make the 
relationship between the timing of marriage and first birth and subsequent child spacing 
misleading. For instance, those who use ineffective contraceptive methods are likely to 
marry earlier because they are induced to do so because of premarital conception. The 
results of their paper show that there exists a direct relationship between the number of 
births and the experience of rapid fertility. For example, about 80% of those who had 
three children at the time of the interview had their first child within two years of mar­
riage, but only 35% of those who had one child at the time of the survey had that child
2Part-time employment impacts negatively but it is not significant.
CHAPTER 3. THE TIMING OF FAMILY FORMATION 29
within two years after marriage. The latter is rejected by Heckman, Hotz and Walker 
(1985),3 which investigate whether it is true that the timing of marriage and the lengths 
of prior intervals affect the spacing of subsequent births once they control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. In fact, they find that if unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, 
the pattern that longer preceding birth interval causes longer subsequent birth intervals’ 
disappears.
Groat, Neal and Workman (1996) analyse the family formation of working mothers in 
the US. They find that the longer the marital work duration, the longer the,interval be­
tween marriage and first child. Another result is that the lowest fertility level is among 
mothers who have worked the greatest proportions of their married lives, at high status 
jobs, and before the birth of the first child.
Cooman, Ermisch and Joshi (1987) focus on the probability of a birth given income 
in England and Wales. Their model confirms that not only demographic characteristics 
but also economic variables are important in explaining the fluctuations in fertility, in 
particular its timing. Del Bono (2001) has recently contributed into this area by looking 
at the impact of unemployment and employment expectations on fertility in the UK. She 
finds that a spell of unemployment induces women to delay childbearing. Those women 
who expect high future wages are more likely to postpone first birth, ceteris paribus. On 
the other hand, if women predict more favourable job opportunities, they bring forward 
the birth event.
After German unification, fertility patterns changed considerably in East Germany. Kreyen- 
feld (2 0 0 0 ) analyses the impact of unemployment at micro level on the timing of first birth. 
Her paper concludes that spells on female unemployment actually increase the hazard for 
first birth in East-Germany, which goes in opposite direction of what Del Bono (2001) 
finds for the UK.
Both childcare and taxation policies affect the participation of mothers. Connelly (1992) 
shows that increased childcare costs lower the probability of employment, especially among 
mothers of preschoolers. Other papers analyse the impact of joint vs. separate taxation 
on employment. Colombino and Del Boca (1990) find tha t under a separate taxation 
the lost of hours worked with respect to a system without taxes is less than under joint 
taxation. Apps and Rees (2001) go further and look at the effect of the tax system on 
the simultaneous decision of fertility and participation. Their model shows that countries
3Their analysis is based on a Swedish sample.
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with individual rather than joint taxation are more likely to have both higher female 
labour supply and higher fertility. The paper also demonstrates that support for families 
should be given by improved availability of domestic childcare and not through direct 
child payments.
Most of the papers focus on one single country and do not compare different economies. 
One exception is the thesis by Wetzels (1999) that analyses the timing of births in Swe­
den, Germany and Great Britain. Her results show that high education delays first child 
in these three countries. In Great Britain, women become mothers at a younger age com­
pared to Sweden and Germany. She suggests that this is due to the fact that maternity 
benefits are lower in Great Britain, which makes the wait to obtain them less appealing, 
especially among low-educated women.
Less research has been done for Spain. We are aware of an important piece of work 
by Ahn and Mira (2001) who use the 1991 Spanish Socio-demographic Survey. They 
look at the the links between high male unemployment rates and the decline in fertil­
ity in Spain. Their results provide strong evidence that periods of non-employment for 
men have a significant negative effect on the probability of marriage. Part-time or tem­
porary contracts have also played a negative role, which suggests that the instability of 
jobs among young men causes the delay of marriage and childbearing among the Spanish 
couples. Our analysis in Section 3.4 differs from theirs in several aspects. We focus on 
both females and males whereas they only investigate males. We also highlight changes in 
society by dividing our sample into two cohorts (1945-60 and 1961-77). Baizan, Aassve 
and Billari (2001) contribute to the Spanish case by modelling simultaneously first birth 
and cohabitation. They find evidence that these two events are correlated. Consequently, 
they claim that in order to obtain reliable estimates, studies should include a hetero­
geneity component that accounts for their mutual dependence. Looking at the economic 
variables, their results show that being employed reduces women’s likelihood of marriage 
and first birth. The latter is true regardless of whether they take account of the unob­
served factor influencing simultaneously first birth and first union .4
For a brief summary on the topic, it is worthwhile reading the paper by Gustafsson (2001). 
The author reviews the empirical and theoretical literature about the postponement of
4We would like to point out, however, that the impact of economic variables (e.g. education, employ­
ment and work experience) remains fairly constant with the same interpretation in the two specifications 
(with and without accounting for interdependence). Thus, we believe that if one is interested in the 
impact of this type of covariate, one need not be overly concerned about correlations between first birth 
and marriage in Spain.
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maternity in Europe. First, there are models that deal with the timing and spacing of 
births and use female wages and male incomes to explain fertility decisions (e.g. Heckman 
and Walker (1990) for Sweden and Merrigan and St-Pierre (1998) for Canada). Second, 
there are dynamic models that compare the utility of having a child at time t+1 rather 
than at time t with the period shadow price of giving birth (e.g. Ermisch (1990) and 
Walker (1995)). Finally, there is a literature that anayses the optimal age of maternity 
and relates it to career planning. For instance, Joshi (1998) studies the costs of children 
in Great Britain, namely, the direct forgone wages and the human capital loss during the 
time out of the labour market. Within this framework, Happel, Hill and Low (1984) find 
it optimal to begin fertility either very early or very late in marriage, depending on how 
much human capital depreciation women have after childbearing.
3.3 Empirical M odel
Our purpose is to analyse the principal determinants of the decisions to get married and 
to have children. Since we are interested in the impact of employment, education and 
labour market characteristics on these decisions, we will mainly focus on these variables. 
To analyse the process, we model the timing between different demographic states (single 
to married,5 married without children to one child, from one child to two children and 
from two to three). We use duration models to study the timing of marriage and births. 
Econometric duration models are used to analyse the main factors (observable and non­
observable) that determine the duration in a given state. In other words, they analyse 
the probability of an event occurring at a particular time, given that the individual was 
at risk at that time. Fertility decisions are based on sociological factors, demographic 
characteristics, education and the employment trajectories. The hazard model applied to 
family creation tells us, given employment, education and other factors, the probability 
that a woman will get married in the next month.6 When looking at the first child, it 
predicts the probability that a woman at risk with those characteristics will have a first 
child in the next month. The same interpretation is extended for the second and third 
child.
To summarize, these microeconomic models allow us to study how observable characteris­
tics influence positively or negatively the chances that a woman gets married or increases 
the size of her family. These covariates can be either time-varying or fixed. Since we 
are interested in how the employment and education paths affect the family creation tra­
5Notice that Section 3.4 analyses the timing of marriage and Section 3.5 considers both marriage and 
cohabitation.
6We have monthly data.
CHAPTER 3. THE TIMING OF FAMILY FORMATION 32
jectory, we do have time-varying variables, which tell us at each period the employment 
status and the educational attainment of the woman. We also introduce regional unem­
ployment rates that correspond to a particular month. This provides a measure of how 
a woman forecasts the risk of temporarily abandoning her job and how the economy is 
performing. Moreover, there are also some social factors that influence the hazard, which 
are taken as constant covariates (for instance, the number of siblings, religion and region). 
The hazard is not only a function of characteristics but also of the time a woman has 
already spent in a certain state.
The two basic concepts are: the survival and the hazard function. The survival func­
tion reveals the probability of ‘surviving’ (remaining) in a specific state. The hazard 
function specifies the probability of exiting (leaving) a particular state.
3.3.1 Hazard Functions
The hazard function, h(t\x) is defined as
h(t\x) =  2jnio < T  < t  + A t\T  > t , x) (3.1)
where x  is the vector of explanatory variables (that might be dependent or independent 
of time) and T  is a random variable of the exit time.
The hazard rate of marriage implies the conditional probability density function of leav­
ing the status of being single to being married, given that the individual has been single 
until t and given her characteristics x. The hazard rate of first birth is the probability of 
exiting the state of being married with no children to the state of having one child, given 
that the particular couple has been married until t and given their characteristics x. One 
can reproduce this methodology to study the change of state from one child to two, from 
two to three, and so on.
Let f(t\x )  be the unconditional (with respect to the time) probability density function 
of exit from one state to another and F(t\x) the cumulative distribution function for an 
individual with characteristics x. We can then write the hazard function h(t\x) as:
h(t\x) = f( t \x ) /{ l  -  F(i|a;)) (3.2)
The denominator in (3.2) is the survival function 5(t|a;) representing the probability of 
‘surviving’ in a specific state. Here the survival rate means, for example, the probability
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at time t that a woman remains single.
As mentioned, the exit rate from a state depends upon the time spent in that state 
and the individual characteristics. Consider, for example, the exit rate from the state 
of being married with no children to the state of being married with one child. There 
are a number of factors that might cause the hazard rate to change (in both directions) 
during the spell of marriage with no child, implying duration dependence. The first is 
that the longer the couple has been married, the older is the woman and her husband. 
It is a biological fact that women and men become less fertile as they age. This implies 
negative duration dependence (Sh/8t < 0). That is, the exit rate depends negatively on 
time. On the other hand, it is possible to find arguments that go in favour of positive time 
dependence (8h/6t > 0). For instance, some couples may wish to get settled before hav­
ing children. Furthermore, some couples may require some kind of treatment to facilitate 
their reproduction. The existence of duration dependence has to be checked empirically. 
It might be that how long the couple has been married has no impact and it is only the 
individual characteristics of both members of the couple that determines the change of 
state. This will be in accordance with an exponential baseline hazard.
The most common assumption is to make the time profile of the hazard function in­
dependent of x. Then, h is formed by two factors: a function of regressor variables, x, 
given by $i(a:), and a function of time ho(t) (the baseline hazard):
h(t\x) =  $i(:r) * ho(t) (3.3)
This specification is the proportional hazard models (PH-models) since two different cou­
ples have hazards that are in fixed proportions for any t  (Cox and Oakes (1984)).7
The hazard has to be positive. A way of achieving this is to take the factor 4>i as
an exponential:
<3>i =  exp(x'(3) (3.4)
giving
h(t\x) =  exp(x'/3) * ho(t). (3.5)
7With time-varying covariates there is not, strictly speaking, such a thing as the proportional hazard 
model. However, it has become common in econometrics to call a hazard of the form in equation (3.3) 
as proportional hazard with time-varying covariates.
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For the baseline hazard ho(t), one might adopt parametric or semi-parametric specifica­
tions (where it is not constrained to belong to a specific parametric family). Forcing the 
hazard baseline function to take a particular shape may be a disadvantage if the para­
metric function does not fit properly the duration dependence.8 This is why we use the 
semi-parametric Cox model, which allows derivation of the coefficients for the explana­
tory variables, but places no restrictions at all on the shape of the baseline hazard. Then, 
depending on the form of the baseline, one could compare the results with a parametric 
specification. Two examples of parametric specifications are the Exponential and the 
Weibull. The former is a model with ho = 1. The exponential parameterisation assumes 
that the hazard is independent of time. One can generalise the Exponential model to the 
Weibull where
h0(t) = a t01-1, a  > 0. (3.6)
The hazard rises or falls monotonically according as a  > 1 or a  < 1. The case a = 1 
comes back to the exponential model.
The appropriate likelihood function for our sample, derived by Lancaster (1979),9 repre­
sents the likelihood of the events in the period during which the exit process is monitored, 
say Li. Therefore, we may face complete and incomplete spells. For example, in the case 
of first birth, complete spells occur when the realised time of being married with no child, 
T{, is less than the period of observation L j. Their contribution to the likelihood function 
is through the density function evaluated at that point. With incomplete spells, there are 
two cases: left censored (when the moment the couple entered into the married with no 
child state is unknown) and right censored (when it is unknown when the couple left this 
state). Normally people do not consider left censored spells (they are eliminated from 
the sample). Under the current paper, we do not face the problem of the left-censored 
spells since we know the dates of marriages and births. Usually, when one talks about 
incomplete spells it is referred to right censored ones, which contribute to the likelihood 
by the survival function evaluated at Li. Individuals who do not exit into a new state are 
censored at the interview date, when either they or their partners are sterilized, or when 
they separated, divorced or widowed.
8Ridder (1987) shows that a flexible baseline hazard is also favorable if we are concerned about 
unobserved heterogeneity.
9Also Lancaster (1990).
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The likelihood can thus be written as:
£-II/ra.*>n*(*.**> (3-7)
Nv NC
where Nu stands for the uncensored cases, while N c  for the censored cases. An alternative 
way to write the likelihood function is
n
£  = J J  (3.8)
2 = 1
where 5i is the censor indicator (takes value 1 for uncensored observations, and 0 for 
censored ones).
Equation (3.8) can be written as a log-likelihood function in terms of the hazard and 
the cumulative hazard function:10
I = ^ 2  Silnh(ti\xi) — ^ 2  H(U\xi). (3.9)
t=l i=l
The log-likelihood function is then maximised with respect to its parameters.
3.3.2 K aplan-M eier Survival Estim ation
The product limit estimator or the Kaplan-Meier estimator is based only on the data of 
the sample and is non-parametric. This estimator is computed as follows
§ ( t ) =  ^  / » , ^ d A  (310)
where rij is the risk set at time j ,  dj is the number of failures at time j ,  and the product 
is over all distinct failures times less than or equal to time j .  The risk set at time j{rij) 
is the number of spells neither completed nor censored before time j .
Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates provide the probability of remaining in the same state 
(e.g. not to have an additional child) at a particular moment of time. Despite the fact 
these estimates omit characteristics, they are a useful first step to analyse the differences 
between two groups.
10The cumulative hazard function is defined as H(t\x) =  J0* h(s\x)ds.
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3-4 The Spanish Case
3.4.1 Introduction
The starting point of the decline of the Spanish birth rate dates back to the late 1970s. 
Nowadays, fertility rates in Spain are lower than in any other country in the EU, except 
for Italy. In 2001, the US Bureau of Census reported that fertility rates were 1.15 for 
Spain, 1.18 for Italy, 1.53 for Sweden, 1.65 for the Netherlands, 1.72 for the UK and 2.06 
for the US.
Part of the sharp decrease in Spanish fertility is due to the fact that women are now 
more educated and they axe entering the labour market in larger numbers. However, 
other countries also experienced this phenomenon but their fertility rates never fell to the 
current Spanish levels (see Figure 3.11 in Appendix 3.9). This means that, although some 
percentage of the decline can be explained by mass entry into the labour force and the 
rise of education, one should also look for other possible reasons. This is what makes the 
Spanish case particularly interesting.
One hypothesis is that countries such as the US, the Netherlands and Sweden achieved a 
higher stable fertility rate (after their initial decline) than that in Spain thanks to their 
more flexible labour markets and their government policies. This means that in these 
countries being employed places less of a constraint on women having children. More­
over, they are characterised by lower unemployment rates and fewer temporary contracts, 
which allows them to marry (or cohabit) at a younger age.
Other nations have attained the ‘two-child norm’ (Hoem and Hoem (1989)) despite their 
increase in levels of education. In general, women start building a family at an older 
age compared to previous cohorts but they end up with two children. Therefore, further 
female education explains part of the decline of the Spanish fertility rates but not all. The 
impact of the level of education on the drop in fertility is strongly linked to the structure 
of the labour market: its flexibility and the number of opportunities it offers. In other 
words, if the Spanish labour market were more similar to that in other countries, then 
Spanish couples would probably form their own households before they currently do and 
educated women would end up with the same ‘two-child norm’.
The previous statement is particularly true with regards to the US. Many American 
women go to university, work and have children. They know that the market offers them 
alternative chances after the birth of their children. Spanish women perceive a greater
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opportunity cost of becoming pregnant at equivalent US educational levels since work 
opportunities for mothers are scarce. Spanish unemployment rates are huge11 and by the 
time they get a permanent contract, which facilitates stability, they are already in their 
mid-thirties.
In 1984, the government decided to liberalize the labour market because of the rise in 
unemployment (Saint-Paul (2000)). However, rather than reducing dismissal costs for 
permanent workers, which is politically difficult to implement, they increased the use of 
temporary labour contracts. The result of this reform was that temporary contracts rep­
resent 95% of new hires. Later on, it was shown that this policy had not succeeded in 
its objective of reducing unemployment. Even if initially, there was a boost in hiring, in 
the following recession (mid-nineties) employment dropped rapidly since firms could take 
advantage of the temporary contracts and easily dismiss their workers. This attempt to 
increase flexibility affected mostly young people and consequently, young potential cou­
ples. Without a stable employment contract, they were not willing to start a family.
US fertility rates stabilised with many mothers working full-time whereas in the Nether­
lands they did with many women working part-time. The Netherlands has been taken 
as an example of a country where the labour market is flexible and people can voluntar­
ily decide to work part-time. Under the latter option, women are able to combine both 
working and having children. In the Dutch society it is understood that either women or 
men take some time off in order to take care of their children, and companies are willing 
to offer this choice.
Sweden finally exemplifies the intervention of the government in childcare policy. This can 
be another alternative that helps prevent the observed Spanish tendency towards lower 
fertility. Both private and public Swedish companies are characterised by their provision 
of childcare and maternity leave. Moreover, the atmosphere in the labour market is such 
that firms are more willing to employ potential mothers.
To summarise, part of the recent drop in Spanish fertility rates can be explained by 
factors similar to those experienced by other countries such as the fast increase in fe­
male education. But the additional drop is due to the fact that educated women who 
wish to combine work with raising a family are discouraged from doing so by the labour 
market structure. The opportunity cost of having children at similar schooling levels is 
greater in Spain than in other countries because of high unemployment and labour mar­
11 The OECD reports that unemployment rates in 2001 are 10.6% for Spain and 4.7% for the US.
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ket instability. Fewer couples decide to marry, and they do it later. Furthermore, among 
married women, more remain without children since they axe afraid of losing their careers.
The aim of this section is not to explain differences in fertility across countries (this 
is done in the next Section 3.5) but to provide further knowledge about fertility decisions 
in the Spanish case. The analysis is done for two groups, the old cohort (women born 
1945-60) and young cohort (1961-77) since the role of women in society in Spain, espe­
cially as a worker, was quite different in these two periods. We also examine the role of 
men in family formation by looking at a male sample.
The outline of this Section is as follows: first, we explain the construction of variables in 
Subsection 3.4.2. Next, we describe the data in Subsections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. Subsection
3.4.5 explains the estimation and the methods applied to overcome the endogeneity be­
tween fertility and female labour supply. The following Subsection summarises the main 
results and we conclude in Subsection 3.4.7.
3.4.2 D ata  and Constructed Variables
We use the ‘Family and Fertility Survey’, a data set collected by the Centro de Investi- 
gaciones Sociologicas (CIS) between June and November of 1995. The structure of the 
questionnaire was originally produced by the United Nations and applied in Spain in 1995. 
The sample is built at the national level with individuals aged between 18 and 49 years 
old. The number of valid interviews was 4021 for women and 1991 for men, obtained with 
a percentage of responses of 83.6% and 77% respectively.
CIS questioned individuals in the 17 regions (Comunidades Autonomas) in proportion 
to the population. Each individual responds to the survey at a particular moment of 
time. Then, they are asked to give information about their past. That is, the poll asks 
every person to build up her history: for instance, the dates of her marriage, first co­
habitation, sequence of jobs (starting and ending date of her job for up to 30 different 
employments), calendar of children born and sequence of schooling (up to 10  different 
courses). In consequence, since it is a retrospective survey there will be errors coming 
from the individuals’ lack of memory. Another shortcoming of this survey is the lack of 
wages and income variables.
In particular, we are interested in building the timing of their marriage and fertility, 
their job career and schooling in order to link the paths. We want to construct a monthly 
record of whether the female is single, married without family, or has one, two or more
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children. Furthermore, we need to know the employment status and education achieved 
in each month. When the person is 15 years old, she is deemed to be in period 0. One 
month later, she is in period 1 , and one year later she is in period 12. The reason why the 
counter begins at 15 is that initially we model the duration to marriage and there were 
only three persons in our sample who had married before. These cases were discarded.
The variables used in the analysis include time-varying dummy variables that reveal the 
employment status of the woman at each month (Emplo). That is, Emplo takes value one 
if the person was employed at the beginning of each period and zero otherwise. The vari­
able Schm is one if the individual is at school and zero if not. For reasons we will explain 
later, we have constructed lag variables of Emplo and Schm for six and twelve months 
(Emplo6, Emplo 12, Schm6, Schml2). Furthermore, since we are interested in timing, we 
have dummy variables for education that tells us the highest level the person had achieved 
by that specific month. The questionnaire provides information on if a woman is studying 
a certain qualification in that month and if she succeeded. Therefore, the variable created 
takes the value of the qualification at that month if she passed the qualification, and the 
inferior level if she did not. The scale of the degrees goes from zero to six in accord with 
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Level 0 starts at the age 
of 3 , 4 or 5 and it lasts from one to three years. Category 1 in the ISCED refers to 
primary education and normally starts at the age of 5, 6  or 7 and continues five years. 
Levels 2 and 3 belong to the secondary school, to the first and second cycle (starting at 
11 or 12, and 14 or 15, respectively). Level 4 is generally achieved four years after the 
individual is 17 or 18 and it is a vocational qualification. Finally, categories 5 and 6  refer 
to a university degree and postgraduate degree, respectively. From this variable, we have 
constructed four dummy variables E l (with value one if the maximum level is 0 or 1, and 
zero otherwise), E2 (one if the individual belongs to category 2 or 3), ESVoc (one if she 
has level 4) and ESGrPo (one if she is at 5 or 6 ).
Furthermore, there are other time-varying variables that provide information about the 
occupational history of each female. First of all, in order to check if it makes a difference 
for the analysis to work part or full-time we have created the following three dummy vari­
ables: NonE is one if at that month the woman is not employed at all; FTE  is one if the 
woman is employed 35 or more hours and PTE  is one if she is employed less than 35 hours.
We believe that the evolution of unemployment has had a great impact on the fertil­
ity trajectory. The variable Unemrf links the regional female unemployment rate to a 
particular individual date. Unfortunately, regional time series are available only from
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the second quarter of 1976 (Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica). Thus, prior to this date, 
we have computed the earliest regional unemployment rates in the following way. We 
take the ratio between each regional unemployment rate and the national unemployment 
rate in the earliest quarter available (third term of 1976). The regional to national un­
employment ratio is assumed to be constant through time. Since there exists data on 
national unemployment rates, we can use these constant ratios to estimate the regional 
unemployment rates. For the same reason as Emplo and Schm, we construct Unemrf6 
and Unemrfl2.
The atmosphere of job security may also influence the decision to build a family. In 
1984, the Spanish government introduced a policy to liberalize the labour market. Fol­
lowing this reform, by 1990 temporary contracts accounted for 95% of new hires and 30% 
of employment. For this reason, we have included a variable that measures the percentage 
of female employees that have temporary contracts Tempf at national level. The lags of 
this covariate are Tempf6 and Tempf 12. This variable takes the value zero for quarters 
prior to 1984 since there were then no temporary contracts in Spain. Despite the fact 
this form of contract was initiated in 1984, there is no data available on number of em­
ployees under each type of contract before the second quarter of 1987. Thus, we have 
computed the missing values assuming the number of temporal contracts grew linearly 
from zero in the first quarter of 1984 to the number existing in the second quarter of 1987.
The rest of the explanatory variables are constant along the segment of a woman’s life 
subject to study. These are social background factors such as the number of siblings 
(Sibling), if her parents were divorced (DivPar), if she is religious (Religious) and the 
region where she lived most of her time up to age 15. The latter has been constructed 
in seven dummy variables following the NUTS categorization.12 There is no information 
on moving region. This is the reason why it is taken as a fixed covariate, enforced by the 
fact that Spain is not characterised by high migration. We incorporate a variable for the 
taste for work ( WorkTaste) that takes value one if the person was at work one year after 
she completed education. Cohort dummies are included with five years’ intervals.
When studying the timing to the first child, we add further fixed variables. Age of 
marriage AgeMa, which is accounted as months from the fifteenth birthday and education 
achieved by the partner (E1P, E2P, ESVocP and ESGrPoP) in dummy variables.
12NW (Galicia, Principado de Asturias, Cantabria); NE (Pais Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja, Aragon); C 
(Castilla Leon, Castilla la Mancha, Extremadura); CMadrid (Comunidad de Madrid); E (Catalunya, 
Comunidad Valenciana, Baleares); S (Andalucia, Murcia); Canaries (Canarias).
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In the analysis of timing to the second child, apart from the partner’s education, there is 
the age at first birth (AgeAtlC), the duration between the marriage and the first birth 
(M enTIC) and a dummy variable equal to 1 when the first child was a girl (Girl).
Finally, when looking at the third birth, the extra variables are age at second birth 
(AgeAt2C), the duration of the previous spell (MenT2C) and two dummy variables that 
take value 1 if the first two children were girls ( TwoGirls) or boys ( TwoBoys).
In the analysis of the probability of leaving the single state, individuals are censored 
at the date of the interview if they were still single. Period zero corresponds to the fif­
teenth birthday and the unit of time is months. Individuals who married before that time 
have been removed from the sample. For the estimation of the probability of having a 
first child, individuals were censored at the date of the interview, or at the time one of the 
members of the couple had had an operation to make pregnancy impossible. They were 
also censored at the time they separated, divorced or widowed. The same criterion was 
followed for the second and third child. Mothers who gave birth to twins were dropped 
out from the sample as well as births before the marriage.
One might think that, rather than being employed or not some time before the preg­
nancy or marriage, what really matters is the way a woman perceives her chances of 
getting back to work. This is the reason why we have constructed a variable that tells us 
the probability that a woman will be employed given her education and labour market be­
haviour. In order to compute the chances of this re-employment proxy, we have estimated 
a probit. The dependent variable takes value 1 if employed and 0 otherwise. Ideally, we 
would like to be able to set the dependent variable 0  when the person is unemployed (i.e. 
to compute the probability of employment given she is in the labour force), but in the 
data one is not able to distinguish between inactivity and unemployment.
Table 3.1 summarises the number of subjects, both who exit13 and are censored, for 
the old cohort (born in 1945-60). Table 3.2 gives the same information for the young 
cohort (born in 1961-77).
13Individuals who exit are those who move from one state to another (e.g. from single to married). The 
censored individuals are those who you stop observing before they exit.
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Table 3.1: Number of Subjects, Exits and Censored in Each State, Cohort 1945-60 — 
Spanish Females
Marriage 1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth
Total 1150 1041 1007 824
Exits 1072 1011 857 338
Censored 68 30 150 486
Table 3.2: Number of Subjects, Exits and Censored in Each State, Cohort 1961-77 — 
Spanish Females
Marriage 1st Birth 2nd Birth 3rd Birth
Total 2228 1024 821 436
Exits 1082 829 444 74
Censored 1146 195 377 362
3.4.3 D escriptive Statistics
Data show a postponing in the age of marriage. In the old cohort, by the age of 30, 93.4% 
of them were married whereas only 83.0% of the cohort 1961-65 was married at this age.14
There has been a substantial increase in Spanish female qualifications. For example, 
only 3.7% of women born between 1951 and 1955 had a university degree, whereas 11.1% 
of women born between 1961 and 1965 did .15
There is a positive correlation between education and age of marriage, which is much 
stronger in the young cohort. Data show also a rise in the levels of education for each age 
of marriage. For instance, among women who married between 15 and 19 years old, 12.9% 
did not finished the primary school in the old cohort. This percentage is only 5.3% for 
the young cohort. Among women who married between 25-29 years old, 6.1% obtained 
a university degree in the old group whereas 19.8% did so in the young group.
If one compares the two cohorts by levels of education, women with the same level of 
schooling tend to marry later in the young cohort. For instance, among graduate women, 
52% of the old cohort marries between 20 and 25 years old, and 28% did between 25 and 
30 years old. However, among the young cohort, 25% of graduate females get married in
14Note that for the calculation of this percentage we take a sub-sample of what we call young cohort 
(1961-77), since only women born before 1965 are observed beyond 30 years.
15Table 3.19 in Appendix 3.8 shows the evolution of female qualifications across cohorts.
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the age interval 20-25 and 50% do so in the age interval 25-30. There are two possible 
explanations. First, one of the targets of women born before the 60s was to get married 
(at all education levels) because of the traditional society. Second, nowadays women are 
more demanding in their career aspirations and they wish to settle into their jobs before 
getting married. The Spanish labour market in the 80s and 90s did not help because of its 
huge unemployment rates and unstable contracts. This delays entry to the labour market 
by graduate women and thus postpones marriage.
In both cohorts, higher education is linked to longer duration between marriage and 
first child. The main difference between the two cohorts comes in the levels of education 
2, 3 and 4, respectively secondary school first level, secondary school second level and 
vocational studies. These education levels have a higher proportion of individuals that 
take more than two years to give birth from the date of marriage. For example, 7.1% of 
women with level 4 have a duration from marriage to first child longer than 2 years in the 
old cohort, whereas 51.9% do so in the young cohort.
In the relationship education vs. spell to second birth, those with the highest levels of 
schooling tend to spread the births over more than two years. As expected, high edu­
cated females delay first birth longer after marriage, this effect being stronger in Cohort 
1961-77. Interestingly, the graduate group experiences an increase in the proportion of 
women having the second birth less than two years after the first one. For example, 93% 
of graduate mothers took more than two years after the first child to have their second 
one in Cohort 1945-60. The percentage is 61% for Cohort 1961-77.
Figure 3.1 represents the proportion of women who had the first child within two years of 
marriage by the age at marriage. Younger cohorts seem to have shorter durations when 
the age of marriage is less than 19 years old. From that age on, the old cohorts show 
a greater proportion of married women having children within two years of their marriage.
Hazard models allow us to search for the main features that influence the timing of births 
and compare among cohorts. Note that the picture refers to women who are married. 
Spanish women still generally marry before having children. In the old cohort 2.5% of 
the women had a baby before they got married. In the young cohort, the percentage is 
5%. It is also interesting to study the timing to marriage, since fewer women get married 
and those who do, marry later. This plays an important role in fertility since fecundity 
has its peak at early ages. The later a couple cohabit together, the later they will have 
children and the shorter will be the fertile spell.
CHAPTER 3. THE TIMING OF FAMILY FORMATION  44
Figure 3.1: Proportion of Spanish Females having a First Birth Within Two Years of 
Marriage
 e Cohort 1945-60  e,----- Cohort 1961-77
100
$ 60 o>
Bc
£  40
20
23
Age at Marriage
25 27 29
Female labour force participation influences family formation. In the old cohort, among 
those women who had at least one child at the time of the interview, 37% were employed 
when they married. For the sample 1961-1965,16 45% of women with at least one child 
were employed. If we focus on employed women, 98% of those who were employed in 
high skill profile jobs at the time of the marriage had at least one child by the time of 
the interview in the old cohort. This percentage is only 82% among women born between 
1960 and 1965. Among low skill profile jobs, the percentages of women who had at least 
one child by the time of the interview are respectively 96% and 92% for the old and 
young cohort. There is a slight increasing tendency to remain childless. 64% of women 
in the old sample who were working in high profile jobs at the time of their first birth 
had a second birth in the old cohort whereas 45% had at least two children in the cohort 
1961-1965. The percentages for low skill profile jobs are respectively 81% and 65% for 
the two cohorts. This shows a reduction of fertility among employed people or, at least, 
a postponement of family formation since the young cohort for this comparison is aged 
between 30 and 35 at the interview. Women employed in more skill demanding jobs have 
fewer children.
Despite the fact fertility has dropped, people in the two cohorts do not report significant 
differences in the ideal number of children (Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.8 summarises the
16In these statistics, we omit relevant information in the computation of number of children such as 
how old the woman is. For a fair comparison we take only individuals aged 30 or more at the interview 
for group 1961-1977.
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Figure 3.2: Number of Children, Married Women at 35 Years Old — Spanish Females
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women’s preferences). Many women in the young cohort consider two children as an ideal 
number but they do not have them. Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of married women 
who have any, one, two, three and four or more children at 35 years old for three cohorts 
(1950, 1955 and 1960). The plot tells us that the percentage of women with any or only 
one child has increased whereas the percentage for three and four has diminished.
3.4 .4  K aplan-M eier Survival G raphs: a C oh ort C om parison
Figure 3.3 represents the Kaplan-Meier Survival in the single state estimates for the two 
cohorts.17 The young cohort shows a higher survival rate in the single state for all £, which 
reinforces our strategy of splitting the analysis between the two cohorts. This enables us 
to seek changes in the social and economic determinants of family formation across these 
two age groups. The same exercise is repeated for surviving in the married childless state 
(Figure 3.4), where time zero corresponds to the date of each woman’s marriage. Figure
3.5 and Figure 3.6 show the Kaplan-Meier Survival estimation in the state of married 
with one and two children, respectively. These pictures provide evidence that the young 
cohort has a greater probability to survive in each state at all durations (note that these 
graphs do not incorporate the effect of the covariates). This is particularly true for the 
survival rate in the single state and the married with two children state. Therefore, we 
observe that the two cohorts behave differently, especially in their decision when to marry 
and the timing to the third child.
17The formulation for the Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates is given in Subsection 3.3.2.
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Figure 3.3: Survival in the Single State, By Cohort — Spanish Females
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Figure 3.4: Survival in the Married Childless State, By Cohort — Spanish Females
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As mentioned in Subsection 3.4.2, the survey was carried out in 1995 and historical in­
formation was collected retrospectively. This implies that older women in 199518 are in 
general observed over a longer time, which means that the number of censored individuals 
with respect to the total is expected to be larger in the young cohort. We would like to 
measure if differences in observed periods could lead to erroneous statements. In order to 
try to account for this effect, we have replicated the old cohort’s Kaplan-Meier estima­
tions by ‘artificially’ truncating data as the young cohort, building the histories for them 
only up to 1980 (even if women were questioned in 1995). Thus, the individuals who are
18Sample aged 18-49.
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Figure 3.5: Survival in the Married With One Child State, By Cohort — Spanish Females
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Figure 3.6: Survival in the Married With Two Children State, By Cohort — Spanish 
Females
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observed further in both cohorts are aged 35. This ‘artificial’ exercise shows that these 
two groups still fall apart. Kaplan-Meier Survival curves for the old and young cohort are 
even more spread out, especially towards the third child. These graphs are in Appendix 
3.9 (Figures 3.12 to 3.15).
3.4.5 E stim ation
The decision to get married is taken some time before the big day. This is why most time 
varying variables are taken six months before the current time in the estimation for the
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hazard of marriage. These are: Schm6, Emplo6, Unemrf6 and Tempf6. Female education 
is also a time-varying variable. Nevertheless, its value in the estimation is not lagged 
since it can be accurately predicted at the time of decision. The decision to give birth 
is also taken some months before the child is born. Thus, there are also lag variables 
for the estimation of the birth timing: Schml2, Emplol2, Unemrfl2 and Tempfl2.19 By 
taking the lags of labour market covariates we also reduce the concern of fertility and 
employment being simultaneously decided.20
Note that the variables Tempf6 and Tempf 12 are likely to be picking up a trend in 
the marriage or births timing since they only vary across time. In order to assess this 
effect, we have re-estimated all the hazards for the young cohort (where these variables 
are included) with a time trend. We indeed find that in those regressions where the pro­
portion of temporary contracts had a negative and significant impact on the hazard, the 
coefficients were reduced once the trend was added. We also learn that this trend variable 
is not significant in any of the female hazard estimations, whereas it shows a significant 
and negative impact in the timing of marriage and first birth for the male sample. We 
explain more about this in Subsection 3.4.6.
One could be concerned about the fact that the decision of marriage and first birth 
are endogenous. Some research has been done in order to measure the importance of this 
effect. For example, Baizan et al. (2001) use a simultaneous hazard equations approach 
in order to overcome potential bias caused by the correlation between the process of first 
birth and union formation.
In order to validate how the mutual dependence of the decision could have an effect 
on our results, we have undertaken the estimation by taking time zero 7 months after 
the marriage. In this case, we select those women whose marriage was definitely not 
simultaneous to the birth. We find that our estimates are not significantly different from 
the estimation where the counter is taken at the marriage date. Thus, we claim that we 
do not have to be preoccupied that our results are misleading because of this potential 
endogeneity.
We believe that this is supported by Baizan et al. (2001) since they find minor changes 
in their economic explanatory variables once they control for an unobserved correlation 
process component. For instance, in their specifications (with and without allowing for
19We have also tried with a lag of nine months but the results were basically the same.
20 Later we discuss how we tackle the problem of endogeneity between fertility and female labour supply.
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mutual dependence), employment reduces the hazard of first birth and marriage, being 
the absolute value greater under the simultaneous model. Despite the fact that they show 
that correlation matters, the interpretation of their economic covariates is more or less 
unchanged.
Another drawback is the endogeneity between fertility and female labour supply.21 This 
endogeneity is generated by the fact that the omitted characteristics will impact on both 
work and childbearing. For example, the omitted variable ‘taste for home-life’ or its op­
posite ‘taste for work’ will tend to have opposite effects on work and childbearing. Since 
they are omitted, they will thus generate a spurious negative addition to the coefficient 
on employment in a fertility equation even if the employment variable is dated prior to 
the birth .22 The importance of this will depend on the extent to which variations in 
employment are driven by tastes as opposed to job-rationing in the labour market.23
If the former is important, then one way of capturing the ‘taste for work’ is to include 
a variable which reflects this, namely a dummy for whether or not the woman worked 
immediately upon leaving full-time education ( WorkTaste). Of course, this is also an 
‘endogenous variable’, but that is the point. Its purpose is to capture the effects of the 
omitted ‘taste for work’ variable. We are not interested in its coefficient, merely in the 
impact of recent employment (Emplol2) on fertility given we control for work tastes. 
Obviously this new variable may not be a complete control. But it should help.
Finally, if employment is fundamentally determined by job-rationing, it will not help 
since it will not capture tastes for work. But this does not m atter since it will not be 
needed, employment being exogenous in this case. The additional variable will simply be 
insignificant.
The estimation of the parameters for the family timing for the female sample has been 
done under two different perspectives, which we call Reduced and Structural form. In 
the male sample we only use the former. We believe that one of the main variables that 
determine each demographic decision (overall in the young cohort) is the expectation of
21 For instance, Angrist and Evans (1998) argue that female employment and childbearing are endoge­
nous.
22Notice that women who decide to have a child might drop employment before the birth if they are 
home-oriented. This is why it is important to lag the employment status variable 12 months. We also 
estimate the hazard with a lag of 18 and 24 months to ensure that we account for this possibility.
23Job-rationing in the labour market definitely plays a main role in women’s employment status. In 
order to test this, we have regressed women’s employment status on personal and labour market char­
acteristics. We have found that female regional unemployment rates are very important in explaining 
women’s employment status.
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being employed at each time (PEmplo). That is, if a woman decides to have a child, she is 
concerned about the probability she will remain employed at birth and after. Among sev­
eral features, her expectation (PEmplo) depends primarily on her education and lagged 
employment characteristics. (PEmplo) is informative since it gives women’s perception 
of tier chances of being employed at each time.
(PEmplo) is a time-varying variable, which results from a probit estimation of the prob­
ability to be employed given individual and labour market characteristics at each time. 
The dependent variable takes value one if the person is employed at that period and zero 
otherwise. The covariates for the estimation of (PEmplo) in the analysis of the timing to 
get married are the following:24 regions (NW, NE, CMadrid, C, E, Canaries), Siblings, Di- 
vPar, education level (E2, ESVoc and ESGrPo, with omitted E l), Religious, WorkTaste, 
cohorts, Schm6, Emplo6, Unemrf6 and Tempf6. Lag variables of 12 months instead of 6 
months are used in the analysis of timing to give birth. There axe also other demographic 
variables such as the age of marriage (AgeMa) as well as the partner’s education.
The parameters of this probit estimation permit calculation of the individual probability 
of being employed each time: PEmplo = f(/3x).
For explanatory purposes, we rewrite the previous equation as:
PEmplo = f(/3x +  (3eEmplo6 +  j3uU nem rf6) (3-11)
where x  is the vector of all explanatory variables except Emplo6 and Unemrf6. This 
result is used as an explanatory variable in the estimation of the structural form.
Structured Form
The estimation of the exit rate in structural form incorporates PEmplo  as explanatory 
variable, together with many other covariates (a;).
hs(t\x, PEmplo) = ho(t)exp(ax +  7  PEmplo) (3-12)
The estimation of PEmplo  and hs share all variables except two (Emplo6 and Unemrf6) 
that we use to identify the equation. By doing this, we consider that these two covariates 
affect the hazard only indirectly through its effect on the chances of being employed at 
each time (PEmplo). This is of interest since it allows us to distinguish between the
24The description of each variable is done in Subsection 3.4.2 and in Appendix 3.7.
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direct and indirect effect (through their influence on PEmplo) of the different variables. 
The Reduced form  will only give the net effect of the two.
Reduced Form
Rather than introducing directly the variable PEmplo  into the estimation, the reduced 
form estimates a model that uses as explanatory variables those elements who determine 
PEmplo.
hr(t\x, Emplo6, UnemrfQ) = h0(t)exp(6x +  6eEmplo6 4 - 6uU nemrf6) (3.13)
Thus, the parameters of these variables provide joint net information about their direct 
and indirect impact on the hazard. For example, we may have that higher education is 
related to higher exit in the estimation of the structural form (aed > 0 ) but the opposite 
in the reduced form (6ed < 0). This means that higher level of education is negative in 
the reduced form estimation because it impacts positively on the expectation of being 
employed and the expectation has a negative effect on the hazard ( 7  < 0 ). Once we 
control for it, higher education actually increases the chances of giving birth. Note that 
tied ~  oted +  7 Ped where 6ed is the estimate for education in the reduced form, aed is the 
estimate for education in the structural form, 7  is the estimate for PEmplo  in the struc­
tural form and /?ed is the estimate for education in the estimation of PEmplo . In this 
example, the negative indirect effect of education on the exit rate offsets the direct and 
positive one, giving a negative sign in the reduced form estimation.
The model is estimated under the reduced and structural form for the two cohorts. 
3.4.6 Econom etric R esults
The explanatory variables are the same in the estimation of both old and young cohort, 
except for Tempf6, which tells the percentage of female employees with a temporary con­
tract at national level for each period. This covariate is only present in the estimation 
for the young cohort. The reason is that these contracts only exist from 1984 onwards. 
Therefore, the majority of people in the old cohort have a zero value, making this variable 
meaningless. Once the variable is removed, the sign and significance of the rest of the 
variables is not modified, their coefficients slightly change and the comparison between 
the two groups is fair.
In none of the estimations do the sign of the coefficients of common variables between
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reduced and structural form change, so both direct and net effect discussed in Subsection
3.4.5 go in the same direction.
Tables 3.3-3.6  report both the coefficient and the hazard ratio for the Reduced model. 
Analogous tables for the Structural form  are in Tables 3.15 to 3.18 in Appendix 3.8.1. 
Exponentiated individual coefficients can be interpreted as the ratio of the hazards for 
a one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. For example, if the hazard ratio on
variable l-if-religious is 1.26, then religious women face a hazard 26% greater than non­
religious and the hazard ratio=exp(coefficient of estimation) is 1.26.
In Subsection 3.3.2 we discussed the concern about the fact that the length of the his­
tory is longer in the old cohort, which causes the number of censored observations to be 
proportionally greater in the young cohort. Although the estimation takes this issue into 
account, one would like to check if the disparity in period of observation leads to different 
conclusions. This is why we have re-estimated for the old cohort following these individ­
uals only up to 1980 (which makes the path equivalent to the young cohort). Results 
show that the coefficients are not significantly different from each other when applying 
the ‘normal’25 and the ‘artificial’ specification in the timing to marriage, first and second 
child. However, some of the estimates are significantly different in the estimation of the 
timing to the third child.26 Fortunately, as we will explain later, results in the ‘artificial’ 
estimation do not contradict our statements. When different from the ‘normal’ estima­
tion (only in the timing towards the third child), conclusions drawn from the ‘normal’
estimation are reinforced rather than reversed.
Female Sample Analysis
Timing to Marriage
Table 3.3 shows the results from the hazard of marriage. Our regional dummies suggest 
that a female from S  (South: Andalucfa and Murcia) 27 is slightly more likely to get mar­
ried in the next month compared to other areas, except for Canaries and the E. However, 
this negative effect is only significant for NE  in Cohort 1945-60. These differences in 
regions are in line with the fact that the South of Spain is the most traditional area of 
the country.
Individual social background is captured by the following variables: Siblings, DivPar
25We call ‘normal’ specification the one that uses all available information (up to 1995). The ‘artificial’ 
specification is the one that makes the fiction of observing the old cohort only up to 1980.
26This is expected since it is in this state where the two observed periods fall more apart.
27The definition of the regional categorical variables is done in Subsection 3.4.2.
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Table 3.3: Timing to Marriage — Spanish Females
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.850 0.127 0.962 0.136
Regions NE 0.937 0.118 0.710** 0.129
Omitted, CMadrid 0.963* 0.116 0.799 0.134
Category C 0.977 0.111 1.082 0.109
is S E 1.016 0.099 0.893 0 .1 0 1
Canaries 1.276 0.175 1.083 0.163
Siblings 1.009 0.013 1.016 0.015
DivPar Yes=i 0.904 0 .2 0 2 1.132 0.143
Religious Y es=i 1.261** 0 .1 0 1 1.324** 0.087
WorkTaste Y es=i 1.087 0.073 0.755** 0.071
Female E2 0.935 0.069 0.769** 0.079
Education ESVoc 0.804* 0.134 0.684** 0.138
Omitted E l ESGrPo 0.975** 0.177 0.630** 0.144
Schm6 Yes=l 0.480** 0.148 0.258** 0.113
Emplo6 Yes=l 0.827** 0.073 1.271** 0.071
Unemrf6 0.969** 0.008 0.989** 0.006
Tempf6 0.991* 0.005
Cohorts 1950-54 1.037 0.088
Omitted 1945-49 and 1955-60 1.570** 0.109
1961-65 for Old and 1966-70 0.962 0.105
Young respectively 1971-77 0.803 0.187
Log likelihood -6657.6 -7148.8
N  subjects 1150 2228
N observations 133006 214516
* Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
and Religious. Neither the number of siblings nor the fact of having divorced parents are 
significant determinants of the hazard rate. However, a religious woman has a hazard 
rate 26% greater than a non-religious at any time in the old cohort and 32% greater in 
the young cohort.
Education level postpones marriage in both cohorts, especially in Cohort 1961-77. For 
instance, at each time and controlling for the other variables, in the young cohort, a 
woman with a graduate or post-graduate degree has an exit rate which is 37% lower than 
that of somebody who only achieved primary school.
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Another variable that has a strong and significant negative impact on the exit rate to 
marriage is the dummy that reports at each time if the individual was or not at school 
six months before (Schm6) the period under consideration. In Cohort 1945-60, a woman 
who was enrolled in education six months before, has an exit rate around 48% that of a 
woman who was not. In Cohort 1961-77, this negative effect is even greater with a hazard 
ratio of 0.26. This is not surprising since students are unable to live independently due 
to the lack of own resources.
Taste for work is not significant in Cohort 1945-60 but it impacts negatively in Co­
hort 1961-77. The covariate that specifies at each time if the individual was employed 
or not six months before (Emplo6) has a totally different effect on the hazard in the two 
cohorts. In Cohort 1945-60, this variable has a negative and significant effect on the 
exit rate, with a hazard rate equal to 0.83. By contrast, this variable has a positive and 
significant effect on the hazard in Cohort 1961-77, with a hazard rate equal to 1.27. That 
is, old-cohort employed women (lagged six months) have less chances of marrying in the 
next month at all times. In the young cohort, to be employed increases substantially the 
chances of getting married. Baizan et al. (2001) find that being employed reduces the 
intensity of marriage in their sample. However, they do not distinguish between the two 
cohorts and apparently the effect of the old cohort seems to prevail if the whole group is 
merged. The advantage of our study is that it allows us to analyse whether some variables 
have a different impact in family formation in these two well-defined groups.
Theory predicts opposite effects of women in employment on marriage. On the one hand, 
one might expect a positive coefficient since female employment actually increases eco­
nomic resources that are needed to form a family. On the other hand, it might have a 
negative effect, especially in more traditional societies, if employment means female inde­
pendence. Our results show evidence that the former (positive) prediction might be valid 
for Cohort 1961-77 whereas the latter (negative) prediction might be applied to Cohort 
1945-60. This could imply a change of mentality in the Spanish society. Before, the main 
target of a woman was to get married and they abandoned their job prospect in order to 
do it (employment was a signal of self-reliance and was conceived as a ‘bad’ characteristic 
for marriage). Nowadays, women study further and they want to develop a job career. 
Thus, they do not marry before they are settled in the labour market. Simultaneously, 
there has also been a generalised increase in the demand for a high standard of living and 
an increase in housing costs, which makes the salary of the woman necessary as a source 
of income in the household. This agrees with the view that female employment is required 
to leave the parental home since it increases resources available and, consequently affects
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positively the hazard of marriage.
We would also like to point out that the dummy Emplo6 might be capturing different ef­
fects in the two age groups. The old cohort is characterised by lower unemployment rates 
around union formation compared to their young cohort counterparts.28 This means that 
mon-employment (i.e. Emplo6=0) in Cohort 1945-60 is more likely to refer to inactivity, 
whereas non-employment in Cohort 1961-77 entails both unemployment and inactivity. 
The latter might contribute in explaining the opposite sign since in the young cohort there 
might be not only a choice option but also an economic issue.
The Structural form  estimation informs about how the six-month in advance forecast 
of being employed affects the hazard. This variable is estimated to influence negatively 
in the old cohort and positively in the young one. This means that the higher the ex­
pectancies of working in six months time, the smaller is the probability of marrying next 
month in the old cohort and, the greater is this probability in the young one.
Regional female unemployment rates (Unemrf6) describe the labour market risks and 
opportunities. We would expect this variable to reduce the likelihood of marriage. The 
coefficient for this estimate is negative and significant for both cohorts. For example, 
an increase of one percentage point in the female unemployment rate reduces the hazard 
rate by 1.1% in Cohort 1961-77. This shows evidence that the more unstable the labour 
market, the lower the chances a woman will marry in the next month. Another poten­
tial reason why the Spanish marry so late is the lack of job security. The latter aspect 
is enforced with the variable that reveals the percentage of female employees that work 
on temporary contracts ( Tempf6). This covariate is negative and significant. That is, 
the greater the proportion of women working on temporary contracts, the smaller is the 
probability of marriage. However, as explained in Subsection 3.4.5, the variable Tempf6 
is likely to be picking up some of the trend in the timing of marriage. If we include a time 
trend in the estimation, we find that this variable becomes less negative (the new hazard 
ratio is 0.997 instead of 0.991).
We also control for five-year cohort bands. In our old cohort estimation, women born 
between 1955-1960 are more likely to exit into marriage. In our young cohort, latter gen­
erations reduce the intensity of the hazard, although the coefficients are not significant.
28The proportion of women employed, unemployed and inactive has changed substantially since 1970. 
For example, 22% married women aged 20-30 were employed in 1977, 1% were unemployed and 77% 
vere inactive. In 1987, the rates were 30%, 13% and 57%, respectively. In 1997, the proportions were 
40%, 20% and 40%.
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Timing to First Child — Spanish Females
Table 3.4 shows that region does not have a significant effect on the probability of having 
a  first child in the next month in Cohort 1945-60. However, it has an impact on Cohort 
1961-77, where all regions have a lower probability of exiting relative to the S. NW, NE, 
CMadrid and E  have a significant coefficient. This is again probably due to the fact 
that the South has remained more traditional and people might be using less effective 
contraceptive methods. Data from the sample seem to corroborate this hypothesis. For 
example, without differentiating among regions, 71% of women took contraceptive pre­
cautions in their first complete intercourse in the young cohort. However, 63% did so in 
the South. By contrast, 75% took precautions in the East and 82% in the North East. 
The equivalent percentages were much lower in the old cohort with an overall of 35% 
using contraceptive methods in the first intercourse. In the South, the percentage was 
26% and in the East and North East was 47% and 32% respectively.
The number of siblings increases significantly the hazard of first child in Cohort 1945-60. 
Parents separation has no impact in either of the two cohorts.29 Finally, Religious is 
positive in both cohorts although it is only significant in the young cohort. In the latter 
group, a woman who defines herself as religious has a hazard rate 32% greater than a 
woman who does not. Nowadays, being religious seems to create more disparity among 
people. That is, those who define themselves as religious do indeed subscribe to a partic­
ular ideology. In the old cohort, people (religious or not) were more generally influenced 
by the traditional society and the fact of calling themselves religious did not imply that 
they were more likely to follow traditional patterns of behaviour than the remainder.
Demography foresees that age of marriage is negatively related to the timing of the first 
child. Our results partly corroborate this expectation since we obtain negative (although 
insignificant) signs. In the old cohort, an extra year on the age of marriage has a hazard 
ratio of 0.99. That is, each year delaying the marriage reduces the exit rate by 1% (ceteris 
paribus). In the young cohort, the ratio is 0.94.
Female education is strongly linked to fertility trajectory. If a woman has achieved a 
graduate or postgraduate degree, she has a high value in the labour market. This in­
creases her opportunity cost of building a family since having a child implies taking some 
time off. The awareness of this opportunity cost is augmented if the labour market is 
neither promising (i.e. high unemployment rates) nor flexible, which enlarges women’s
29Notice that the number of disruptions in Spain in the period covered is still rather low (2% in the 
old cohort and 4% in the young one).
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Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.958 0.132 0.646** 0.159
Regions NE 0.983 0.124 0.715** 0.156
Omitted. CMadrid 1.028 0.121 0.620** 0.157
Category C 1.222* 0.114 0.874 0.125
is S E 0.889 0.105 0.669** 0.118
Canaries 1.096 0.183 0.957 0.181
Siblings 1.035** 0.014 0.999 0.017
DivPar Y es=i 0.871 0.212 0.995 0.108
Religious Y e s - i 1.006 0.106 1.315** 0.105
AgeMa 0.991 0.014 0.940 0.022
WorkTaste Yes=i 0.993 0.070 0.759** 0.092
Female E2 0.967 0.070 0.900 0.099
Education E3Voc 1.288 0.152 0.659** 0.184
Omitted E l ESGrPo 0.813 0.151 0.651** 0.203
Partner E2P 0.932 0.141 0.956 0.229
Education ESVocP 0.994 0.199 1.082 0.334
Omitted E1P ESGrPoP 0.731* 0.182 1.050 0.257
Schml2 Yes—1 0.873 0.177 0.972 0.145
Emplol2 Y es=l 0.829** 0.070 0.854** 0.076
Unemrfl2 0.992 0.007 0.988* 0.007
Tempf 12 1.001 0.005
Cohorts 1950-54 0.973 0.092
Omitted 1945-49 and 1955-60 1.034 0.117
Cohort 1961—65 for Old and 1966-70 0.810 0.115
Young respectively 1971-77 1.172 0.245
Log likelihood -6103.6 -4958.4
N subjects 1041 1024
N observations 26176 25452
’"Significant at 10% level. 
’"’"Significant at 5% level.
professional career risk aversion of motherhood. While a higher education level is not 
significant for the timing of first child in Cohort 1945-60, it has a negative and signif­
icant impact on the probability of having a first child next month in Cohort 1961-77. 
For example, a woman with an undergraduate or postgraduate degree has a hazard rate 
that is 65% of that of a woman with a primary qualification. This shows evidence that 
the opportunity cost increases with the level of education, particularly when females are
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more attached to the labour force (i.e. Cohort 1961-77). Educational enrolment lagged 
twelve months is not significant since most women get married once they have abandoned 
education.
Being employed lagged twelve months reduces the hazard of first child30 in both co­
horts, ceteris paribus. The hazard ratio is 0.83 and 0.85 for the old and young cohort 
respectively. There are theoretical opinions that predict the impact of employment on 
fertility in both directions. On the one hand, female employment raises resources and 
should increase the likelihood of first child. On the other hand, employed women find 
it hard to combine work and family and they postpone childbearing. The latter is espe­
cially true if policies that facilitate reconciliation between family and work are missing 
and if there is both instability and inflexibility in the labour market. Our results suggest 
that female employment is a brake on family formation in Spain. This has political impli­
cations for the Spanish government who could implement broader family-friendly policies.
In Subsection 3.4.5 we discussed the general concern about the endogeneity of fertil­
ity and labour supply. In order to overcome it, we lag31 the employment covariate and 
we control for the individuals’ work preferences with the variable WorkTasteP  Those 
women with higher preference for work are less likely to have a first child in the next 
month, being strongly significant in the young cohort. We believe that this variable re­
duces the possibility that the impact of employment status Emplol2 is misleading.
Intuition indicates that women who work part-time are more family oriented. This is 
why the model was also estimated taking into account job status: i.e. part-time vs. full­
time. The effect on the probability of having a child in the next month was found to be 
similar under the two categories.33 Recent work by De la Rica, Ariza and Ugidos (2002) 
using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) finds that part-time (com­
pared to full-time) does not increase intensities of Spanish first birth. This is due to the 
fact that part-time jobs are not common in Spain and in any case they are typically not
30This result is consistent with other empirical studies (for example, Kalwij (2000) for the Netherlands, 
Hoem and Hoem (1989) for Sweden and Harvey (1996) for the US).
31 We also lag employment 18 and 24 months to exclude the possibility of home-oriented women leaving 
employment far before the birth, which will reverse the causality. We find that our employment covariate 
lagged 18 is negative and significant in both cohorts. The employment covariate lagged 24 months reduces 
the hazard to first child but it is not significant. We believe that there is evidence for employment causing 
postponement of fertility since employment status far ahead from the birth date affects negatively the 
hazard.
32The preference for work is a dummy value that equals 1 if the individual is working one year after 
completing school and 0 otherwise.
33Since we found no significant difference between part and full-time we decided to merge them into 
one single category (employed).
CHAPTER 3. THE TIMING OF FAMILY FORMATION 59
based on a voluntary decision. The percentages of part-time jobs vary a lot in Europe. 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain are those EU countries where this typology 
is less frequently used. By contrast, in the North and Centre of Europe they are much 
more prevalent. In the latter group, the government’s intervention to reconcile family and 
work, rather than the production structure, has favoured the development of part-time 
jobs (Consejo Economico y Social (1996)). Moreover, among those countries where part- 
time jobs are most frequent (e.g. Great Britain and the Netherlands), most people who 
work part-time prefer this to full-time work (e.g. Nickell and Van Ours (2000)). We would 
expect to find that these two job statuses influence differently the chances of childbearing 
in countries with more flexibility in working hours. De la Rica et al. (2002) compare 
the effect of working status on first birth in Great Britain, the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Spain. They find evidence that Spain is the country with the largest part-time negative 
effect on fertility.
Theory by Becker (1960) predicts that the husbands’ income should impact positively 
on fertility. Ariza and Ugidos (2002) estimate the timing of first birth in Spain with 
‘Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares’ (Spanish Household Survey Panel Data). 
They find that partner’s income affects positively the hazard. Income information is miss­
ing in our data and we use husbands’ education as a  proxy since one expects that higher 
education is linked to higher wage. Results from the estimation show that this variable 
is not significant for first birth.
Female regional unemployment rates have a negative effect on the timing to the first birth, 
with significance in the young cohort. An increase of one percentage point in female un­
employment in a particular region in Cohort 1961-77 reduces the hazard rate by 1.2%. 
Therefore, precarious labour market conditions are translated into fertility postponement. 
Recall that, ceteris paribus, being at work postpones births and high unemployment rates 
also delay childbearing. The latter might sound controversial but it is not. It means that 
given two women with the same characteristics except for their regional unemployment 
rates, the woman with lowest unemployment rate has a greater probability of having a 
birth since it is easier for her to have a job whenever she wants. Potential mothers care not 
only of their employment status but also in their expected possibilities to work afterwards.
Even though the proportion of female temporary contracts had a negative influence in 
the timing to marriage, it does not have an impact on first birth.
The Structural model shows that the forecast of being employed in twelve months time
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generates a negative and significant sign in both cohorts. This suggests that combining 
family and work does not seem complementary tasks for Spanish mothers.
Timing To Second Child — Spanish Females
Table 3.5: Timing to Second Child — Spanish Females
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.628** 0.152 0.571** 0.244
Regions NE 0.626** 0.138 0.914 0.219
Omitted CMadrid 0.835** 0.132 0.565 0.238
Category C 0.825 0.125 0.678** 0.167
is S E 0.754** 0.115 0.687** 0.171
Canaries 0.862 0.194 0.670 0.260
Siblings 1.020 0.014 1.031 0.023
DivPar Y es=i 0.967 0.233 0.987 0.141
Religious Yes=i 1.111 0.125 1.087 0.153
AgeAtlC 0.986 0.011 1.017 0.031
M enTIC 0.839** 0.031 0.950 0.046
Girl Y es=l 0.997 0.073 0.875 0.099
WorkTaste Yes=i 1.013 0.073 0.923 0.104
Female E2 1.126 0.081 0.744** 0.124
Education ESVoc 1.469** 0.168 0.945 0.254
Omitted E l ESGrPo 1.077 0.207 1.663* 0.271
Partner E2P 1.053 0.147 0.951 0.284
Education ESVocP 1.006 0.222 0.955 0.395
Omitted E l ESGrPoP 1.124 0.199 1.116 0.328
Schml2 Yes—1 0.770 0.275 0.648 0.370
Emplol2 Yes=l 0.726** 0.083 0.812* 0.107
Unemrfl2 0.993 0.007 0.989* 0.010
Tempfl2 0.992 0.007
Cohorts
Omitted 1945-49 and 
1961-65 for Old and 
Young respectively
1950-54
1955-60
1966-70
1971-77
0.937
0.848
0.107
0.143
0.942
0.806
0.173
0.349
Log likelihood - 5220.4 2519.0
N  subjects 1007 821
N observations 58893 36986
* Significant at 10% level.
“"^Significant at 5% level.
h  Table 3.5 we observe generalised evidence that women who do not live in the South
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have a smaller hazard rate of having a second child. Both the number of siblings and 
parents divorced are not significant. Neither is religion.
Demographic explanations are captured by the age at first child and the spell from mar­
riage to first child. There is the generalised view among demographic papers that variables 
such as the timing of marriage and the lengths of prior births spells impact strongly on 
the spacing of subsequent births. However, Heckman et al. (1985) show that these demo­
graphic explanations are not valid in the timing to a second child once they control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in a parametric specification of the hazard.34 We find similar 
results to theirs. In the young cohort, there is evidence that neither of the two is signifi­
cant. In the old cohort, only the duration between marriage and first child is. An extra 
year implies a reduction of the hazard rate by 16%.
Some authors find that higher values of education tend to delay the onset of childbearing 
and then compress the span of births into fewer years. A high level of female education 
has been related to faster timing to the second child (e.g. Hoem and Hoem (1989)).35 
Once a woman has a first child, theory suggests that a high-educated woman will have 
a shorter spell towards the second child. The reason is that they compress the births 
when it is optimal for their professional life. This prediction is fulfilled in Cohort 1945- 
60, where the coefficients are positive although only significant among women with a 
vocational qualification. In Cohort 1961-77, those women who finished with a secondary 
qualification have a negative and significant coefficient, and their exit rate is 26% smaller 
than the exit rate of a woman who only got the primary qualification. Women with a 
vocational qualification have a non-significant negative coefficient.
By contrast, those women who obtained a graduate or post-graduate degree have greater 
chances to have a second child in the following month, compared to somebody with a 
primary qualification. The coefficient is positive and significant with a hazard ratio of 
1.66. Thus the theory is confirmed for those women who have a university degree. They 
will compress the spell between the first two births. This does not imply that women 
with a graduate or post-graduate degree have more children than those with only pri­
mary school. The result means that women with a university degree that had a first 
child are more likely to have a second child faster. These are a special sub-group among 
graduate women whose jobs and personality allowed themselves to have a first child and 
then, they are likely to have a second child faster. As the human capital theory predicts,
34 Notice that using a flexible baseline hazard reduces the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on the 
covariate effects (Ridder (1987)).
35Other authors find that education affects negatively the hazard rate in all births.
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they try to have the second child quicker in order to compress the time spent off their jobs.
To be employed twelve months before reduces the likelihood of having a second child 
in the next month in both cohorts. The hazard ratios are 0.73 and 0.81 for the old and 
young cohort respectively. Similarly to the timing of first birth, there were no significant 
differences between part and full-time. Thus, employment is a constraint to expand the 
family, even after controlling for taste for work. The same reasons suggested for first 
birth (i.e. labour market flexibility, regulations and childcare provisions) can be applied 
to second birth.
Labour market situation is measured by regional female unemployment rates and the pro­
portion of female fixed-term contracts. In the two cohorts, the higher the unemployment 
is, the less chances to have a second child in the following month. This is particularly the 
case in Cohort 1961-77 where the hazard ratio is 0.989, which means that an increase of 
one percentage point in regional female unemployment rates reduces the hazard by 1.1%. 
The impact of fixed-term contracts on second birth, although negative, is non-significant. 
Here, the coefficient becomes actually more negative with the time trend in the estimation.
Despite the fact that high levels of the husband’s education (proxy for income) are foreseen 
to reduce the time to a second child, our results do not support this theory. Coefficients 
appear to be insignificant.
Timing to Third Child — Spanish Females
Table 3.6 shows that in general those living in the South have a greater probability of 
having a third child in the next month. The number of siblings increases the hazard rate 
significantly in Cohort 1945-60. Neither divorced parents nor religion are significant.
Previous literature (e.g. Harvey (1996)) found that demographic variables have a major 
role in the timing to the third child whereas employment and education are less impor­
tant. Our results are in line with theirs since both coefficients of the age at second child 
and the duration of the spell from the first child to the second child are negative and 
significant. For instance, the hazard ratios for the birth interval are 0.81 and 0.79 for the 
old and young cohort respectively. That is, an extra year in the spell first to second child 
reduces the hazard by 19% in Cohort 1945-60.
We find that there exists a significant preference for boys in Cohort 1945-60. Couples 
with two girls have a probability to have a third child 38% greater than couples with one
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Table 3.6: Timing to Third Child — Spanish Females
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.458** 0.250 0.151** 0.752
Regions NE 0.622** 0.227 1.160 0.457
Omitted CMadrid 0.481** 0.216 0.356 0.698
Category C 0.734* 0.183 1.229 0.367
is S E 0.590** 0.175 0.617 0.400
Canaries 1.077 0.263 1.300 0.660
Siblings 1.054** 0.021 1.004 0.051
DivPar Y es=i 0.884 0.358 0.602 0.455
Religious Yes=i 0.776 0.206 1.459 0.427
AgeAt2C 0.992* 0.024 0.897** 0.063
MenT2C 0.811* 0.043 0.787** 0.100
TwoGirls Yes=i 1.383** 0.154 1.594 0.306
TwoBoyS Yes=l 0.956 0.127 1.381 0.291
WorkTaste Yes=i 1.214** 0.117 1.197 0.271
Female E2 0.862 0.132 0.486** 0.290
Education ESVoc 0.580** 0.310 1.682 0.615
Omitted E l ESGrPo 0.980 0.387 0.158** 1.135
Partner E2P 0.661** 0.195 1.026 0.633
Education ESVocP 0.887 0.344 0.394 1.039
Omitted E l ESGrPoP 0.911 0.299 2.461 0.748
Schml2 Yes=l 1.235 0.432 1.719 0.654
Emplol2 Yes—1 0.808 0.150 0.746 0.330
Unemrfl2 0.985 0.011 0.965 0.025
Tempf 12 1.001 0.016
Cohorts
Omitted 1945-49 and 
1961-65 for Old and 
Young respectively
1950-54
1955-60
1966-77
0.703**
0.638**
0.160
0.224
0.494 0.473
Log likelihood - 2014.6 -374.3
N  subjects 824 436
N  observations 78561 28289
* Significant at 10% level.
^^Significant at 5% level.
or two boys. The dummy for boys is not significant in any of the cohorts. This corrobo­
rates a predilection for boys and not for variety of sexes in the old group. It seems that 
in Cohort 1961-77’ the sex of the children is minor in the decision to have a third child.
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High levels of education, especially at graduate and post-graduate levels, strongly de­
crease the exit rate for both cohorts. This shows evidence that graduate women at parity 
two choose the two-child norm. That is, those graduates who have children prefer indeed 
to discontinue childbearing after the second birth.
Lagged employment status is negative but not significant. This means that at parity 
two other factors (i.e. education, region and demographic covariates) rather than employ­
ment are more crucial in determining the probability of a third pregnancy. The precarious 
labour market plays a minor role on the exit rates (female unemployment rates impact 
negatively but are insignificant). Therefore, labour markets and employment mainly af­
fect fertility at earlier parities.
Once more we do not find evidence that partner’s education increases the hazard rate, 
which is contra-intuitive. Notice (as explained in Subsection 3.4.2) that this variable is 
taken at the interview’s date and it is an approximation.
Being born in later cohorts reduces the intensity of a third birth, ceteris paribus. Cohort 
effects only play a role in second parity for the old cohort.
Some of the coefficients in the ‘artificial’ estimation for the old cohort are significantly 
different from the ‘normal’ estimation. However, they do not affect the nature of our 
conclusions. Coefficients that were significant under the ‘normal’ specification still are 
under the ‘artificial’ one and they do not change sign.
Male Sample Analysis
Up to now the paper deals with the decision to marry and have children from the women’s 
perspective, controlling for their social and labour market characteristics. Note that part­
ner’s information is scarce since we can only account for their education. The reason is 
that there is no retrospective records about partner’s characteristics in the female sample.
We are aware that men’s contribution to the drop in fertility should be further explored. 
That is, it is not only women’s labour market situation but also men’s that has caused 
the decline in fertility in Spain. The increase in unemployment rates and temporary con­
tracts has occurred in both sexes. Theory forecasts a negative relationship between male 
unemployment and fertility.
Since the FFS survey was also undertaken for a sample of men, it is worth analysing
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their family formation. Unfortunately, the size of the sample is smaller (there are 1992 
completed interviews compared to 4021 we had for women), which makes only reasonable 
the estimation up to first child. We proceed as in the female study by splitting the esti­
mation into two cohorts: Cohort 1945-60 and 1961-77’ Our variables are practically the 
same except for the fact that we do not include Taste Work.36 Accordingly, we control 
for male regional unemployment rates and the proportion of total male contracts that are 
temporary.
Table 3.7: Number of Subjects, Exits and Censored in Each State — Spanish Males
Cohort 1945-60 
Marriage 1st Birth
Cohort
Marriage
1961-77 
1st Birth
Total 784 639 1204 374
Exits 676 614 396 267
Censored 108 25 808 107
Timing to Marriage
Results in Table 3.8 show that the main determinants of marriage in Cohort 1945-6037 
are the fact of being at school, which increases the duration to marriage, and being em­
ployed, which reduces it.38 An individual who is employed has a probability of exit to 
marriage in the next month twice as large the probability of an individual who is not. 
Being enrolled in education decreases the hazard by 53%. Regional unemployment rates 
are not significant. Neither is the education level. Religion increases the hazard by 16%.
In Cohort 1961-77, a man with a graduate or postgraduate degree has an exit rate that 
is 50% smaller than the one of someone with only a primary qualification. Enrolment in 
education reduces the hazard of marriage by 67%. A religious person has a probability of 
exit to marriage 49% greater than a non-religious one.39 Employed men have an exit rate 
much greater than non-employed men. Both the regional unemployment rates and the
36As discussed by Angrist and Evans (1998) and Ahn and Mira (2001), male employment is certainly 
exogenous in fertility choices. Consequently, we do not need to deal with corrections for potential endo­
geneity between participation and fertility as we did for our female’s sample.
37The estimation has been also done with the fiction of censoring individuals in 1980 so as to make it 
comparable to Cohort 1961-77 in terms of censoring. The target of this exercise is to check if the estimates 
are significantly different under both specifications (old cohort and ‘artificial’ old cohort). Results show 
that they are not, which means that one can rely more on the description and comparison of both old 
and young cohort.
38Both variables are lagged six months.
39Similar to women, religion seems to play a greater role in the young cohort. This may be due to 
the fact that, in previous generations, everybody ‘had’ to be religious and follow the ‘rules’ of society. 
Nowadays, differences in behaviour between those who are or are not religious are probably greater.
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Table 3.8: Timing to Marriage — Spanish Males
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.830 0.159 0.958 0.241
Regions NE 0.632* 0.167 0.586** 0.263
Omitted, CMadrid 0.800 0.178 0.649** 0.255
Category C 0.684** 0.152 0.764 0.210
is S E 0.962 0.127 1.253 0.191
Canaries 1.150 0.239 1.262 0.177
Siblings 1.0004 0.017 1.075** 0.024
DivPar Yes=i 0.927 0.127 0.995 0.149
Religious Y es=i 1.165** 0.085 1.488** 0.108
Male E2 1.035 0.093 0.846 0.136
Education ESVoc 0.969 0.190 1.177 0.272
Omitted E l ESGrPo 1.076 0.152 0.501** 0.256
Schm6 Y es=l 0.471** 0.206 0.329** 0.238
Emplo6 Y es=l 2.527** 0.139 1.603** 0.139
Unemrm6 0.990 0.009 0.981 0.013
Tempm6 0.988 0.011
Cohorts 1950-54 1.272** 0.110
Omitted 1945-49 and 1955-60 1.312** 0.144
1961-65 for Old and 1966-70 0.884 0.176
Young respectively 1971-77 0.859 0.349
Log likelihood -3980.93 -2350.3
N subjects 784 1204
N  observations 121438 131938
* Significant at 10% level.
^Significant at 5% level.
proportion of temporary contracts negatively affect the hazard rate but their coefficients 
are not significant. Note, however, that the negative effect of temporary contracts on the 
hazard disappears once a time trend is included in the regression. The worsening of the 
male labour market has partly contributed to the delay in marriage and, consequently, 
the postponement of births in the young cohort.
Our results suggest that unemployment at micro level (note that spells of non-employment 
are highly related to unemployment in the male’s sample) rather than at macro level (un­
employment rates) is the main individual reason for postponing marriage. We therefore 
observe that being employed is crucial for getting married in both cohorts. This is dif­
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ferent from the female analysis in the old cohort. In that case, working women were less 
likely to get married in the next month, ceteris paribus.
Timing to First Child
Table 3.9: Timing to First Child — Spanish Males
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.714** 0.166 0.639 0.297
Regions NE 0.735* 0.173 0.384** 0.349
Omitted CMadrid 0.674** 0.195 0.598 0.325
Category C 0.883 0.164 0.795 0.263
is S E 0.631** 0.137 0.450 0.236
Canaries 0.934 0.256 0.290** 0.364
Siblings 1.012 0.018 1.011 0.033
DivPar Yes=i 0.931 0.121 0.992 0.305
Religious Y es=i 1.081 0.091 1.181 0.135
AgeMa 1.015 0.014 0.908** 0.041
Male E2 1.001 0.104 1.355 0.395
Education ESVoc 0.675* 0.212 1.729 0.389
Omitted E l ESGrPo 1.109 0.173 1.461 0.385
Partner E2P 1.329* 0.172 0.558 0.395
Education ESVocP 1.112 0.239 0.423* 0.520
Omitted E1P ESGrPoP 1.021 0.255 0.422* 0.473
Schml2 Yes—1 1.550** 0.218 1.324 0.312
Emplol2 Yes=l 1.197 0.153 0.735* 0.182
Unemrml2 0.983* 0.009 1.000 0.016
Tempml2 1.009 0.013
Cohorts 1950-54 1.145 0.119
Omitted 1945-49 and 1955-60 1.051 0.151
1961-65 for Old and 1966-70 0.657** 0.210
Young respectively 1971-77 0.882 0.429
Log likelihood -3413.90 -1315.66
N subjects 639 374
N observations 17303 9130
^Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
Table 3.9 shows that any region has a smaller exit rate to first birth relative to the South 
in both cohorts. An extra year on age of marriage has no impact on the hazard in Cohort 
1945-60 but it significantly reduces the intensity in Cohort 1961-77.
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In general, higher levels of male education affect the hazard positively, although coef­
ficients are not significant. In our female sample we obtained the reverse effect. It is 
interesting to observe that partner’s education (which here implies female’s education) 
postpones significantly first child in Cohort 61-77, which is in accordance with our finding 
in the female sample.
Surprisingly, being employed does not increase the hazard of first birth. Regional unem­
ployment rates only affect negatively in the old cohort. It seems that the major impact of 
economic indicators on fertility comes through their influence on the timing to marriage. 
That is, non-employment partly causes the drop of fertility through the delay in marriage 
and consequently, in births (since the age of marriage increases the duration to the birth of 
the first child, although only in the young cohort). Thus, spells of unemployment reduce 
indirectly fertility by postponing marriage. These results are consistent with the paper 
by Ahn and Mira (2001). Although they use a different survey with annual units of time, 
they also show that non-employment spells reduce the probability of getting married. In 
their analysis, being employed has a minor effect on births due to sample selection. Those 
who do not have jobs will not marry, which means tha t they are not eligible for births. 
The same explanation can be applied to our findings.
3.4.7 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this section is to analyse the effects of labour market instability, employment 
status, education, social and demographic characteristics on the timing of family forma­
tion. Our motivation is to understand further the low fertility rate in Spain. We focus 
on both female and male individuals and separate our sample into two different cohorts: 
Cohort 1945-60 and Cohort 1961-77. We next summarise our main findings.
The labour market both at the individual and at the aggregate level is crucial for family 
formation and its impact is different for men and women.
We have some evidence that the phenomenon of the late-leaving of the parental home 
in Spain has been enforced by the unstable labour market, particularly from the woman’s 
perspective. Whereas regional unemployment does not affect the timing of marriage and 
first child for men, it significantly postpones both states for women. The increased pro­
portion of temporary contracts also reduces the likelihood of women marrying, although 
it has a small effect.
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Employment at the individual level is a key factor for marriage. Men who are employed 
marry faster in both cohorts. However, employed married men do not have a greater 
probability of having a birth, ceteris paribus. Male employment accelerates family forma­
tion through increasing the likelihood of marriage.
Interestingly, a woman’s employment status has a different impact on the likelihood of 
getting married in the two cohorts. While being employed has a negative impact on the 
chances of marrying in Cohort 1945-60, it has a positive effect in Cohort 1961-77. One 
explanation could be that the role of women in society has changed substantially. Before, 
women left their jobs in order to build up a family. Nowadays, women wish to develop a 
working career and do not marry until they are well settled in their job. Modern women 
work both for personal development and economic reasons (caused by an increase in living 
standards and housing prices). This view is supported by the fact that a taste for work 
is not significant in the timing of marriage in the old group but it delays marriage in 
the young cohort. A complementary reason is related to the meaning of individual non­
employment. Female unemployment rates have risen in the last two decades and were 
very high when the young cohort was at the standard age of marriage. Thus, individual- 
non-employment is more likely to imply inactivity in Cohort 1945-60 than in Cohort 
1961-77. We expect this to have an effect on our estimates.
Married women who work postpone having their first child in both cohorts, ceteris paribus. 
This is due to their greater opportunity cost of having children and the lack of facilities 
to enable employed women to combine job and family. Female employment status also 
affects negatively the chances of having a second child in both cohorts. We find that work­
ing part-time does not impact differently on our hazards since part-time work is hardly 
an option in Spain (e.g. in 1987, 13.7% work part-time and one third of those involun­
tary). Thus, the Spanish government may have a role in developing policies that help to 
reconcile fertility and participation such as the provision of childcare or an increase in the 
flexibility of working hours (i.e. the voluntary choice of full vs. part-time hours).
Demographic factors rather than employment status are the main contributors in the 
hazard of third child. In fact, age at second child and the duration of the spell between 
first and second child, together with female’s education explain the timing of third birth. 
A similar result was found by Harvey (1996). Interestingly, in the old cohort, the wish to 
have a boy in the family influences positively the hazard to the third child.
Becker (1960) suggests that a high level of education is linked to low fertility because
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of the implied higher opportunity cost of having children. We find that education post­
pones marriage in Cohort 1961-77 and by delaying household formation it negatively 
affects fertility. Furthermore, we observe that highly educated married women delay the 
first birth, especially in Cohort 1961-77.
The impact of education on the timing of the second child is less clear-cut. In Cohort 
1945-60, the coefficient of education in the hazard function is positive and significant 
among those who have a vocational qualification. It is interesting to notice that in Cohort 
1961-77, women with a graduate or post-graduate degree are far more likely to compress 
their first and second child. This suggests that those graduate women who overcome the 
barrier of first birth are faster to their second birth, compared to women with a primary 
qualification. The coefficient of education turns out to be negative in the estimation of 
the hazard rate for the third child, which implies that graduate and post-graduate women 
who have children prefer the so-called ‘two-child norm’.
Household income that is exogenous to women’s employment is expected to influence 
positively the probability of expanding the family (Becker (I960)). We use partner’s ed­
ucation as a proxy. However, we do not find the predicted values. Among our social 
background covariates, religion is the most important since it significantly reduces the 
time to marriage for both men and women.
The stylised factors in Spain since the 70s are: a rise of female employment, an increase 
of overall unemployment, a fall in male employment, a rise in temporary contracts and an 
increase in education. In our analysis, we show that male employment reduces the timing 
to marriage. Since male employment rates have fallen, we expect a decline in fertility by 
delaying demographic processes. We observe that a rise in instability (i.e. unemployment 
and temporary contracts) postpones female marriage, which in turn impacts negatively 
on fertility. We have also evidence that female employment postpones childbearing. Since 
female employment rates have risen since the 70s, we again expect a drop in fertility. Si­
multaneously, we find that higher levels of female education postpones marriage and first 
birth. Therefore, the growing years in female schooling also explains the decline in family 
size.
All these factors have contributed to the drop in fertility. If we would like to reverse 
the declining path in fertility, we need to accomplish three things: first, we should reverse 
the impact of female employment on childbearing. The fact that female employment post­
pones motherhood suggests that there is lack of reconciliation between family and work.
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We believe that the government should introduce policies that facilitate the combination 
of participation and fertility. This can be achieved by increasing both the availability of 
public childcare and flexibility of the number of hours in periods of childcare. Second, 
we should reduce female instability in the labour market. Third, we should implement 
policies to raise male employment.
3.5 European Comparison
3.5.1 Introduction
In recent years, the decline in fertility has been substantial in some European countries. 
This has been extensively attributed to women entering into the labour market. How­
ever, we nowadays observe in Europe that those countries with higher female employment 
are those with higher fertility. Therefore, it seems to be the case that in some countries 
individual employment status and/or other institutional characteristics make female par­
ticipation and fertility positively related (see Chapter 2). We investigate the impact of 
the labour market at the individual level, which could in turn contribute to understanding 
the aggregate picture.
The main purpose of this section is to show how the labour market, education and other 
characteristics affect the individual decision to marry/cohabit, have a first and second 
child in Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. We aim to discover whether 
being employed delays the demographic process or whether, on the contrary, it brings it 
forward. This depends on specific policies, such as public childcare availability, taxation 
and flexible hours schemes, and makes cross-country comparison essential. Since welfare 
and taxation policies differ across these countries, we expect to find differences in the way 
individual characteristics affect the spacing of births. We also investigate the impact of 
the economic environment on fertility by analysing if female unemployment rates cause a 
postponement of family formation.
This section is organised as follows: Subsection 3.5.2 describes the data and the con­
struction of the variables. Subsection 3.5.3 explains the methodology and Subsection 
3.5.4 presents the main results. Finally, Subsection 3.5.5 concludes.
3.5.2 D ata and Constructed Variables
We use the Family and Fertility Survey (FFS). The structure of the questionnaire was 
originally produced by the United Nations but the collection was undertaken by different
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institutions.40 This has caused variations in the available explanatory variables since not 
all the proposed questionnaire sections were applied on all countries. Despite this draw­
back, these data have the advantage that whenever we have coinciding variables, they 
derive from the same question and have the same interpretation. For our analysis, we 
have selected those relevant explanatory variables that existed in all five countries in order 
to estimate the timing of marriage/cohabitation, first and second birth. Further details 
of this survey can be read in Subsection 3.4.2. We would like to point out that part of 
this section will sound familiar for those who read Section 3.4. However, we think that 
those who look at the sections independently will find this reiteration useful.
We next summarise country-data collection:
Belgium: Flemish and Brussels capital region
Belgian41 data were collected in the Flemish and Brussels capital region between 1991 
and 1992. Therefore, our results are not representative for the whole Belgium, but only 
for the Flemish and Brussels capital region. The number of valid interviews was 2088 for 
women and 1319 for men, obtained with a percentage of responses of 69.2% and 66.3% 
respectively. Individuals were between 20 and 41 years old.
West- Germany
The survey file contains information on 5036 persons (2024 men and 3012 women) bom 
between 1952 and 1972, aged 20-39 on l 3t January 1992. Interviewing took place in 1992.
Italy
The target population was women and men aged 20-49 years old. The interviews were car­
ried out between November 1995 and January 1996. There were 4824 women interviewed 
and 1206 men.
Spain
The data set was collected by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas (CIS) between 
June and November of 1995. The sample is built at the national level with individuals 
aged between 18 and 49 years old. The number of valid interviews was 4021 for women 
and 1991 of men, obtained with a percentage of responses of 83.6% and 77% respectively.
40We obtained FFS directly from the United Nations. We have FFS project number 93, approved by 
the FFS commission.
41 From now on, any time we talk about Belgium we only refer to the Flemish and Brussels capital 
regions.
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Sweden
The Swedish Family Survey conducted in 1992/93 consists of eight cohorts: women born 
in 1949, 1954, 1959, 1964 and 1969; men born in 1949, 1959 and 1964. The interviews 
took place at the end of 1992 and at the beginning of 1993. A total of 4229 women 
and 2177 men were included in the sample, altogether 3318 women and 1666 men were 
interviewed.
A major effort has been undertaken to select those explanatory variables42 that are mean­
ingful across our countries. These are the following: size of the city of origin (City), being 
religious (Religious), education, cohorts, age of marriage or first cohabitation (AgeMaCo), 
taste for work ( WorkTaste)43 and monthly employment status (Emplo). The latter is a 
time-varying covariate.44 The scale of the qualifications in education goes from zero to six 
in accord with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). From this 
variable, we have constructed four dummy variables E l (with value one if the maximum 
level is 0 or 1, primary school), E2 (one if the individual belongs to category 2 or 3, 
secondary school), ESVoc (one if she has level 4, vocational qualification) and ESGrPo 
(one if she is at 5 or 6, graduate or post-graduate degree). Our reference category is the 
lowest level El. Notice that category ESVoc does not exist either in Italy nor in Sweden. 
Table 3.19 in Appendix 3.8 shows the evolution of education attainment across cohorts 
for each country. It is interesting to observe the improvement in qualifications in Spain 
and the high level of graduates in Sweden.
In order to make our sample consistent across countries, we select cohorts born between 
1951 and 1970 and observable calendar years up to 1993. Surveys in Spain and Italy were 
undertaken in 1995, which means that individuals of the same cohort might be observed 
longer compared to the other countries.45 We restrict those individuals to be followed-up 
until 1993. In Sweden, we have women for five specific cohorts: 1949, 1954, 1959, 1964 
and 1969. This means that we have not been able to completely homogenise cohorts. 
Nevertheless, we believe that our results are fairly comparable.
42Full description of the variables in Appendix 3.7.
43It takes value one if the person was at work one year after she completed education, and zero 
otherwise.
44Note that education is not at time-varying covariate but it is taken at the date an individual completes 
school. We were obliged to take this measure since schooling calendar is missing in Belgium, West- 
Germany and Italy. In the latter countries, only the highest level of education at completion date is 
reported. Despite this, we believe that this variable is adequate since it captures the expectation of the 
level of human capital achieved for those observed months before the school abandonment.
45Notice that we have a retrospective survey.
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We think that the growth in unemployment has had a great impact on fertility pat­
terns, especially in countries with high female unemployment rates. The variable Unemrf 
accounts for the female national unemployment rate of a particular individual date. Un­
employment rates have been collected from Eurostat Publications, the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadfstica (Spain) and Statistiska Centralbyran (Sweden).
Since the decisions of marriage/cohabitation and births are taken well before hand, we 
have constructed lag variables of Emplo, and Unemrf for twelve months46 (Emplol2 and 
Unemrf 12). Lagging the employment status (Emplo 12) partly overcomes the problem of 
fertility and employment being simultaneously decided. Furthermore, one could be con­
cerned that more family oriented women abandon employment in advance, which would 
still cause a misleading result. That is, if we assume that the employment variable is 
endogenous because ‘taste for work’ is omitted and ‘taste for work’ has a positive impact 
on employment and a negative impact, ceteris paribus, on fertility, we need to control 
for ‘taste for work’. Thus, we include a covariate taste for work in our regression. This 
variable ( WorkTaste)47 captures the the relevant preference and leaves our time-varying 
Emplol2 less prone to spurious interpretation. If Emplol2 turns out to be negative and 
significant, this implies that being at work reduces the likelihood of having a further child 
at that time, no matter what is your career taste.
The proportion of women who have cohabited at least once is 10.5% in Belgium, 34.5% 
in West-Germany, 3.5% in Italy, 5% in Spain and 47% in Sweden. Because of this, we 
study the timing of marriage or cohabitation to account for each country’s sociological 
pattern 48 Therefore, a change of state occurs when a woman either marries or starts 
cohabiting with her partner. We also analyse the timing of first birth from the date of 
marriage or cohabitation (depending on each woman case) and the timing of second birth.
Table 3.20 in Appendix 3.8 summarises the number of subjects, both who exit49 and 
are censored, for each country.
46Lags of 6 , 9 and 12 months were tried without different results.
47It takes value one if the person was at work one year after she completed education.
48 Notice that in Spain and Italy there are no differences in results when only considering marriage since 
cohabitation is very rare.
49Individuals who exit are those who move from one state to another (e.g. from single to cohabiting). 
The censored individuals are those who you stop observing before they exit.
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3.5.3 M ethodology
We study the timing of marriage/cohabitation, first and second birth with a hazard model, 
as described in Section 3.3. The exit or hazard rate of marriage/cohabitation (M -C ) im­
plies the conditional probability density function of leaving a status of being single to 
being M-C, given that the individual has been single for a certain time and given her 
characteristics. The exit or hazard rate of a first birth is the probability of exiting the 
state of M -C  with no children to the state of having one child, given that the particular 
couple has been married for a specific period and her characteristics. Finally, the hazard 
rate of a second birth is the likelihood of leaving the state of one child, given the duration 
of that state and her observable characteristics. We estimate our hazards for each country 
and we find how each covariate influences the timing of family formation.50
It is interesting to observe the path of the survival rates across countries. Kaplan-Meier 
Survival estimates (Figures 3.7 and 3.8) give the probability of remaining in the same 
state (e.g. single) at a particular moment of time.51 In Figure 3.7, exiting implies getting 
married, whereas in Figure 3.8, exit is either marriage or cohabitation. Despite the fact 
these estimates omit characteristics, they are a useful first step to analyse the differences 
between countries. We observe that focusing only on marriage has a complete different 
behaviour that exiting at both marriage and cohabitation in Sweden. Whereas just about 
40% women end up being married, most of them have been cohabiting. In West-Germany, 
cohabitation is also noticeable and it is surprising their high rate of 25% of women who 
do not marry nor cohabit. Belgian women marry (and cohabit) faster than Italy or Spain, 
although these countries converge at a similar rate of 11-13% of women who do not marry.
In Figure 3.9 we represent the survival Kaplan-Meier estimates for a group of women 
from the time they got married or first cohabited. We observe that Spain and Italy have 
a similar pattern and have the fastest shifts to first child. This is not in line of what 
current fertility data suggest since Italy and Spain have nowadays late mean age of first 
birth. Note, however, that this analysis merges women from cohorts 1951-70, and, conse­
quently, entails births occurred in the 70s, characterised by high fertility in both Italy and 
Spain. In Section 3.4, we have actually found that there are significant postponements 
of marriage and first birth in later cohorts in Spain. Interestingly, West-Germany has 
23% of childless married or cohabiting women,52 far above the other countries rates. In 
Belgium, 10% stay without children after marriage or cohabitation. These percentages
50We describe the meaning of each variable in Appendix 3.7.
51 The formula for the Kaplan-Meier Survival estimation is explained in Subsection 3.3.2.
52This number is in line with Beets (1997) who finds that in West-Germany 25% of women older than 
34 years old from cohort 1950 have not yet become mothers.
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Figure 3.7: Survival in the Single State, Exit being Marriage — Country Comparison
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Figure 3.8: Survival in the Single State, Exit being Marriage or Cohabitation— Country 
Comparison
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are 9% in Italy, 6% in Spain and 12% in Sweden.
Figure 3.10 shows the survival Kaplan-Meier estimates for staying with only one child. 
Swedish are the group with the lowest rate with about 10% women remaining with a 
single child. Spain follows with 13%. Italy and Belgium are very close with 19% and 18% 
women who never exit into a second birth. Finally, West-Germany is again the country 
with the highest proportion of women (30%) who survive in the state of only one child.
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Figure 3.9: Survival in the Married or Cohabiting Childless State — Country Comparison
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Figure 3.10: Survival in the Married or Cohabiting With One Child State — Country 
Comparison
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3.5 .4  E conom etric R esu lts
We represent hazard ratios, which are the exponential of the coefficients of the hazard 
estimation. An explanation of how to interpret the hazard ratios is given in Subsection 
3.4.6. We use the Reduced form estimation described in Subsection 3.4.5 and focus only 
on females.
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Timing to Marriage or First Cohabitation
Table 3.10 shows the impact of our explanatory variables on the probability of mar­
riage/cohabitation {M-C) in the next month. We first comment about how labour char­
acteristics impact on couple formation. We observe that employment (lagged 12 months) 
increases the probability of M-C in the next month in all countries. For example, em­
ployed Belgian women have a probability of M-C next month 274% greater than their 
non-employed counterparts. Hazard ratios are 1.64,1.46,1.16 and 1.27 for West-Germany, 
Italy, Spain53 and Sweden respectively. Unemployment rates provide information about 
the labour market opportunities and economic situation. An increase of one percentage 
point of unemployment decreases the hazard in all countries, being significant in West- 
Germany, Italy and Spain.
We also examine more carefully if the unemployment rates are actually picking up the 
tendency for late marriage instead of the effect of precarious labour markets on family 
formation. For this purpose, we re-estimate the hazards including a variable for trend. We 
find that coefficients for Unemrf 12 are rather similar (although they decline in Belgium 
and in Spain) which suggests that unemployment rates indeed postpone M-C and are not. 
merely a trend.54
Concerning female human capital, we find that a high level of education delays M-C 
in Belgium, Italy and Spain. In these countries women with graduate and post-graduate 
degree have a probability of M-C  much smaller than their lowest educated women coun­
terparts. This is not the case in West-Germany and Sweden. We do not have a clear-cut 
reason for West-Germany and Sweden being different. A priori, we thought that this 
could be due to the fact that in these two countries cohabitation is far more common 
and start already at university, under parental support. Under this case, achieving higher 
education would not be a limitation for cohabiting. However, if we look at the timing of 
marriage only (M),55 we find that high levels of education do not postpone marriage in 
West-Germany and Sweden either, which weakens our proposed explanation.
We have also estimated the timing of M-C  initiating the analysis time at the date of 
completing education, instead of at the age of fifteen. For those countries where educa-
53Notice that in Section 3.4 we found the interesting result that being at work brings forward marriage 
in cohort 1945-60, whereas it has the opposite effect for cohort 1961-77. In this estimation, we consider 
cohorts 1951-70.
54The trend variable is negative and significant in all countries, except in Belgium, where it is negative 
but not significant.
55Table 3.21 in Appendix 3.8 shows the hazard ratios for the timing of marriage.
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Table 3.10: Timing to Marriage/Cohabitation — Country Comparison
Variables Hazard Ratios1
Belgium W-Germany Italy Spain Sweden
City2
Religious
WorkTaste3
1.040 (0 .060) 
0.983 (0 .064) 
0.881** (0 .052)
0.818** (0.040) 
0.964 (0 .047) 
1.116* (0.070)
0.916* (0.045) 
1.033 (0.078) 
0.849** (0.040)
0.987 (0 .045) 
1.055 (0 .063) 
0.909** (0 .042)
0.799** (0.036) 
0.794**(o.o3i) 
0.831** (0.034)
Education'4 
E2
ESVoc
ESGrPo
0.725** (0.052) 
0.510** (0.041) 
0.482** (0.054)
1.270 (0.193) 
0.976(0.198) 
1.006 (0.178)
0.648** (0.039) 
0.368** (0.033)
0.802** (0.044) 
0.483** (0.045) 
0.463** (0.046)
1.319** (0.154) 
1.009 (0.122)
Emplo 12 
Unemrf 12
2.738** (0.147) 
0.993 (0.005)
1.644** (0.098) 
0.919** (o.oi2)
1.459** (0.067) 
0 .958**(o .o o 9)
1.163** (0.056) 
0.980** (0 .006)
1.274**(o .054) 
0.948 (0.036)
Cohorts5 
1954* 
1956-607 
1961-658 
1966-70Q
1.066 (0.075) 
1.044 (0.095) 
0.772** (0.073)
1.037 (0 .071) 
1.158* (o.ioo) 
0.856 (0 .089)
1.025 (0 .067) 
1.065 (0 .092) 
0.737** (0 .072)
1.402** (o.ioi) 
1.467** (0 .167) 
1.260 (0 .181)
1.065 (0.065) 
1.061 (0.063) 
1.005 (0.067) 
0.992 (0.062)
* Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
1 Standard errors in brackets.
2Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants).
3Dummy (1 if individual show preference for work).
4Omitted category is the lowest level (El) .
5Omitted category is Cohort 1951-55 (Cohort 1952-55 for West-Germany and Cohort 1949 for Sweden).
6 Cohort 1954 for Sweden only.
7 Cohort 1959 for Sweden.
8 Cohort 1964 for Sweden.
9 Cohort 1969 for Sweden.
tion postpones M-C, we aim to know if high education has an additional impact on the 
timing of M-C, apart from the effect due to the fact that people do not start cohabiting 
before the end of their studies. Interestingly, we find that education has roughly the same 
negative impact on the hazard, which means that the delaying effect of education on M-C 
is not only because of more time required but also of being more highly educated itself. 
For West-Germany and Sweden, coefficients of education with the two origins are approx­
imately the same. Thus, especially in Sweden, the positive impact of human capital on 
the hazard of M-C might be caused by both more students starting cohabition and the 
education itself afterwards.
Except for West-Germany, our estimates show that females with a taste for work de­
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lays M-C. Religion does not play any role in the probability of M-C, except for Sweden, 
where being religious delays this event. Interestingly, religion increases substantially the 
probability of couple formation through marriage only (see Table 3.21 in Appendix 3.8) in 
all countries. Notice the change of sign for Sweden, which suggests that, in this country, 
religion is a very important determinant of marriage and deterrent to cohabitation. In 
Table 3.21 we observe that later cohorts have a strong negative impact on the timing of 
marriage in Sweden, which implies that getting married is becoming less common. Fi­
nally, there is a generalised result that coming from a city postpones M-C, this effect 
being stronger when looking at the probability of marriage.
Timing to First Child
In Table 3.11 we observe the impact of employment on the timing of first child among 
those women who are married or cohabiting. Results suggest that being at work (lagged 
12 months) increases the probability of having a first birth in Sweden. For example, an 
employed Swedish women has a probability of having a first birth in the next month 50% 
greater than her counterpart, ceteris paribus.56 On the other hand, we find that being 
at work decreases the likelihood of motherhood in Belgium, Italy and especially Spain, 
being irrelevant in West-Germany. Therefore, there is some evidence that employment 
status affects birth decisions differently across countries. Sweden is the country with 
the most generous and flexible labour and public childcare schemes, which facilitates the 
combination of family and work. Interestingly, Sweden is also the country where female 
employment brings the first baby forward. In West-Germany, although being at work 
is not positive, it is not reducing the hazard either, which means that it does not raise 
constraints on first birth. Female unemployment rates reduce the likelihood of first birth 
in all countries.57 Therefore, precarious economic environment have negative impact on 
childbearing.
High levels of education delays the first birth in all countries. This is in line with other 
papers, which find that women with more schooling find it optimal to postpone mother­
hood (e.g. Wetzels (1999)).
Results show that religious couples have a higher probability of giving birth and that
56Heckman et al. (1985) find that working delays first and second birth with another dataset. However, 
they use working at current duration as covariate, instead of lagging this variable to avoid capturing 
women on leave and endogeneity. In fact, if we take the same definition as theirs, we also obtain a 
negative effect. But we believe that lagging employment status is necessary in this context.
57The coefficients are reduced in Spain and in West-Germany when a trend variable is incorporated in 
the model.
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Table 3.11: Timing to First Child — Country Comparison
Variables Hazard Ratios1
Belgium W- Germany Italy Spain Sweden
City2 
Religious 
WorkTaste3 
AgeMaCo
0.825** (0 .073) 
1.276** (0 .104) 
0.896 (0 .0628) 
0.970** (o.oii)
0.927(0.058) 
1.174** (0.074) 
0.993 (0.080) 
0.980 (o.oi3)
0.906* (0 .051) 
1.527** (0 .142) 
0.799** (0 .043) 
0.965** (0 .009)
0.847** (0 .043) 
1.393** (0 .095) 
0.945 (0 .048) 
0.981* (o.oii)
0.747** (0 .042) 
1.164** (0 .053) 
0.816** (0 .040) 
0.998 (0.007)
Education4 
E2
ESVoc
ESGrPo
0.852** (0.066) 
0.900 (o.08i) 
0.654** (0.087)
0.982 (0.190) 
0.819 (0 .214) 
0.750 (o.i7i)
0.892* (0.058) 
0.803** (0.085)
0.891** (o.o5i) 
0.790** (0.085) 
0.604** (o.o7i)
0.799* (o.ioi) 
0.779* (0 .102)
Emplo 12 
Unemrf 12
0.882* (0.058) 
0.972** (0.006)
0.991(0.075)
0.992(0.020)
0.837** (0 .042) 
0.973** (0 .009)
0.803** (0 .040) 
0.984** (0.006)
1.500** (0 .084) 
0.867** (0 .033)
Cohorts5 
19546 
1956-607 
1961-658 
1966-709
1.019 (0.072) 
0.864* (o.07i) 
0.607** (0.074)
1.065 (0.094) 
1.065(0.124) 
0.178 (0.177)
1.024 (0.070) 
0.963 (0 .086) 
0.876 (0 .095)
0.998 (0.081) 
0.936 (o.ii3) 
0.822 (o.i26)
1.072 (0.067) 
0.935 (0.061) 
0.904 (0.065) 
0.707** (0.069)
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
1 Standard errors in brackets.
2Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants).
3Dummy (1 if individual show preference for work).
4Omitted category is the lowest level (El) .
5Omitted category is Cohort 1951-55 (Cohort 1952-55 for West-Germany and Cohort 1949 for Sweden).
6 Cohort 1954 for Sweden only.
7 Cohort 1959 for Sweden.
8 Cohort 1964 for Sweden.
9 Cohort 1969 for Sweden.
those living in cities at the age of fifteen postpone motherhood. Finally, the older a 
woman starts her union, the later she has her first birth.
For the timing of first birth, we have also estimated the hazard with origin of the analysis 
time at the age of fifteen, instead of at the age of first marriage or cohabitation. The 
impact of our explanatory variables on the probability of having a first birth is approxi­
mately the same as in Table 3.11, except for the employment status in Belgium. W ith this 
new origin, we find that being at work increases the likelihood of first birth. This implies 
that in Belgium the positive effect of being employed on M-C prevails on its negative 
effect on first birth. This is not the case neither in Italy nor Spain, where employment
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status postpones first birth also with the origin of the analysis at the age of fifteen.
Timing to Second Child
Table 3.12: Timing to Second Child — Country Comparison
Variables Hazard Ratios1
Belgium W- Germany Italy Spain Sweden
City2 
Religious 
WorkTaste3 
AgeAtl C 
M enTIC4
0.842* (0.076) 
1.010 (0.106) 
1.028 (0.088) 
0.875** (0.076) 
1.019** (0.008)
0.869* (0.088) 
1.043 (0.088) 
0.948 (0.094) 
1.065 (0.155) 
0.991 (0.012)
0.979 (0.072) 
1.344** (0.175) 
0.775** (0.053) 
1.161 (0.120) 
0.986* (0.009)
0.898* (0.056) 
1.299** (0.120) 
0.980 (0.059) 
0.984 (0.071) 
0.999 (0.006)
0.864** (0.059) 
1.128** (0.059) 
1.144** (0.066) 
1.059 (0.083) 
0.996 (0.007)
Education5 
E2
ESVoc
ESGrPo
1.112 (0.105) 
2.165** (0.238) 
2.976** (o.47i)
0.767 (0.180) 
0.844 (o.28i) 
1.061 (0.298)
0.778** (0.057) 
1.056 (0.142)
0.960 (0.064) 
1.314** (0.177) 
1.152** (0.187)
0.799* (o.ioi) 
0.822 (0.118)
Emplo 12 
Unemrf 12
0.753** (0.050) 
0.996** (o.oo7)
0.863* (0.077) 
1.036(0.029)
0.750** (0.048) 
0.979* (o.oii)
0.755** (0.049) 
0.980** (0.008)
1.229** (0.073) 
0.963 (0.041)
Cohorts6 
19547 
1956-608 
1961-659 
1966-7010
1.113 (0.079) 
1.079 (0.093) 
1.758** (0.388)
1.005 (o.ni) 
0.974 (o.i42) 
0.831 (0.184)
1.029 (0.080) 
1.128 (o.ii2) 
1.047 (0.159)
0.981 (0.091) 
0.899 (o.ii9) 
0.735 (o.i4i)
1.050 (0.071) 
1.309** (0.092) 
1.598** (0.142) 
1.518** (0.272)
"‘Significant at 10% level.
"‘"‘Significant at 5% level.
1 Standard errors in brackets.
2Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants).
3Dummy (1 if individual show preference for work).
4Months between marriage/cohabitation and first birth.
5Omitted category is the lowest level (El ) .
6Omitted category is Cohort 1951-55 (Cohort 1952-55 for West-Germany and Cohort 1949 for Sweden). 
Cohort 1954 f or Sweden only.
8 Cohort 1959 for Sweden.
9 Cohort 1964 f or Sweden.
10 Cohort 1969 for Sweden.
Table 3.12 shows the hazard ratios for the timing to the second child measured from the 
birth of the first child. We learn that being at work delays second birth in all countries, 
except for Sweden. There is also evidence that high female unemployment rates also have 
a negative impact on further confinements except in West-Germany.58
58The coefficient for Belgium disappears if a trend is added into the model.
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Interestingly, we observe a change of pattern in the effect of high education. In Bel­
gium and Spain, we observe that women with tertiary education are more likely to have a 
second child, which means that they compress fertility. This does not imply that women 
with further education have more children, but suggests that within this skill group, 
those who have one child tend to have the second one faster. Unexpectedly, we do not get 
the same evidence for the other countries. Hoem and Hoem (1989) actually found this 
compressing effect in Sweden using another data set.
3.5.5 Conclusions
In this section, we aim to analyse the impact of education, employment status and eco­
nomic atmosphere on the timing of family formation in Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, 
Spain and Sweden.
We find empirical evidence that employment (lagged 12 months) increases significantly 
the probability of marriage/cohabitation in the next month, ceteris paribus, in all coun­
tries. This implies that those countries with lower female employment rates are expected 
to postpone their first cohabitation.
Results show that being at work rises the likelihood of first birth in Sweden, but it 
reduces it in the rest, especially in Italy and Spain. Therefore, there are significant differ­
ences in the relationship between employment and motherhood across countries. Sweden 
is well-known for its public childcare and family allowances, which moderates female’s 
time constrain. Similarly, Swedish are characterised by more flexibility in the number of 
hours at work, which facilitates the combination of employment (even if shorter hours) 
with childcare. Wage disparity between males and females is likely to be smaller too, 
increasing female’s opportunity cost to stay at home. This suggests that if the other 
countries (particularly Spain and Italy) became closer to Sweden, we would also observe 
that employment brings the first birth forward.
Finally, it is common across countries that precarious economic opportunities postpone 
family formation since women perceive the risk of losing their jobs. Thus, countries with 
higher female unemployment rates are expected eventually to have lower fertility rates.
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3.6 Summary of Main Findings
This chapter has comprised an extensive empirical investigation of key aspects relating 
to the timing of family formation. Using the Family and Fertility Survey, we test some 
of the ideas developed in demographic economics. Among others, we look at whether 
being employed imposes a constraint on having children, whether economic instability 
postpones fertility or whether high educated female find optimal to postpone births.
From the Spanish analysis, we summarise the main findings as follows:
•  Spanish male employment reduces the timing to marriage. Since male employment 
rates have fallen since the 70s, we expect a decline in fertility by delaying demo­
graphic processes.
• A rise in job instability captured mainly by the unemployment rates postpones 
female marriage and eventually fertility.
• There is evidence that female employment rates in Spain postpones childbearing. 
Since female employment has increased since the 70s, we expect a drop in fertility.
• Higher levels of female education postpones marriage and first birth in Spain. Con­
sequently, the rise in female schooling also contributes to the decline in family size.
All these factors that postpone motherhood have evolved in the direction of decreasing 
fertility since the 70s. If we would like to reverse this declining path, we need to accom­
plish the following: first, reverse the negative impact of female employment on the timing 
of births through the introduction of policies that facilitate the combination of family 
and work. Second, we need to reduce female instability in the labour market. Third, we 
should increase male employment.
From the European comparison, we learn that:
• It is possible for female employment to impact positively on the timing of births as 
happens in Sweden. In order to increase fertility in the other countries, especially 
in Italy and Spain, we should follow the Swedish case and implement policies that 
reverse the sign of female employment on the timing of births.
A precarious job market is shown to have a negative impact on fertility in all coun­
tries.
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3.7 Appendix A: Labels for the Variables
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Table 3.13: Variable Labels, FFS
E l Dummy (1 if highest education is primary degree; omitted category)
E2 Dummy (1 if highest education is secondary degree)
ESVoc Dummy (1 if highest education is vocational tertiary degree)
ESGrPo Dummy (1 if highest education is university degree)
E1P* Dummy (1 if partner’s highest education is primary degree; omitted)
E2P* Dummy (1 if partner’s highest education is secondary degree)
ESVocP* Dummy variable (1 if partner’s highest education is vocational degree)
ESGrPoP* Dummy (1 if partner’s highest education is university degree)
City** Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants)
Religious Dummy (1 if individual’s is religious)
Siblings* Number of siblings
WorkTaste Dummy (1 if working one year after completing school)
DivPar* Dummy (1 if parents divorced)
AgeMa* Age of marriage
AgeMaCo** Age of marriage or first cohabitation
AgeAtl C Age at first child
AgeAt2C* Age at second child
M enTIC  Months between marriage and first child
MenT2C* Months between first child and second child
Girl* If first child was a girl
Two Girls* If both first and second children were girls
TwoBoys* If both first and second children were boys
Emplo 12 Dummy (1 if employed 12 months ago)
Schml2* Dummy (1 if at school 12 months ago)
Unemrf 12 Female regional unemployment rates 12 months ago
Tempf 12 Female proportion of temporary contracts at national level 12 months ago
Unemrml2 Male regional unemployment rates 12 months ago
Tempml2* Male proportion of temporary contracts at national level 12 months ago
NW* North-West region
NE* North-East region
CMadrid* Madrid region
C* Centre region
E* East region
Canaries* Canaries Islands region
S* South region (Omitted category)
Cohort X -  Y  Individual is born between year X  and Y
^Variable only for the Spanish analysis.
**Variable only for the European comparison analysis.
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3.8 Appendix B: Tables
3.8.1 The Spanish Case
Table 3.14: Ideal Number of Children for a Spanish Family1 1960-77
Number of Children Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77
0 0.5% 1.1%
1 3.4% 5.6%
2 47.7% 53.2%
3 20.0 % 17.8%
1 or 2 3.1% 4.0%
2 or 3 16.0% 11.9%
1 Table does not show % for more than 3 children.
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Table 3.15: Timing to Marriage, Structural Form — Spanish Females
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 1.079 0.112 1.150 0.111
Regions NE 1.027 0.117 0.742** 0.125
Omitted CMadrid 1.068 0.114 0.886 0.123
Category C 1.073 0.108 1.165 0.102
is S E 1.180* 0.094 0.952 0.091
Canaries 1.286 0.175 1.126 0.163
Sibling 1.008 0.013 1.016 0.015
DivPar Y es= i 0.910 0.201 1.116 0.143
Religious Y es=i 1.310** 0.100 1.337** 0.087
Female E2 0.923 0.069 0.783** 0.079
Education ESVoc 0.788* 0.134 0.669** 0.138
Omitted E l ESGrPo 0.965 0.178 0.651** 0.144
Schm6 Y es= l 0.488** 0.149 0.257** 0.115
PEmplo Yes—1 0.836 ** 0.078 1.201** 0.087
Tempf6 0.991* 0.005
Cohorts 1950-54 0.965** 0.085
Omitted 1945-49 and 1955-60 1.187 0.083
1961-65 for Old and 1966-70 0.928 0.101
Young respectively 1971-77 0.729* 0.180
Log likelihood -6666.1 -7158.5
N  subjects 1150 2228
N  observations 133001 214492
^Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level.
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Table 3.16: Timing to First Child, Structural Form — Spanish Females
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 1.035 0.118 0.759** 0.128
Regions NE 1.012 0.122 0.776* 0.148
Omitted CMadrid 1.061 0.119 0.703* 0.142
Category C 1.245* 0.112 0.943 0.116
is S E 0.931 0.100 0.753** 0.104
Canaries 1.119 0.182 0.999 0.181
Sibling 1.034* 0.013 0.999 0.017
DivPar Y es=i 0.888 0.212 0.999 0.106
Religious Y es= i 1.0003 0.106 1.324** 0.105
AgeMa 0.981* 0.010 0.929** 0.022
WorkTaste Y es= i 0.997 0.070 0.789** 0.097
Female E2 0.973 0.072 0.918 0.010
Education ESVoc 1.297* 0.154 0.682** 0.186
Omitted E l ESGrPo 0.845 0.186 0.678* 0.202
Partner E2P 0.916 0.141 0.971 0.228
Education ESVocP 0.987 0.200 1.140 0.308
Omitted E1P ESGrPoP 0.728* 0.182 1.088 0.256
Schml2 Yes— 1 0.868 0.177 0.951 0.150
PEmplo Y es=l 0.745** 0.104 0.774** 0.124
Tempf 12 1.001 0.005
Cohorts 1950-54 0.954 0.089
Omitted 1945-49 and 1955-60 0.973 0.088
1961-65 for Old and 1966-70 0.786** 0.114
Young respectively 1971-77 1.069 0.204
Log likelihood -6104.0 4959.9
N  subjects 1041 1024
N  observations 26064 25435
^Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
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Table 3.17: Timing to Second Child, Structural Form — Spanish Females
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.682** 0.130 0.793 0.181
Regions NE 0.642** 0.135 1.083 0.206
Omitted CMadrid 0.874 0.126 0.728 0.199
Category C 0.856 0.121 0.769* 0.155
is S E 0.791** 0.109 0.834 0.143
Canaries 0.872 0.193 0.714 0.259
Sibling 1.021 0.014 1.029 0.022
DivPar Y es=i 0.985 0.233 0.982 0.143
Religious Y es=i 1.112 0.125 1.082 0.153
AgeAtlC 0.976** 0.011 1.002 0.030
M enTIC 0.839** 0.031 0.950 0.046
Girl Y es=l 0.996 0.073 0.872 0.099
WorkTaste Y es=i 1.014 0.073 0.938 0.104
Female E2 1.128 0.082 0.752** 0.125
Education ESVoc 1.496** 0.168 1.018 0.257
Omitted E l ESGrPo 1.104 0.208 1.727** 0.274
Partner E2P 1.061 0.147 0.967 0.283
Education ESVocP 1.032 0.222 0.944 0.396
Omitted E l ESGrPoP 1.139 0.199 1.135 0.328
Schml2 Yes—1 0.765 0.275 0.992 0.270
PEmplo Y es=l 0.676** 0.099 0.763* 0.143
Tempf 12 0.992 0.104
Cohorts 1950-54 0.892 0.095
Omitted 1945-49 and 1955-60 0.767** 0.096
1961-65 for Old and 1966-70 0.873 0.169
Young respectively 1971-77 0.710 0.341
Log likelihood -5220.7 -2520.8
N  subjects 1007 821
N  observations 58859 36951
^Significant at 10% level.
^^Significant at 5% level.
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Table 3.18: Timing to Third Child, Structural Form — Spanish Females
Variables Cohort 1945-60 Cohort 1961-77Haz. Ratio Std. Error Haz. Ratio Std. Error
N W 0.538** 0.217 0.268 0.631
Regions NE 0.665* 0.221 1.345 0.446
Omitted CMadrid 0.514** 0.210 0.521 0.642
Category C 0.773 0.179 1.489 0.342
is S E 0.640** 0.165 0.849 0.335
Canaries 1.103 0.262 1.417 0.653
Sibling 1.054** 0.021 1.003 0.051
DivPar Y es=i 0.873 0.357 0.611 0.458
Religious Yes=i 0.770 0.206 1.256 0.412
AgeAt2C 0.905** 0.020 0.886** 0.063
MenT2C 0.807** 0.043 0.777** 0.100
Two Girls Yes=i 1.386** 0.154 1.592 0.307
TwoBoyS Yes=l 0.970 0.126 1.388 0.290
WorkTaste Y es=i 1.206 0.117 1.174 0.269
Female E2 0.859 0.132 0.509** 0.289
Education ESVoc 0.577** 0.311 1.729 0.621
Omitted E l ESGrPo 0.986 0.388 0.163** 1.138
Partner E2P 0.660** 0.195 0.982 0.634
Education ESVocP 0.885 0.344 0.401 1.039
Omitted E l ESGrPoP 0.917 0.299 2.573 0.751
Schml2 Y es=l 1.270 0.431 1.563 0.650
PEmplo Yes-1 0.800 0.171 0.709 0.410
Tempf 12 0.999 0.016
Cohorts
Omitted 1945-49 and 
1961-65 for Old and 
Young respectively
1950-54
1955-60
1966-77
0.634**
0.514**
0.140
0.153
0.474 0.470
Log likelihood - 2015.5 -375.3
N  subjects 824 436
N  observations 78474 28182
* Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
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3.8.2 European Comparison
Table 3.19: Evolution of Qualifications,1,2 FFS — Country Comparison
Belgium West-Germany Italy Spain Sweden
Females
E l 11.5% 4.1% 24.9% 39.7% 7.4%
Cohort 1951-55 E2 60.7% 81.9% 63.1% 49.7% 53.2%
Cohort 1949 for Sweden E3Voc 23.1% 4.4% 6.9%
E3GrPo 4.7% 9.6% 12.0% 3.7% 39.4%
E l 10.1% 2.5% 16.2% 25.3% 3.4%
Cohort 1956-60 E2 56.1% 82.5% 70.7% 58.6% 54.3%
Cohort 1954 for Sweden ESVoc 26.7% 3.8% 8.8%
ESGrPo 7.1% 11.2% 13.1% 7.3% 42.3%
E l 6.7% 4.0% 9.1% 15.0% 0.9%
Cohort 1961-65 E2 54.3% 85.1% 79.2% 65.1% 62.0%
Cohort 1959 for Sweden ESVoc 30.6% 3.5% 8.8%
ESGrPo 8.4% 7.5% 11.7% 11.1% 37.1%
Males
E l 12.0% 1.6% 17.4% 41.0% 14.6%
Cohort 1951-55 E2 60.0% 61.3% 69.6% 43.4% 51.7%
Cohort 1949 for Sweden ESVoc 15.5% 11.8% 5.2%
ESGrPo 12.5% 25.3% 13.0% 10.4% 33.7%
E l 10.6% 3.4% 9.9% 18.2%
Cohort 1956-60 E2 60.3% 69.5% 75.2% 64.2%
No data for Sweden ESVoc 17.0% 4.5% 4.9%
ESGrPo 12.1% 17.6% 14.9% 12.7%
E l 6.8% 2.3% 3.5% 11.2% 1.1%
Cohort 1961-65 E2 61.4% 79.3% 82.9% 72.9% 68.4%
Cohort 1959 for Sweden ESVoc 18.8% 7.5% 5.7%
ESGrPo 13.0% 10.9% 13.6% 10.2% 3.5%
1Note that E3Voc is not reported either in Sweden nor in Italy.
2West-Germany, Italy and Sweden have longer university degrees. This explains the decline 
in percentage for E3GrPo in Cohort 1961-65 since some individuals may have not 
completed the degree by the time of the interview.
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Table 3.20: Number of Subjects, Exits and Censored in Each State — Country Compar­
ison
M -C M 2 IB 3 SB4
Belgium
Total 3233 3230 2651 1946
Exits 2651 2403 1946 1264
Censored 582 827 705 682
West-Germany
Total 2990 3000 1794 1089
Exits 1794 1331 1089 601
Censored 1196 1669 705 488
Italy
Total 3223 3227 2367 1901
Exits 2367 2304 1901 1179
Censored 856 923 466 722
Spain
Total 2669 2672 2148 1789
Exits 2148 2046 1789 1189
Censored 521 626 359 600
Sweden
Total 3273 3313 2937 2140
Exits 2937 1546 2140 1563
Censored 336 1767 797 577
1 State of marriage or cohabitation. 
State of marriage only.
3State of first birth.
4State of second birth.
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Table 3.21: Timing to Marriage — Country Comparison
Variables Hazard Ratios1
Belgium W-Germany Italy Spain Sweden
City2 
Religious 
WorkTaste3
0.781** (0.050) 
1.248** (0.090) 
0.851** (0.053)
0.785** (0.044) 
1.206** (0.069) 
1.049 (0.078)
0.892** (0.045) 
1.309** (0.106) 
0.822** (0.039)
0.934 (0.044) 
1.241** (0.078) 
0.879** (0.042)
0.732** (0.049) 
1.418** (0.073) 
0.769** (0.044)
Education4 
E2
ESVoc
ESGrPo
0.666** (0.049) 
0.542** (0.045) 
0.438** (0.053)
1.237 (0.222) 
0.994 (0.234) 
0.810 (0.171)
0.625** (0.038) 
0.342** (0.032)
0.806** (0.044) 
0.479** (0.046) 
0.419** (0.044)
1.041 (0.144) 
0.988 (o.i43)
Emplo 12 
Unemrf 12
3.083** (0.179) 
0.988** (0 .006)
1.780** (0.127) 
0.870** (o.oi4)
1.410** (0.066) 
0.954** (0.009)
1.200** (0.059) 
0.978** (0.006)
1.042 (0.058) 
0.709 (0.034)
Cohorts5 
19546 
1956-607 
1961-658 
1966-709
1.056 (0.076) 
0.975 (0.092) 
0.601** (0.061)
1.043 (0.081) 
1.047 (0.108) 
0.779* (o.ioi)
1.01 5 (0.067) 
1.099 (0.096) 
0.737** (0.074)
1.360** (o.ioo) 
1.424** (0.165) 
1.172 (o.i7i)
0.705** (0.049) 
0.573** (0.043) 
0.540** (0.045) 
0.305** (0.038)
* Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
1 Standard errors in brackets.
2Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants).
3Dummy (1 if individual show preference for work).
4Omitted category is the lowest level (El) .
5Omitted category is Cohort 1951-55 (Cohort 1952-55 for West-Germany and Cohort 1949 for Sweden). 
6 Cohort 1954 f or Sweden only.
Cohort 1959 for Sweden.
8 Cohort 1964 f or Sweden.
9 Cohort 1969 for Sweden.
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3.9 A ppendix C: Graphs
3.9.1 T he Spanish  C ase
Figure 3.11: Evolution of Total Fertility Rates: US, Netherlands and Spain
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Figure 3.13: ‘Artificial’ Survival in the Married Childless State, By Cohort — Spanish 
Females
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Figure 3.14: ‘Artificial’ Survival in the Married With One Child State, By Cohort — 
Spanish Females
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Figure 3.15: ‘Artificial’ Survival in the Married With Two Children State, By Cohort 
Spanish Females
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Chapter 4 
Employment Transitions after 
M otherhood
4.1 Introduction
The employment transitions that mothers experience after childbearing are crucial to the 
understanding of the relationship between fertility and female labour force participation. 
These transitions after a birth may take different forms. For instance, some women move 
from employment to non-employment (either they become unemployed or inactive). We 
define this as a Career Break and it can be either temporary or permanent. Women may 
also experience Downward Occupational Mobility. That is, even if a woman remains em­
ployed, she may end up in an occupation that is below the one held before birth in terms 
of quality, payment and responsibility.
The are studies relating the incidence of Downward Occupational Mobility to motherhood 
in Britain (Newell and Joshi (1986) and Dex, Joshi, McCulloch and Macran (1998)). 
However, there are no similar studies for Spain. Part of the contribution of this chapter 
is to fill in this gap.
Turning now to Career Breaks, there is theoretical evidence that labour and family poli­
cies have an impact on female labour supply, especially amongst mothers. Becker (1981) 
models female labour supply taking into account family decisions. Women with children 
allocate their time between the labour market and childcare. There are several factors that 
determine their choice: preferences and cultural aspects, the price of childcare, possible 
substitutes for childcare and family taxation policies. All these elements play a funda­
mental role in a mother’s employment decision and consequently, in the transitions from 
employment to non-employment after first birth. In order to evaluate how various policies
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affect female participation around childbearing, cross-country and cross-time comparison 
is important.
Transitions to non-employment after childbearing matter because they are likely to cause a 
loss in human capital and future wages, and this effect is expected to be larger the longer 
the time spent out of paid work.1 For example, Beblo and Wolf (2002) find evidence 
that discontinuous employment caused by maternal leave reduces the wage for females, 
ceteris paribus. Depending on the economic conditions and governmental rules, women 
might face barriers against returning to work after a period of maternity or childcare leave.
This Chapter is organised as follows: in Section 4.2 we summarise some key work on 
this literature. Section 4.3 describes the labour market, maternity leave and taxation 
regimes in Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. In Section 4.4 we analyse 
the probability of employment after motherhood, given females’ observed characteristics 
and labour market conditions. In Section 4.5 we restrict the transitions analysis to the 
Spanish case. Country comparison follows in Section 4.6. We then conclude in Section 
4.7.
4.2 Related Literature
Downward Occupational Mobility through breaks in employment (in particular linked to 
childbearing) has mainly been studied in the UK. Most studies point out that the length 
of time spent not working prior to re-entry and taking part-time jobs are the principal 
reasons for Downward Occupational Mobility. For example, Newell and Joshi (1986) focus 
on British women born in 1946 to study occupational downgrading after childbearing. 
Although some recent mothers had not completed the transition back to paid work at the 
interview date,2 they observe that three out of ten of the completed transitions experi­
enced downward mobility. They argue that mothers who move to part-time work have 
higher risk of downward mobility compared to full-time returners. The same result is 
found by Perry (1988), who concludes that working part-time after birth increases the 
likelihood of downward occupational mobility. Dex et al. (1998) uses the 1958 National 
Child Development Study cohort to model employment transitions around childbearing in 
Britain. They find that education is the main factor that secures women’s job continuity 
after motherhood. Contrary to what the authors expected, delaying motherhood helps 
high-educated women to remain at work but it is not essential.
1 Notice that we will use ‘work’ as a synonymous of ‘paid work’.
2 Mothers axe 32 years old at the interview date.
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Most of the research on employment transitions around motherhood focuses on the with­
drawal of women from work ( Career Break) which can be either temporary or permanent. 
For the US, Desai and Waite (1991) test whether occupational sex composition3 deter­
mines the likelihood that recent mothers are employed. They find that the probability of 
being employed after childbearing depends mainly on those occupational characteristics 
that raise the opportunity cost of being out of the labour force, independently of sex 
composition. They also distinguish between women with high and low work commitment 
depending on their answer to the question whether they plan to work at the age of 35. 
As expected, they find that those who said yes had a greater probability of remaining at 
work after motherhood. However, women with low commitment were more responsive to 
financial pressures and worked when they had to.
Ondrich, Spiess and Yang (1996) study the return to work after childbirth in Germany 
using a hazard approach. They focus on the legal parental leave period and the post- 
parental leave. Their results show that once the protection expires, mothers with strong 
labour force attachment (measured by years of experience and pre-birth full-time con­
tracts) are more likely to return.
There are several studies for the Scandinavian countries. For instance, Ronsen and Sun- 
strom (1996) study mother’s employment transitions around birth in Sweden and Norway. 
They use a hazard approach to analyse the entry into employment after birth, with spe­
cial focus on the effect of parental leave policies. Albrecht, Edin, Sunstrom and Vroman 
(1999) estimate the effects of different types of time career interruptions on wages by 
gender. They test whether human capital depreciation is the main cause for wage drops. 
Since they find that parental leave is not negative for female’s whereas it is for male’s, 
they propose signaling as an alternative explanation. Bernhardt (1986) analyses women’s 
home attachment at first birth, using a logistic model for three educational groups. She 
concludes that the likelihood of being at home 12 months after confinement is signifi­
cantly affected by education, marital status, early labour-force withdrawal and duration 
of the union. Furthermore, the paper shows that low educated women have become, over 
time, closer to other educational groups in terms of home attachment. Bernhardt (1988) 
writes about the increasing tendency to reduce working hours among one-child mothers, 
particularly among women with a low level of education. Part-time work has become 
the ‘combination strategy’ (family and work) for both women who previously would have 
selected the ‘home strategy’ and for those who would have followed the ‘career strategy’, 
as the author defines it.
3They call female occupations those with a majority of women in the market.
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Similar results are developed in Ellingsaeter and Ronsen (1996) and Kravdal (1992) for 
Norway. In the 80s, Norwegian labour force participation rates for mothers with the 
youngest child under 3 years increased substantially from 47% to 69%. This increase was 
accompanied by a rise in part-time work, partly thanks to the state, which is a good 
creator of part-time jobs.
Adam (1996a) uses the Spanish Household and Expenditure Survey (ECPF) for the pe­
riod 1985-90 to study married women’s labour force transitions in Spain. The advantage 
of our data (FFS, see Subsection 4.5.2) compared to the ECPF is that it has richer in­
formation about women and comprises longer periods.4 But the greatest weakness of our 
data compared to hers is that there are no income covariates. In Adam (1996a), the 
author concludes that children are the main reason for mothers’ abandoning the labour 
force in Spain. However, the principal cause of re-entry is the insecurity of husband’s 
employment rather than children.
Although the vast majority of research has been done for single countries, there are, how­
ever, three main references that deal with more than one country. Gustafsson, Wetzels, 
Vlasblom and Dex (1996) and Wetzels (1999) compare women’s labour force transitions 
related to childbirth in Germany, Sweden and Great Britain. They use different panels 
for each country: the GSOEP for Germany, the Swedish HUS and the British BHPS. 
Their results show that German and British women have higher full-time employment 
pre-first-birth. German women stay longer at home with children because of their ‘bread­
winner regime’.5 They also find evidence that the accumulation of human capital is a 
main determinant for re-entry in Germany and Great Britain whereas it is not in Sweden. 
Their paper shows a crucial relationship between the timing of re-entry into employment 
and country-specific policies.
Another cross-country study by Saurel-Cubizolles, Romito, Escriba-Agiiir, Lelong, Pons 
and Ancel (1999) describes the return to work after childbirth in France, Italy and Spain, 
and its relationship to their different maternity leave policies. Their results show that 
the percentage of women coming back to work within a year after birth is around 80% in 
both France and Italy. The proportion is lower in Spain6 (53%). The gap of post-birth
4Adam (1996b) points out in her paper the shortcoming of ECPF, which is the lack of female’s 
education, experience and regions.
5This implies a strict division of labour. That is, the husband is perceived as the earner and the wife 
as the carer.
6Their study is based on urban and rural areas around Valencia city in 1992. Therefore, their work can 
not be generalised to the entire Spanish population since their sample only covers the Valencian region.
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employment break was related to each country’s policies. For example, Italian women 
returned to work later, which they say is due to their longer post-birth maternity leave.7
4.3 Labour Market, Taxation and Welfare Policies
In this section we report ‘family friendly’ policies across countries that are relevant for 
mother’s employment. We summarise in Table 4.1 the main characteristics of mater­
nity/parental leave8 and benefits in these countries. We also provide information on 
childcare leave9 in Table 4.2. These data are a subset of those used by Gauthier (2000). 
Besides maternity and childcare leave, countries differ substantially concerning daycare 
provision. For example, Moss and Deven (1990) report that 31% of one-year-old children 
with working mothers were in the collective daycare system in France, whereas less than 
10% are in Italy or Spain.
Table 4.1: Maternity Leave and Benefits — Country Comparison: 1975-971
Duration of leave2 Cash benefits3
Countries 1975 1985 1990 1997 1975 1985 1990 1997
Belgium 14 14 14 15 60 80 80 77
Germany 14 14 14 14 100 100 100 100
Italy 22 22 22 22 80 80 80 80
Spain 12 14 16 16 75 75 75 100
Sweden 30 51 51 64 90 70 71 62
1Source: Gauthier (2000) and Moss and Deven (1990). 
2Duration of the leave in weeks.
o
Cash benefits as a percentage of regular wages.
Table 4.3 shows that Spain, Italy and Germany are the countries with less public funded 
childcare.10 But not only the quantity and cost of childcare matters but also if it fits 
working mothers’ conditions. Hank and Kreyenfeld (2000) find that the availability of 
childcare does not increase female participation in West-Germany. They argue that, de­
spite high rates of available childcare, the opening hours are too limited to satisfy the
For the same reason their results are not directly comparable to ours since we look at the national level.
7The authors seem to use surveys that consider women on maternity leave as not working. This is 
different from our survey, which accounts women on maternity leave as working, except for Sweden.
8The term maternity/parental leave refers to paid leave during the period immediately prior and after 
childbirth.
9 Childcare leave refers to optional extended leave after maternity/parental leave.
10 Although this might be partly endogenously driven, we believe that it provides evidence for differences 
in public funded childcare.
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Table 4.2: Childcare Leave Schemes in 1999 — Country Comparison2
Countries Duration1 Cash Benefits3 Flexibility
Belgium 3 37% Up to the child’s fourth birthday
Germany 364 24% Immediately after paid maternity leave
Italy 6 30% Up to the child’s ninth birthday
Spain 364 Unpaid Immediately after paid maternity leave
Sweden 15 66% Up to the child’s eighth birthday
1 Source: Gauthier (2000).
Duration in months.
3Cash benefits as % of wage.
4Duration includes the post-birth period covered by the maternity leave.
Table 4.3: Children in Public Funded Childcare in 1993 — Country Comparison1
Countries Under age of 3 Age 3 to school age
Belgium 30% 95%
Germany2 5% 65%
Italy 6% 97%
Spain 5% 84%
Sweden 33% 79%
1 Source: Gauthier (2000), Moss and Deven (1990) and Tietze and Cryer (1999). 
2Data from 1988.
needs of an employed woman.
Gauthier (2000) summarises public policies affecting fertility and families in the 15 EU 
members. She finds that across all family types, cash support for family tends to be low 
in Portugal, Spain and the UK. Furthermore, she points out that these cash trends over 
time are relatively stable, except for some increase in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and 
Luxembourg. Finally, flexible arrangements provided by firms is another way to facili­
tate the combination work and family. Table 4.4 summarizes data on flexible working 
arrangements in enterprises as it appears in OECD (2001). Italy and Spain have the 
lowest percentage of employees reporting that they work flexi-time.
There is also an impact of different taxation systems on the incentives in couple families. 
The basic issue is whether the income is calculated on the basis of the sum of the two 
earned incomes (Joint) or on the basis of the two earned incomes separately (Separate).
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Table 4.4: Indicators of Family-friendly and Relevant Flexible Working Arrangements in 
Enterprises in 1995-96 — Country Comparison1
Countries Employer provision 
for child day-care
% of employees reporting 
they work flexi-time
% of women part-time 
on a voluntary basis
Belgium 14% 26% 21%
Germany 16% 33% 27%
Italy 5% 19% 11%
Spain 8% 20% 8%
Sweden 1% 32% 20%
1Source: OECD (2001).
Table 4.5: Evolution of the Taxation Type — Country Comparison1
Countries 1970 1980 1990
Belgium2 Joint Joint Separate
Germany Joint Joint Joint
Italy3 Joint Separate Separate
Spain4 Joint Joint Separate
Sweden5 Joint Separate Separate
1Source: OECD (1993).
2Belgium moved to Separate system in 1990.
3Italy moved to Separate system in 1977.
4Spain moved to Separate system in 1989.
5Sweden moved to Separate system in 1971.
Whatever form of joint tax system is used, there is a priori a reduced incentive for the 
partner with lower potential earnings to work to increase his/her labour supply. This is 
because the tax system is progressive and, if a couple is taxed jointly, they will probably 
face a higher tax rate for the sum of their earnings, compared to a situation where their 
earnings are taxed individually. In Table 4.5 we report the type of taxation regime in 
each country. Except for West-Germany, all countries moved from a Joint to Separate 
system between 1970 and 1990. Joint taxation has been linked to a ‘breadwinner’ model 
(see Sainsbury (1994) for further details), which is characterised by the strict division of 
labour. That is, the husband is perceived as the earner and the wife as the carer. Apart 
from the type of taxation system, there are other family-based tax reliefs and benefits 
that are relevant for re-entry into employment after motherhood. Table 4.27 in Appendix 
4.9 summarises some standard tax reliefs in 1990.
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4.4 Empirical Specification
The empirical model aims to determine how a woman’s observed characteristics before 
her first birth affect her probability of working after the baby is born. We are interested 
in transitions from employment (12 months before the birth event) to non-employment.11 
Mothers who were at work before birth decide monthly after birth if they participate in 
the labour market. They maximise their utility subject to their budget and time con­
straint (see Becker (1981) for further details on family-labour supply models). For given 
preferences, family and taxation policies have an impact on the mother’s budget (e.g. sub­
sidies for childcare) and time constraint (public available child-care or flexible hours),12 
and these policies could make it more likely that women participate, ceteris paribus (see 
Chapter 2 for a theoretical perspective). Simultaneously, mothers who choose to be active 
are affected by job opportunities (i.e. unemployment rates) that resolve if they are em­
ployed. These job opportunities also differ across countries. In our analysis, we estimate 
a reduced form model for the probability of employment after childbearing that embodies 
both the decision process and the economic conditions.
We estimate a probit model that takes into account the sample selection that arises from 
being employed or not before birth, using the Heckman approach. We first determine 
the characteristics that make it more likely that women belong into the sub-sample of 
being at work before birth and then the factors that determine whether this sub-group is 
employed or not after birth. In the selection equation we control for the national female 
unemployment rates at one year before birth in order to identify the model. By doing 
this, we assume that these unemployment rates have no direct effect on the probability 
of being employed after birth, given that we are controlling for year dummies after birth 
(which capture the unemployment rates at that time).
We use the Latent Variable Model for Binary Variables.13 We observe a binary vari­
able Eit, which is the labour force status of a woman i at time t. This variable Eit can 
only be observed in two states: a woman is at work (Eit=1) or not (Eit=0). Never­
theless, not all women in the labour force are there with the same certainty. That is, 
a woman might be observed as E it= 1 but be very close to leave employment, whereas 
another woman might be also observed as Eu= 1 and be very attached to her decision.
11 Downward Occupational Mobility is not modelled but only described for the Spanish case in Section 
4.5. This is because occupational categories are missing for the other countries under analysis.
12Notice that if women have fully flexibility on the number of hours, they face a continuous time 
constraint. By contrast, if they must either work full-time or not work at all, they face a kink in the time 
constraint that could lead them to non-participation with higher probability.
13We base our model description on Long (1997).
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We suppose that there is an unobserved or so-called latent variable Eil that generates the 
observed Eit s. Those women who have larger values of Ei* are observed as Ea=  1, while 
those with smaller values of E£  are observed as Eit=0. The idea of a latent E£  is that 
there is an underlying propensity to work that generates the observed state through the 
following measurement equation:
Eu = { „ /. ' (4.i)
where r  is the threshold.
The latent Efi is assumed to be linearly related to the observed characteristics Xu by 
the structural model:
Hit = x itP 4- (4-2)
Although we are not able to observe a change in Ejj. results in a change in what we 
indeed observe, namely, whether a woman is at work at that time. Some characteristics, 
for example, the number of children in the household, will modify the woman’s propensity 
to be employed as opposed to working at home. We would expect that a new birth will 
diminish the propensity to work up to a point to overcome a threshold that makes this 
woman decide to leave the labour force and stay at home.
Since E = 1 when E* > 0 and E* = xj3 +  e,
P r(E  = l|a:) =  P r(E * > 0|x) =  Pr(x(3 +  e > 0|a?) =  Pr(e > —xfi\x)}4
We assume that our errors follow a normal distribution with E(e\x) = 0, which results in 
the probit model. The normal distribution is symmetric, meaning that P r{E  = l|x ) =  
Pr(e < x/3\x). This is the cumulative density function of the error distribution evaluated 
at x/3. Consequently,
P r(E  = l|ar) =  $(&/?) (4.3)
These models permit us to compute how different explanatory variables affect the prob­
ability that an individual belongs to a particular status (categorical dependent variable). 
Here, the probit estimation has the target to determine the probability of a woman with 
certain characteristics being at work or not. Since we are interested in the evolution of a 
woman’s career following the first birth, we estimate a monthly probit15 from the moment
14We take the threshold r  as zero. There is no loss of generality here because the threshold is absorbed 
into the constant term.
15We assume that the errors are normally distributed.
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS AFTER MOTHERHOOD 106
of birth onwards.
If observations are independent, the general likelihood function of a probit model is:
L (P IE ,X )  =  f t  $(*</?) n < i  -  (4.4)
E = 1 E = 0
E  is a random variable that takes value 1 if the individual is employed and 0 otherwise. 
In our probit, we have the following specification:
i f *  -  $ (a tDt +  PkXkit)) (4.5)
E = 1 k E = 0  k
Dt is a matrix with 96 columns, one for each month after motherhood.16 For example, D\ 
is a column vector that takes value 1 for each individual at the month one after birth and 
0 otherwise. Similarly, D2 takes value 1 at month 2 after confinement and 0 otherwise, 
and so on. Xkit is a vector of explanatory variable k for each individual i and time after 
birth t. (3k is the vector of the coefficients of the explanatory variables and at is the 
vector with the coefficients of the duration effects. If we maximise the log-likelihood of 
the previous expression, we will find the estimates for (3k and a t.
Note that we do not observe all individuals after first motherhood up to 96 months, which 
means that the contribution of each individual to the whole explanatory matrix does not 
have the same length. We are aware that observing individuals over a heterogenous period 
of time might produce misleading estimates because there may be a systematic relation­
ship between period of stay in the sample and employment status. In order to check this, 
we re-estimate the same model and restrict the sample to those individuals who appear 
throughout the whole period (older individuals). Results (see Table 4.30 in Appendix 
4.9) are numerically similar to those estimated with the whole sample (Table 4.22), which 
suggests that we do not need to be preoccupied by observing individuals over different 
length of time.
To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we will plot the predicted probability path 
of being at work for different representative individuals (called R I). The estimated prob­
ability of being employed at each month after first birth is given by the next expression, 
where we substitute our selected values for XkRit•
16We analyse post-birth labour force status up to 96 months after the confinement.
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Prob(E = l )RIt = §{a tDt +  ^  PkXkRit) (4.6)
k
We reduce the duration dummies to £>3, £>6, D \2, £>24, £>48, and DQ6 and plot the proba­
bility of being employed at each of these post-birth periods.
4.5 The Spanish Case
4.5.1 Introduction
Although there are some studies of employment transitions and Downward Occupational 
Mobility after motherhood in Europe, especially in the UK (see Section 4.2), little re­
search has been done on this topic for the Spanish case. We are aware of one piece 
of research by Adam (1996a) that uses the Spanish Household and Expenditure Survey 
(ECPF) for the period 1985-90 to study married women’s labour force transitions. Our 
analysis differs from hers in that we investigate both transitions from employment to 
non-employment (temporary or permanent Career Break) and Downward Occupational 
Mobility after childbearing. We use different data sources (see later in Subsection 4.5.2) 
that allow us to study when these transitions are more likely to occur and how they have 
evolved between the 70s and the 90s. This is important since the society, labour market 
institutions and the jobless rate have changed considerably over this period.
There are several potential reasons why Downward Occupational Mobility may happen, 
both on the supply and the demand side. On the one hand, mothers may be willing to 
take jobs that involve fewer responsibilities so as to be able to take care of their children. 
On the other hand, employers may be reluctant to hire mothers for high profile positions 
since they think that their family role may absorb their energy and interfere with their 
productivity. Employers may also think that the skills of mothers deteriorate when they 
are on maternity leave. Furthermore, in some countries, women return to part-time jobs 
after childbearing and, for whatever reason, these part-time jobs tend to be more concen­
trated in low qualified occupations.17
The outline of this section is as follows: the next subsection presents the data. In Sub­
section 4.5.3 we describe the employment transitions in the sample. Subsection 4.5.4 
summarises the factors under which transitions to non-employment are more likely to 
happen. We finally conclude in Subsection 4.5.5.
17This may be a supply phenomenon from the mother’s side.
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4.5.2 D ata and Constructed Variables
In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the employment behaviour of women 
around first birth we exploit three complementary datasets: ‘Family and Fertility Survey’ 
(FFS), ‘Encuesta de Poblacion Activa’ (EPA), which is the Spanish Labour Force Survey, 
and ‘European Community Household Panel’ (ECHP). We next explain how the use of 
all of them compensates in part for their individual deficiencies.
The FFS allows us to analyse some of the factors that determine the likelihood of return­
ing to work after first birth and how these transitions have evolved across time. However, 
although the FFS is rich in demographic and social variables, it lacks precise information 
about some job-related characteristics. For example, it does not specify tenure or type of 
contract (permanent vs. fixed-term). Since our focus is to explore how pre-birth job and 
personal features affect post-birth labour force status, we would like to have a complement 
to the FFS that incorporates these covariates into the analysis. This is done with the 
EPA, which contains broad information on job-related characteristics and it is available 
with panel structure since 1987. Individuals are followed for six quarters with interviews 
every three months, which means that we can build up a woman’s history for a year and 
a half.
Limitations of the FFS and the EPA make it desirable to combine both of them in 
order to explore post-birth employment transitions. On the one hand, the FFS allows us 
to construct long life histories, and it contains social and partners’ education variables. 
But some details on job features are missing. On the other hand, the EPA has further 
labour market variables but it lacks long histories and social covariates. By using both 
surveys, we are able to describe more accurately the patterns of employment transitions 
after childbearing. We undertake two independent analyses (one estimation with the FFS 
and another with the EPA) and complement results. These two surveys share the same 
drawback, which is the lack of income and wage data. For this reason, we need a third 
survey (ECHP) in order to rank occupations.
FFS
A full description of the ‘Family and Fertility Survey’ is given in Subsection 3.4.2 of 
Chapter 3. For our estimation we select those women who gave birth at least once (1941 
individuals).
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The explanatory variables18 are the following: region dummies {NW, NE, C, CMadrid, 
E, Canaries and S ), being religious (Religious), education {El, E2, ESVoc and ESGrPo), 
cohorts, partner’s education,19 monthly working experience from 15 years old to the last 
job before birth (Experience), national proportion of temporary contracts {Temporary), 
age at first birth (AgeAtlC) and its square {AgeAt 1C2), age at first job {AgeAtlJob) 
and a dummy for the occupation held one year before birth. The latter variable has 
been classified initially into four categories High, Moderate, Low and Very Low for the 
descriptive statistics. However, in the estimation of the model, we reclassify the occupa­
tional ladder into one dummy variable ( OcHIGH) by joining the two highest categories 
{High and Moderate) into one {HIGH) and the two lowest levels {Low and Very Low) 
into one {LOW).  All explanatory variables are taken at one year pre-birth, except for the 
proportion of temporary contracts, which is a time-varying variable.
EPA
For the EPA analysis, we have constructed our sample in the following way. We take fe­
males who are between 16 and 49 years old. We pool interviews from 1987 to 1996. Then, 
we select those women who had a birth between the third and fourth quarter in their 
sequence of interviews. The reason why we only consider birth transitions in the middle 
of the observed history is that we would like to have labour force status information for 
at least six months before birth and at least six months after. In fact, what is observed 
at quarter 1 will imply employment characteristics between six and nine months before 
birth, without being able to be more precise on that. The same is true for post-birth 
labour force status. The total number of women in our sample who had a birth between 
the third and fourth quarter are 2016. For 722 of them, this was their first birth.
Some explanatory variables20 refer to job features at quarter 1: Employer is a dummy 
that takes value one if the woman was employer and zero if employee; Public is one if
18Full description of the variables in Table 4.24 in Appendix 4.8.
19Partner’s education is a covariate that refers to the partner at the interviews’ date and not at the 
birth date. A female could have changed partner in between, which would imply that the education 
collected is not the father’s one. However, we believe that the correlation of education between partners 
is expected to be high. That is, for those few who changed companion, education of the current partner 
should be a good proxy for the father’s education. It is also possible that in 1995 the mother does not 
have a companion anymore because of being widowed, separated or divorced. In this situation, partner 
education will be missing (6% of our cases). There axe two plausible solutions. First, we can discard 
these individuals and proceed with our estimation. Second, we can make missing values take a particular 
value (e.g. E1P=  1) and create simultaneously a dummy variable that takes value one whenever partner’s 
education is missing. We have undertaken both estimations and we have found that in any option the 
rest of the estimates were affected. Our results are presented in the latter alternative since we believe 
that it is worth keeping our sample size greater.
20Description of the variables in Table 4.25 in Appendix 4.8.
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she was employed in the public sector; Permanent is one if the person had a permanent 
contract; Fulltime takes value one if she worked more than 35 hours per week; Tenure 
is the number of months she was working at that particular job; OcHIGH if the person 
was previously employed in a HIGH position. Other variables correspond to values at 
quarter 6: Age and its square Age2; educational dummies E l, E2, ESVoc, and E3GrPo\21 
Nationality takes value one if she is Spanish; a dummy for marital status (Married)’, re­
gional dummies NW, NE, C, CMadrid, E, Canaries and S, being the latter the omitted 
category; temporal dummies Year 1988-90, Year 1991-93 and Year 1994~96 with the 
former as the reference level.
ECHP
The analysis of a child-birth job transitions requires the construction of an occupational 
ranking. One criterion to build the ranking of occupations would involve ordering them 
according to wages of workers in the sample. Since the FFS does not have wage informa­
tion, we must find an alternative approach in order to construct a proxy for occupation 
ranking. We take the wave 1994-95 of the data set ECHP (which contains wages), create 
the classification for a comparable sample in the ECHP,22 and apply the same ordering 
rule to the FFS and the EPA sample. The construction of the ranking is done as follows. 
We first estimate a logarithmic wage equation on age, square of age, and occupation dum­
mies.23 Then, we use the coefficients of this estimation to order the different jobs into 
four categories.
The first and highest position (called High) in terms of wages is formed by the following 
occupations: legislators, senior officials and corporate managers, physical, mathematical, 
engineering science, life science, health, teaching and other professionals. The next group 
(named Moderate) are: teaching and other associate professionals, office clerks and cus­
tomer services clerks, metal, machinery and related trades workers, precision, handicraft, 
printing and related trades workers. The third category (Low) is formed by physical, 
engineering science, life science and health associate professionals, general managers, per­
sonal and protective services workers, models, salespersons and demonstrators, extraction 
and building trades workers, other craft and related trade workers, stationary-plant and 
related operators, machine operators and assemblers, drivers and mobile-plant operators. 
The lowest position on the occupation ladder ( Very Low) is occupied by market-oriented 
skilled agricultural and fishery workers, subsistence agricultural and fishery workers, sales
21 The omitted category is the lowest level.
22The sample consists of employed women between 16 and 49 years old.
23The survey follows the ISCO occupations’ classification.
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and services elementary occupations, agricultural, fishery and related labourers, workers 
in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport.
4 .5 .3  D escrip tive  S ta tistic s
We have already introduced the possibility of two types of employment transitions: the 
complete abandonment of employment after a first birth (either towards inactivity or 
unemployment) and the movement towards a lower rung of the occupational ladder (but 
remaining employed). We called the former temporary or permanent Career Break and the 
latter Downward Occupation Mobility. We next describe the incidence of these transitions 
in Spain making a simultaneous use of both the FFS and the EPA data.
Tem porary or Perm anent C areer B reak
Figure 4.1: Employment Rates Around First Birth — Spanish Mothers
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Figure 4.1 shows mother’s employment rates (in the FFS sample) at different periods 
of time surrounding the first birth, starting two years before and finishing two years af­
ter.24 This graph confirms that there exists an important permanent Career Break after 
childbearing since there are a large number of women who do not return to paid work. 
Employment rates fall drastically from 57% twenty-four months before birth to 33% af­
terwards. In the EPA25 sample, the proportion of women who are at work between six
24Employment rates are computed taking into account censoring. For example, there are some women 
not observed two years after birth. Thus, they have been subtracted from the total number of mothers 
in order to compute the rates.
25In Subsection 4.5.2 we explained the gain of complementing the FFS analysis of employment tran­
sitions with the EPA. This survey contains more detailed information on pre-birth job characteristics
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Table 4.6: Staying-on-rates at Work After First Birth — Spanish Females
Survey EPA1 FFS2
Months After Birth 6-9 12 2 4 60
% 65 60 59 56
n observations 308 1125 1077 906
Conditioned of Employment 6-9 Months Before 1st Birth. 
Conditioned of Employment 12 Months Before 1st Birth.
and nine months before their first child (quarter 1) is 42.7%. This result is analogous to 
the one we have in the FFS’s statistics (see Figure 4.1). Employment rates are 41.4% 
at quarter 2, 37.8% at quarter 3, 33.8% at quarter 4, 32.4% at quarter 5 and 32.5% at 
quarter 6.26 Notice that the EPA survey classifies women in maternity leave as being 
employed. This means that we could observe drops from the labour force a quarter after 
birth. The reason is that some women might stop working just after their maternity leave 
period expires and considered as employed until then.27
Table 4.6 shows the staying-on rates of those women who were employed one year before 
first birth: 65% of women who were employed at first quarter were employed at quarter 6. 
In the FFS, around 60% of women who worked one year before birth worked one year after, 
which seems in line with the EPA output. The advantage of EPA is that we are able to 
disentangle transitions from employment to unemployment from those from employment 
to inactivity. In our sample, we observe that among those women who were employed at 
first quarter, 11% are unemployed at quarter six and 24% are inactive. Therefore, there 
is a significant proportion of women that experience unemployment after childbearing. 
Furthermore, the job characteristics of women who were working before motherhood play 
an important role in the chances these women will be employed after. This information 
is summarised in Table 4.7.
For example, tenure at work is a positive determinant of returning to job: 41.2% of women 
who said to have been in their pre-birth job for less than 12 months stayed at work. The 
percentage is 64.6% for tenure more than 12 months. As expected, 77.9% of those moth­
ers with a pre-birth permanent contract are at work in quarter 6, whereas 49.7% is the
(e.g. tenure, type of contract or sector are not present in the FFS) and disentangles unemployment from 
inactivity. However, the period of observation after motherhood is limited to 6-9 months.
26Recall that births in EPA occur between quarter 3 and 4.
27Maternity leave in Spain lasts for 16 weeks. Women must take at least 6 weeks after the delivery, 
and no duration is mandatory before birth.
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS AFTER MOTHERHOOD 113
Table 4.7: Staying-on-rates at Work After First Birth By Characteristics, EPA — Spanish 
Females
Characteristics %
Public Sector YesNo
85
60
Tenure >12 Months <12 Months
65
41
Type of Contract PermanentFixed-Term
78
50
Daily Hours Full-timePart-time
67
45
Education Level Graduate Non-Graduate
87
57
equivalent percentage for those with a fixed-term contract. Pre-birth full-time jobs also 
contribute positively to the likelihood of being employed, with percentages 45% and 67% 
for part-time and full-time respectively. A pre-birth job in the public sector also increases 
enormously the proportion of women who are employed afterwards: 84.8% of women pre­
viously in the public sector work after childbearing whereas only 59.8% do among those 
in the private sector before birth. Education level is, however, a key factor. 87.2% of 
women with a graduate education degree are employed at quarter 6, the percentage being 
much lower for non-graduates.
The employment rate after birth seems to stabilise at around 35%. In fact, the em­
ployment rate 10 years after the first birth calculated from our FFS sample is 34.3%. 
This excludes the possibility that women are coming back to work in large numbers af­
ter a break of two years or more. Data demonstrate that rather than women returning 
slowly to work, mothers who left work at birth are not returning at all (the employment 
rates remain flat). Therefore, there is evidence of the so-called permanent Career Break 
(total abandonment of the employment history). This is in fine with the paper by Adam 
(1996b),28 which finds that Spanish mothers tend to withdraw from the labour force after 
childbearing and are likely to remain outside. Interestingly, her results show that women 
whose husbands’ are unemployed return to the labour force with greater probability.
We would like to know if employment rates around motherhood differ across cohorts. In 
Figure 4.2 we compare employment rates close to birth for cohorts 1945-54 and 1955-64. 
Although both groups share approximately the same level of employment two years before
28The author uses the Spanish Household and Expenditure Survey (ECPF) from 1985 to 1990.
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Figure 4.2: Employment Rates Around First Birth, By Cohort — Spanish Mothers
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Figure 4.3: Employment Rates Around Marriage for Women Without Children, By Co­
hort — Spanish Females
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birth (60% for women born between 1945-54 and 58% for those born between 1955-64), 
they converge to a rather different level two years after. Employment rates 24 months 
after childbearing are 27% and 38%, respectively. This shows that the negative impact 
of family formation on female’s employment has diminished in younger generations. We 
can also calculate the proportion of women who were at work one year before birth and 
still are two years after. We find that approximately 56% of women who were employed 
before are employed after in cohort 1945-54. The proportion is about 66% for the cohort 
1955-64. Thus, transitions from employment to non-employment are reduced in younger 
generations.
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Table 4.8: Staying-on-rates1 at Work By Cohort, FFS — Spanish Females
After Marriage2 After 1st Birth
Cohorts 1945-54 1955-64 1945-54 1955-64
% 59 84 56 66
1 Staying-on rates stands for the percentage of women who were employed 
12 months before the event and they are employed 24 months after. 
2Women without children.
Note that employment rates initiate their decline some time before birth, which is prob­
ably caused by women abandoning their work at marriage. In order to disentangle the 
effect of birth on employment from the effect of marriage, we need a control group. We 
look at employment rates around marriage for those women without children. Pooling all 
cohorts we calculate employment rates close to marriage for childless women. The rate of 
employment for this control group is 64% 24 months before marriage and 58% 24 months 
after. Therefore, there is a drop in employment, caused by the fact of getting married. 
We similarly compute these rates for cohorts 1945-54 and 1955-64 in order to check for 
generational changes. This is done in Figure 4.3.29 Employment rates move from 67% 
two years pre-marriage to 41% two years post-marriage for women born between 1945-54. 
Rates decline from 62% to 52% for women born between 1955-64. This is evidence that 
the negative impact of marriage on female employment rates (i.e. traditional society) di­
minishes in younger cohorts. Notice that the decline is sharper at marriage among women 
born between 1945-54. Therefore, the exit rate from the labour market around first child 
is shown to be stronger caused by the birth itself in later generations. In Table 4.8 we 
summarise the staying-on rates after marriage30 and first birth by cohort.
In Figure 4.4 we provide further information on the evolution of female employment rates 
in Spain by age in 1977, 1987 and 1997. In 1977, we observe that employment rates for 
females in their early 20s are about 50% and they decline considerably afterwards. The 
profile for 1987 is rather different, with a rising trend up to the age of 27 (at about 40%) 
and a slight decline afterwards. Finally, in 1997, employment rates increase sharply up to 
the late 20s (at about 50%) and they remain fairly constant afterwards. Thus, Figure 4.4 
shows that the pattern of employment rates by age (which also reflects family formation 
and education) is changing over time. The increase of women’s education explains the
29We must point out that the sample size for the construction of this graph is very small: 27 individuals 
for the cohort 1945-54 and 69 for cohort 1955-66.
30This is done for a control group of women who are married without children.
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of Employment Rates By Age, EPA — Spanish Females
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rising trend up to the age of about 28 years in cross sections 1987 and 1997. In 1977, 
however, women were employed at a fairly young age and left their jobs once they started 
their own family.
Another interesting aspect is how long it takes for women to come back to the labour 
market after a first birth, conditional on their returning. Table 4.9 represents the monthly 
average of the gap between birth and first job for different groups among those women 
who returned within five years. Those women who did not break their job history and 
worked continuously after birth are considered to have a nil gap. Data show that the 
mean time in returning to work for those women who were working one year before birth 
is 0.5 months. Additionally, women who did not work before but did it after the confine­
ment have an average gap of 19.7 months. This number is calculated for those women 
who came back to work during the period of five years, which means that some women 
might start working later and, consequently, they are not accounted for in the analysis. 
This censoring causes an underestimation of the average gap. Despite this fact, Table 4.9 
shows unequivocally that women at higher positions return to work faster on average. Fe­
male previously at High job category have a zero mean. Those females initially at a Very 
Low position, who came back to a job within five years, required an average of 1.2 months.
One might question how it is possible for such a low average gap if females have the right 
of maternity leave. Recall that we are conditioning on returning within five years and a 
woman can be under maternity leave while remaining employed. Being under maternity 
leave is not equivalent to not working. In fact, maternity leave is accounted as being
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Table 4.9: Average Monthly Returning Gap to Working Status for those who Return in 
Five Years, FFS — Spanish Females
Occupational Status Before n Average Monthly Return Gap
Not Working 270 19.7
High 55 0.0
Moderate 228 0.2
Working Low 283 0.4
Very Low 188 1.2
Total 754 0.5
TOTAL 1150 7.1
Table 4.10: Occupational Status After First Birth By Age at Motherhood (%), FFS — 
Spanish Females
Occupational Status 5 Years After Birth Age at l at Birth
-20 2 0 - 2 4 25-29 30-h
Not Working 68.5 69.9 63.9 59.3
Working at Good Level 1.1 1.3 4.0 5.3
Working at Average Level 4.0 6.9 11.4 17.7
Working at Low Level 13.1 12.9 14.6 13.3
Working at Very Low Level 13.3 9.0 6.1 4.4
Total Number 276 982 624 113
employed in the Spanish Statistics. Table 4.9 shows that women employed before moth­
erhood who work at any time within five years of childbearing did not experience hardly 
any non-employment gap. This is particularly true for pre-birth women in high-level oc­
cupations since they have a higher opportunity cost and a higher degree of job attachment 
compared to their counterparts with low-profile jobs. They are also more likely to have 
better working conditions and be able to pay for childcare.
Age of motherhood has been related to the concern of women returning to the labour 
market after a birth. It is appealing to investigate which is the range of age at first child 
with higher occupation category after childbearing.
The average age of motherhood in the group of women who had never held a paid job is 
22.3, compared to 24.7 for those who had worked before birth.31 Table 4.10 represents
31Note that this average is computed for those women who already had a child. This biases the number 
downwards. The purpose of these numbers is not to show the average age of motherhood, but to see the 
differences in age of motherhood coming from pre-birth employment status.
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the job status 5 years after birth by age of motherhood.32 Once more we face censoring 
among recent mothers at interview. Thus, in these tabulations we omit those women who 
had their first birth less than five years before the interview date. Table 4.10 shows that 
those women who enter motherhood before 25 years old are more likely to remain out of 
work after birth. Only those who became mothers after 25 are a significant proportion 
in occupations located in High or Moderate positions in the occupational ladder. Age 
of motherhood is strongly linked to the pre-birth working status. In our sample, 68% of 
women who had a first child before their 20s did not work one year before, compared to 
48% among those women who gave birth after the age of 25. Thus, age at motherhood 
matters in the post-birth job status partly through its effect on pre-birth job status.33
Downward Occupational Mobility
As discussed above, Downward Occupational Mobility is another type of employment 
transition linked to childbearing. Descriptive statistics seem to predict that this type of 
career cost is less pronounced in the Spanish sample. For example, among women who 
were employed 3 months before and 12 months after the confinement, only 2.3% change 
occupation.34 Similarly, 5.1% of women who are employed 3 months prior to the birth 
and 24 months later have modified their occupational status. This percentage increases 
to 16.4% among those women who held a paid job 3 months before and 10 years after. 
As expected, the proportion of changes rises through time. If we are able to show that 
most of the transitions are downwards, we might be able to relate Downward Occupational 
Mobility to childbearing. Obviously, transitions in occupation only enable us to pick up 
part of the job transitions (the one that implies changing from one occupation to another 
inferior, with 28 different ISCO choices). However, women may have experienced down­
ward mobility within an occupation. Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish in our 
data different positions within the same occupation, which may be the most important 
fraction of job transitions.
Table 4.11 should be interpreted as follows: the percentage of females who were in a 
particular job status before birth and are in any of the job status after the confinement. 
Note that this table follows individuals up to when they are censored.35 That is, ‘Not 
Working After’ means that the individual did not have any job after motherhood up to
32 Age of motherhood is classified into four groups: less than 20 years, between 20-24, 25-29 and 30 or 
more.
33Note that pre-birth status of working is shown to influence significantly the post-birth status in Table 
4.11.
34 At this point we do not specify if higher or lower on the occupational ladder.
35 Both younger cohorts and later first child mothers are censored earlier because of the structure of 
our data.
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the last month we observe her. Similarly, we compare pre and post-birth job position by 
looking at the first job after confinement.36 For example, 52.5% employed women in the 
Very Low category are not currently working. 46.6% of women previously working in the 
Very Low level remained in the same category in their first job after birth. Finally, 0.9% 
of those Very Low women turned out to be working in a higher level after birth. The 
main information in this table is that the lower the job category before the confinement, 
the more likely you are to leave the labour market (note that women in High level have an 
abandonment rate of 8.8% compared to 52.5% for women in Very Low level). This table 
also provides evidence that the movement between categories among women who remain 
working is insignificant.37 For instance, 0.7% women initially classified as Low moved 
down towards Very Low. 0.9% in the Moderate level also declined in position. Therefore, 
we find no evidence of Downward Occupational Mobility in our data. This differs from 
several studies for British samples (Newell and Joshi (1986), Dex (1987), McRae (1991) 
and Callender, Millward, Lissenburgh and Forth (1996)) that have related Downward Oc­
cupational Mobility to movements into part-time work after childbirth, despite the fact 
that many part-time job positions are offered at high levels in Britain.38
In our study, Downward Occupational Mobility is less of an issue and this may be due 
to the scarcity of part-time jobs in Spain (only 3% of women move from full-time pre­
birth job to part-time post-birth job). Actually, we would probably face more downward 
occupational transitions if part-time jobs were more available. Under this scenario, we 
may observe fewer individuals with any type of Career Break and more with Downward 
Occupational Mobility. For example, Bernhardt (1988) found that Swedish mothers who 
before would have chosen to stay home are taking increasingly, over time, the combination 
family plus work option, which is part-time.
Following the same criterion as in the FFS, we rank occupations in the EPA to see 
if there are movements between categories after childbearing. The EPA data do not 
capture Downward Occupational Mobility either39 and confirm the explanation that we
36This is different from Figure 4.1, where we follow up to 24 months. Despite the fact data show that 
late returners is not a typical pattern, we want to allow for the possibility to return after any number 
of months. This is why we take the occupation held at first job after birth as the level to compare with 
pre-birth job category.
37Although not reported, the same pattern is observed within the 28 ISCO levels.
38We have constructed employment tabulations by occupation level for childless and mothers aged 16- 
59. We have used the British GHS (General Household Survey) between 1974 and 1999. The proportion 
of employed childless women in part-time jobs are 18.7% for level 1, 25.1% for level 2, 49.8% for level 3 
and 18.5% for level 4, level 1 being the highest category. The percentages for their mother counterparts 
are 52.0%, 62.4%, 77.1% and 49.3%. We observe that part-time jobs for mothers seem to be far greater 
than for childless at all levels, and not only for those in low positions.
39If we had had information about wages, we could have studied wage drop, which is a more accurate
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Table 4.11: Change in Occupational Status Around First Birth (%), Cohort 1945-77, FFS 
— Spanish Females
1st Job After1 Occupational Status 12 months Before
Not Working Working
High Moderate Low Very Low
Not Working 96.5 8.8 28.8 40.5 52.5
Good 0.3 91.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average 0.2 0.0 70.3 0.3 0.0
Low 1.8 0.0 0.5 58.5 0.9
Very Low 1.2 0.0 0.4 0.7 46.6
Total Number 999 57 229 304 236
xNot working at the interview. Note that these women might come back to work 
some time after the date of the interview, especially if they had recently entered 
into motherhood. This information is not known (censored) and we are only able to 
state that these individuals have not come back to the labour force yet. We observe 
some women longer than others with a maximum of 30 years after birth.
propose for the non -Downward Occupational Mobility in the FFS, which is based on the 
non-existence of transitions from full-time jobs to part-time jobs. At first quarter, the 
percentage of women at part-time jobs is 13% and six quarters afterwards this rate is 12%.
Table 4.11 shows that there is a mass movement among mothers who were previously 
working towards a non-working status. This phenomenon is decreasing in importance the 
higher the level of job category.40 Women who work at the top of the occupational ladder 
are more likely to come back to the labour force compared to those in lower positions. 
This is due to the fact that these women are more attached to their job careers. It is 
important to be aware that some of recent mothers might have not come back to work 
yet. This would lead to an overestimation of the percentages of people who are moving 
towards a non-working status after birth. In order to check for the importance of this 
effect, we have constructed Table 4.26 in Appedix 4.9.1, where only individuals who had 
the first child potentially a long time ago (cohort 1945-60) are considered. The results in 
Table 4.26 are very similar to Table 4.11, which confirms the high proportion of drops in 
working status among mothers.41
measure of job downgrading after motherhood.
40This result is complemented by EPA where tabulations show that 80% of women employed at HIGH 
profile jobs at quarter 1 are at work at quarter 6 , whereas 52% of those who were at LOW  are employed 
afterwards.
41 Note, however, that these women are the oldest of the whole sample 1945-77 and thus, the more 
‘traditional’ oriented. We may have a smaller dropping out of the labour market among younger cohorts,
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To summarise, there is a significant fall in the proportion of women with paid work 
after a first birth. Moreover, this drop appears to be persistent since the employment 
rates do not recover after birth. This result is at odds with the results in Dex et al. (1998) 
'using British data. They find that transitions into paid work increase with time after 
birth. That is, they observe that post-birth, the employment of British women declines 
but then recovers as time goes on. In our Spanish sample, this recovery seems to be non­
existent. Rather than a temporary exit from paid work, it looks closer to a permanent 
one. Data confirm the expected result that those women who were previously working in 
high positions have a greater chance of working after. We also find that movements across 
levels in the occupational ladder are insignificant. Finally, there is evidence that age of 
motherhood is an important factor determining the chances of returning to paid work. 
Age at first birth is strongly linked to the fact of having worked before the confinement, 
which may explain why teenage mothers are less likely to work after birth.
4.5.4 Econom etric R esults
In this section we explain the main findings from the estimation of the probability of 
staying-on at work in Spain, following the empirical specification described in Section 4.4. 
We first report the results from the FFS survey and then those from the EPA survey. 
Recall that the FFS covers an extended time horizon and allows us to analyse changes 
in market conditions and policies (Table 4.12 summarises some policies partly described 
in Section 4.3). By contrast, the EPA enables us to study the effect of pre-birth in-job 
characteristics on the likelihood of remaining employed.
Table 4.12: Labour Market1 and Maternity Leave2 Evolution in Spain: 1975-1997
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Female Unemp. Rates 4.8 10.2 25.7 24.2 30.9
% Fixed-Term Contracts 0 0 7.1 34.2 38.2
Duration3 Maternity Leave 12 14 16 16 16
Cash Benefit? Maternity Leave 75 75 75 100 100
1Source for Spain: INEBase.
2Source: Gauthier (2000) and Moss and Deven (1990). 
3Duration of the leave in weeks.
4Cash benefits as a percentage of regular wages.
if we would be able to observe them further in their history.
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Probit Estimation with FFS
In Table 4.13 we present the marginal effects for the probit estimation of employment 
after first child. Since we are also interested in analysing the evolution through time of 
the impact of skills on the staying-on rates after childbearing, we include into the model 
interactions between OcHIGH42 and the post-birth monthly duration dummies. We also 
interact ESGrPo43 with these duration dummies.44 We focus on cohorts 1945-69.
Results show that uncertainty (i.e. temporary contracts) in the labour market decreases 
the likelihood that women will stay-on employed after motherhood. Table 4.13 indicates 
that previous job career experience matters for post-confinement employment status. Pre­
birth occupation level positively affects the probability of staying-on at work at any time 
after birth, although it is not significant. Female education is a key factor since higher 
levels substantially increase the probability of remaining employed after motherhood.45 
Partner’s education does not seem to play a major role. Although the coefficients of the 
partner’s education dummies are not significant, signs reveal that those females whose 
partner has medium education have a smaller probability of being employed than those 
whose partner has a primary qualification. The reason could be that for low levels of 
partner’s education (i.e. primary qualification), males are more likely to be unemployed 
or have lower earnings, which makes females employment more necessary. This is cor­
roborated by Adam (1996b) who finds that those women whose partners are unemployed 
have a greater probability of re-entry after confinement.
Social characteristics also have an impact on women’s withdrawal from the labour force. 
Religion affects negatively, although insignificantly, the probability of returning to work 
after confinement. This might be due to more traditional-oriented preferences amongst 
religious people. Estimations have also been undertaken with a dummy for marital status. 
We find that those who were married are slightly less likely to remain at work (on the 
border of the 10% significant level). The interpretation from the rest of the variables does 
not change under either sample (only married women or all women). Because we lose 
partner’s education for the non-married mothers and because most women are married 
at the date of birth in our sample (97.2%), we choose a specification with only married 
women.
42 Dummy variable that takes value 1 if level occupation is HIGH one year before birth.
43Dummy variable that takes value 1 if mother’s highest education level is university degree or above.
44Note that monthly duration dummies after birth (D 3 , D&, £>12, D 2 4 , and Dqq) and their
interactions with education and occupation level are not reported in the table.
45The omitted category is E l, which is the lowest level.
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS AFTER MOTHERHOOD  123
Table 4.13: Probability of Employment After First Birth: following 96 Months, FFS — 
Spanish Females
Model Probit After l s< Birth: Marginal Effects 1,2
Coefficient dF/dx Std. Error
Temporary3 -0.0035** 0.0018
Experience41 0.0047** 0.0011
OcHIGHb 0.037 0.043
Age A t 1C 0.024 0.039
AgeAtl C2 -0.0013* 0.0007
AgeAtlJob 0.046** 0.012
Religious -0.032 0.042
E2e 0.048 0.040
ESVoc 0.17** 0.056
ESGrPo 0.21** 0.062
E2P1 -0.087 0.073
E3VocP -0.035 0.116
ESGrPoP 0.058 0.089
N W 8 0.0079 0.060
NE -0.030 0.061
CMadrid -0.121** 0.059
C 0.021 0.059
E -0.0035 0.048
Canaries -0.030 0.083
Cohort 1950-549 -0.011 0.059
Cohort 1955-59 0.092 0.057
Cohort 1960-64 0.129* 0.069
Cohort 1965-69 0.099 0.084
Log likelihood -4515.4
N  subjects 1941
N  observations 4878
* Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
1 Duration dummies and interactions are not reported.
n
Standard errors adjusted for individual clustering.
o
Proportion of female fixed-term contracts at national level. 
4Accumulated number of months worked up to the birth.
5Dummy (1 if high level of occupation one year before birth.) 
6Female Education: Omitted category is the lowest level (E l). 
7Partner Education: Omitted category is the lowest level (E1P ). 
8Regions: Omitted category is South (S ).
9Omitted Cohort is 1945-49. Cohorts in sample from 1945 to 1969.
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Our cohort dummies take the oldest cohort 1945-49 as reference category. Results in­
dicate that younger generations are more likely to stay-on at work after confinement, 
although this is only significant for cohort 196Q-64.46
It is useful for interpretation purposes to plot the predicted probability path of being 
at work (conditional on being employed before birth) for different representative individ­
uals (called R I). The first sequence of figures take as benchmark a woman whose skills 
seem to direct her towards the lowest probability of staying-on employed at any month 
after birth. This implies a female who was employed in LOW  occupation and with lower 
than a secondary qualification in education. Continuous variables are taken at the mean: 
experience at pre-birth job, age at first child and its square, age at first job and national 
temporary contracts (the latter is a time-varying variable). Other reference covariates are: 
born in the East, religious and from cohort 1950-54.47 Departing from this benchmark, 
we represent the predicted probability of employment (conditional on being employed 12 
months before birth) for the profile of different persons.
Figure 4.5: Probability of being Employed after First Birth Conditional on being Em­
ployed 12 Months Before, By Skill Profile — Spanish Females
o Low Education & Occupation Level a High Education Level
□ High Occupation Level + High Education & Occupation Level
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For example, Figure 4.5 shows48 that the occupation level held before birth affects the 
path of the probability of being employed (and hence, staying-on at work) after the con­
46We have re-estimated the model for two separate cohorts, those born between 1945-54 and those born 
between 1955-64. The aim is to investigate if there are significant differences in the way our variables 
impact on the likelihood of staying-on at work after childbearing in the two groups. We find that there 
are not and therefore, we only report the estimation for the pooled group 1945-69.
47The latter variables are not necessarily related to women more attached to the labour force as skills 
certainly are.
48Low Education & Occupation Level is the profile for the benchmark individual with characteristics 
as explained in the text and low pre-birth job skills.
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finement. Those women who initially had a HIGH job position (High Occupation Level 
in the graph) have a greater probability of being employed, especially up to five years 
post-birth. Between around 12 and 48 post-birth months, the positive impact of HIGH 
on employment, ceteris paribus, is increasing. Thus, the HIGH group has a higher prob­
ability of being employed than the LOW  one. However, its favorable effect, compared to 
their LOW  counterparts, elapses almost completely after a longer period.
In Figure 4.5 we observe that many women with a graduate or post-graduate degree 
(ESGrPo, line High Education Level in the graph) stay-on at work after first birth. Up to 
four years, the advantage of being under category ESGrPo decreases slightly with time, 
maybe due to the fact that this group tend to compress first and second child49 and some 
leave employment temporarily. However, after 48 months, the employment rates of these 
women increase and diverge again from their counterparts. We also plot the profile for 
someone who had both high education and pre-birth occupational level (High Education 
& Occupation Level). To have a graduate or post-graduate degree seems to be the main 
determinant on the likelihood of being employed after childbearing, although a pre-birth 
high occupation level plays a positive role too up to five years after birth, ceteris paribus. 
In Figure 4.12 in Appendix 4.10 we compare cohort 1960-64 with cohort 1945-49. We 
see that later cohorts have greater chances to stay-on at work after childbearing, keeping 
everything else constant.
Notice that if there are potential omitted covariates that vary across time and regions 
which are correlated with other explanatory variables, our estimation for these other vari­
ables could be biased. In order to check this effect, we undertake a new estimation where 
we control for the same explanatory variables as in Table 4.13 (except for Temporary), 
post-birth monthly duration dummies and include year-regional dummies. We create 120 
year-regional dummies (30 years, from 1966 to 1995} and 4 regions50 (N , SCanaries, C 
and EMadrid).
Once year-region dummies are incorporated the effect of cohorts is reversed. Later cohorts
High Education Level is the profile for an individual with all characteristics equal to the benchmark, 
except for the fact that she has graduate/post-graduate education instead of primary education.
High Occupation Level is the profile for an individual with the benchmark’s characteristics, except that 
she was working at a high classified occupation before birth, instead of at a low level one.
High Education & Occupation Level is the profile for an individual with graduate/post-graduate education 
and high level of occupation in the employment before birth.
49There is some evidence that single-child-mothers with graduate or post-graduate degrees tend to have 
a second child relatively fast (see Section 3.4).
50These have been built by reclassifying our original 7 region dummies: N  is NE  and NW, SCanaries 
is Canaries and 5, C is C  and EMadrid is E  and CMadrid.
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become less likely to stat-on at work after confinement, although the coefficients are not 
significant. Thus, once we control for all those region characteristics that change across 
periods, cohort effects disappear. This suggests that the slightly positive effect of later 
cohorts on staying-on employed in Table 4.13 is picking up some changes across years that 
positively affect individuals and are captured by the cohorts dummies when they are not 
controlled for in the estimation.51 The rest of explanatory variables remains unchanged.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 in Appendix 4.10 show the predicted probability of employment 
after birth for the latter specification.52 Figure 4.14 takes as a benchmark someone with 
low skills born between 1950 and 1954, and compares two different years: 1966 and 1995. 
We observe that if a mother in cohort 1950-54 had the child in 1995 instead of 1966, she 
would have had a greater probability of employment at all times after birth. This suggests 
that the later a woman gives birth, the more likely she is to stay at work. Interestingly, 
the positive impact of years on remaining employed is not a pure cohort effect but it is 
caused by other factors.53 In fact, when we compare two individuals born in different 
cohorts in one particular year, younger cohorts appear to have, unexpectedly, a smaller 
probability of being employed. Figure 4.15 in Appendix 4.10 represents cohort 1945-49 
versus cohort 1960-64 in 1966. In this graph we see that the younger cohort predicted 
probability of employment after confinement is smaller than the one for the older cohort.
Probit Estimation with EPA
The EPA survey helps us to study in more detail the impact of pre-birth job characteris­
tics on post-birth labour force behaviour. For example, it allows us to analyse the effect 
of tenure, type of contract, sector, self-employment and full-time pre-birth job features on 
staying-on at work after childbearing. Furthermore, we are able to disentangle employ­
ment to unemployment from employment to inactivity transitions.
First, we focus on transitions employed vs. non-employed, without distinguishing between 
inactive and unemployed. We take a sample of women who were employed at quarter 1 
(between six and nine months before they had a birth) and estimate the probability that 
they will be employed at quarter 6 (between six and nine months after confinement). We 
estimate staying-on rates in employment after first and second births. Since paid ma-
51 We explore the reasons for variations across years in the staying-on rates in Section 4.6.
52Figure 4.13 shows practically the same profile as the one we obtained with the estimation without 
Year-Region Dummies in Figure 4.5.
53We think about changes in taxation and family policies that mean that recent mothers have more 
incentives to stay-on in employment in the last years. For example, going from a joint taxation to a 
separate one in 1989.
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Table 4.14: Probability of Employment After First and Second Birth, EPA — Spanish 
Females
Model After 1st Birth After 2nd Birth
Coefficient dF/dx Std. Error dF/dx Std . Error
Employer1 0.076 0.090 0.23** 0.040
Public2 0.14* 0.078 0.11 0.069
Permanent3 0.20** 0.075 0.34** 0.074
Fulltime4 0.17* 0.097 -0.075 0.066
Tenure5 0.0022** 0.005 0.0005 0.0005
OcHIGH6 0.080 0.075 0.0009 0.076
Age -0.012 0.067 0.066 0.049
Age2 0.0004 0.001 -0.0009 0.0008
Nationality -0.029 0.28 Dropped7
Married -0.21** 0.040 -0.15** 0.046
E2* 0.034 0.090 0.11 0.069
ESVoc 0.003 0.13 0.19* 0.041
ESGrPo 0.26** 0.092 0.19** 0.074
NW» 0.23** 0.037 0.21** 0.039
NE -0.014 0.10 0.11* 0.054
CMadrid 0.16 0.076 0.17* 0.066
C 0.029 0.082 0.055 0.054
E 0.087 0.072 0.095* 0.049
Canaries 0.044 0.11 0.08 0.082
Year 1991-9310 -0.041 0.072 0.051 0.043
Year 1994-96 -0.038 0.075 0.057 0.044
Log likelihood -149.4 -108.9
N  observations 304 275
* Significant at 10% level.
""“Significant at 5% level.
1 Dummy (1 if employer at pre-birth job; 0 employee).
2Dummy (1 if public sector at pre-birth job).
3Dummy (1 if permanent contract at pre-birth job). 
4Dummy (1 if worked more than 35 hours at pre-birth job). 
5Months worked at specific pre-birth job.
6Dummy (1 if high level occupation at pre-birth job). 
Nationality=l predicts success perfectly (dropped).
Q
Female Education: Omitted category is El.
9Regions: Omitted category is S.
10Years: Omitted category is Year 1988-90.
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ternity leave has expired at that time, we are sure that we do not classify as employed 
those women who will leave employment just after their rights finish. Second, we esti­
mate transitions from employment to staying-on in the labour force, which implies that 
the dependent variable is one if the individual is either employed or unemployed and zero 
if inactive at quarter 6. Third, we select those individuals who were employed at quarter 
1 and in the labour force at quarter 6 and we estimate the probability that they are either 
employed or unemployed.54
Our first aim is to show which job and educational characteristics contribute to the prob­
ability of staying-on employed at quarter 6. Some explanatory variables55 refer to job fea­
tures in the first quarter: Employer, Public, Permanent, Fulltime, Tenure and OcHIGH. 
Other variables correspond to values at quarter 6: Age, Age2, educational dummies {El, 
E2, ESVoc, and ESGrPo), Nationality, Married, regional dummies (NW, NE, C, E, Ca­
naries and S) and temporal dummies (Year 1988-90, Year 1991-93 and Year 1994~96).
Table 4.14 summarises the marginal effects for the probit estimation of employment be­
tween six and nine months after first and second child. There is evidence that pre-birth 
job characteristics greatly influence the chances of returning to work after first birth. Any 
woman who was employed in the public sector before childbearing has a probability of 
returning to work after first birth 14 percentage points greater than her counterparts, 
ceteris paribus. Similar effect is related to the security of the contract since holding a pre­
birth permanent position increases post-first-birth employment by 20 percentage points. 
Tenure is also positive and significant. The longer a mother had worked in that pre-birth 
job, the better the chances of being employed after. Previous full-time employment also 
has a positive impact on post-confinement employment. Those women who worked in 
high level jobs are more likely to stay-on employed. There is also evidence that pre-birth 
characteristics not only affect the chances of returning to work after the first child, but 
also after the second. In the latter case, being an employer and having a permanent 
contract plays a significant positive role.
Amongst the demographic characteristics, marital status appears to be the most rele­
vant feature. Contrary to what we might expect, given the evidence for other countries,56
54We do not use a nested probit since we believe that the process is sequential. That is, first there 
is the choice of being or not in the labour market at quarter 6 and then, once you are in, there is the 
allocation into employment or unemployment.
55Description of the variables in Table 4.25 in Appendix 4.8.
56Self-constructed employment rates for single mothers and married mothers for the UK (using the 
GHS survey) show that employment rates for married mothers are significantly higher at all years from 
1979 to 1999. For example, in 1990, 60% married mothers are employed whereas only 39% of their
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being married reduces the chances of re-entering employment after first and second birth. 
Those women with a graduate or post-graduate degree are 26 percentage points more 
likely to re-enter employment after the first child compared to women with only a pri­
mary qualification. The rate is 19 percentage points for post-second-birth return.
We next analyse the factors that determine the probability of being in the labour force 
after motherhood, either employed or unemployed. In Table 4.15 we observe that the 
probability of being active after first birth depends positively and significantly on occupa­
tion level, tenure and on having a full-time contract. It depends negatively on marriage. 
When we look at second birth we find that those who were previously employers or who 
had permanent contracts were more likely to be in the labour force after birth, whereas 
marriage affects it negatively. Higher levels of education raises participation after both 
first and second birth.
Finally, we select post-birth active women and focus on the effect of pre-birth job char­
acteristics on the probability of being employed rather than unemployed. As Table 4.16 
shows, the main factors affecting employment are the pre-birth type of contract and 
tenure. Those women who had a permanent contract are more likely to be at work. 
Tenure also contributes positively. Looking at employment after second birth, those who 
were previously employers or had a permanent contract have greater chances of being em­
ployed after motherhood. Both marital status and occupational level axe not significant 
for post-first-birth transitions. However, marriage contributes negatively to the likelihood 
of being employed after second birth.
These three analyses reveal that tenure and possession of a permanent contract influence 
post-first-birth employment mainly by increasing the chances of being employed among 
those women who are in the labour market after childbearing. This suggests that the 
increase of temporary contracts is likely to have caused a rise in transitions from employ­
ment to unemployment. On the other hand, marital status and occupational level affect 
the likelihood of choosing to be in the labour force, no matter if employed or unemployed. 
Being an employer plays a positive and significant role on staying-on employed after sec­
ond child. Higher levels of education impact positively and significantly for both after first 
and second child employment, particularly by increasing the likelihood of participation.
single counterparts are. Also Ondrich et al. (1996) find that marriage does not affect return to work 
after childbirth in Germany. In the paper by Ronsen and Sunstrom (1996), marriage at first birth is 
insignificant for re-entry in Sweden but it reduces the hazard in Norway.
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Table 4.15: Probability of Being at the Labour Force After First and Second Birth, EPA 
— Spanish Females
Model After 1st Birth After 2nd Birth
Coefficient dF/dx Std. Error dF/dx Std. Error
Employer1 -0.007 0.083 0.13** 0.033
Public2 0.060 0.065 0.069 0.056
Permanent3 0.054 0.061 0.20* 0.065
Fulltime4 0.15** 0.087 -0.022 0.053
Tenure5 0.0012* 0.00061 0.0006 0.0004
OcHIGH6 0.098* 0.058 -0.0091 0.056
Age -0.048 0.057 -0.013 0.036
Age2 0.0009 0.0009 0.0003 0.0006
Nationality 0.14 0.28 Dropped7
Married -0.16** 0.041 -0.12** 0.037
E28 0.040 0.068 0.034 0.051
ESVoc 0.13* 0.057 0.11** 0.044
E3GrPo 0.19** 0.065 0.18** 0.045
NW» 0.17** 0.045 0.15** 0.031
NE 0.092 0.061 -0.024 0.083
CMadrid 0.099 0.083 0.093 0.062
C 0.040 0.069 0.047 0.056
E 0.060 0.064 0.047 0.055
Canaries -0.0020 0.18 -0.0052 0.091
Year 1991-93i() 0.038 0.055 0.0091 0.051
Year 1994-96 0.081 0.054 -0.0086 0.056
Log likelihood L32.3 -101.9
N  observations 304 275
*Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
1 Dummy (1 if employer at pre-birth job; 0 employee). 
2Dummy (1 if public sector at pre-birth job).
3Dummy (1 if permanent contract at pre-birth job). 
4Dummy (1 if worked more than 35 hours at pre-birth job). 
5Months worked at specific pre-birth job.
6Dummy (1 if high level occupation at pre-birth job). 
Nationality= 1  predicts success perfectly (dropped). 
8Female Education: Omitted category is El.
9Regions: Omitted category is S.
10Years: Omitted category is Year 1988-90.
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Table 4.16: Probability of Being Employed vs. Unemployed After First and Second Birth 
— Spanish Females
Model After 1st Birth After 2nd Birth
Coefficient dF/dx Std. Error dF/dx Std. Error
Employer1 0.038 0.040 0.058** 0.025
Public2 0.065 0.038 0.028 0.031
Permanent3 0.12** 0.064 0.13** 0.060
Fulltime4 0.024 0.063 -0.032 0.021
Tenure5 0.0013** 0.00062 0.0006 0.00023
OcHIGH6 -0.00069 0.047 0.017 0.047
Age 0.0033 0.037 0.035 0.022
Age2 -0.00005 0.00061 -0.0005 .0003
Nationality1 Dropped Dropped
Married -0.002 0.050 -0.051* 0.021
E2* 0.036 0.060 0.054 0.033
ESVoc -0.014 0.0911 Dropped9
ESGrPo 0.10 0.056 0.0084 0.055
N W w 0.040 0.042 0.045 0.022
NE 0.071 0.037 -0.016 0.059
CMadrid 0.035 0.067 Dropped11
C 0.060 0.035 -0.015 0.045
E 0.042 0.044 0.008 0.036
Canaries Dropped12 0.032 0.028
Year 1991-93ri 0.063 0.037 -0.024 0.042
Year 1994~96 0.011 0.042 -0.042 0.046
Log likelihood 68.99 -43.1
N  observations 224 197
*Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
I Dummy (1 if employer at pre-birth job; 0 employee). 
2Dummy (1 if public sector at pre-birth job).
3Dummy (1 if permanent contract at pre-birth job). 
4Dummy (1 if worked more than 35 horns at pre-birth job). 
5Months worked at specific pre-birth job.
6Dummy (1 if high level occupation at pre-birth job). 
7Nationality=l predicts success perfectly (dropped).
Q
Female Education: Omitted category is El.
QE 3 V oc= 1 predicts success perfectly (dropped).
10Regions: Omitted category is S.
II CMadrid= 0 predicts success perfectly (dropped).
1 9 Canaries= 0 predicts success perfectly (dropped).
13Years: Omitted category is Year 1988-90.
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4.5.5 Summary and Conclusions
In Section 4.5 we focused on temporary or permanent Career Break and Downward Oc­
cupational Mobility after motherhood. We use two data sources (FFS and EPA) in order 
to develop a comprehensive analysis on the main factors that determine the staying-on 
rates in employment after motherhood.
We find no evidence for Downward Occupational Mobility since movements across lev­
els in the occupational ladder are insignificant after a first birth. We suggest the lack of 
freely available part-time jobs, which have been linked to downward mobility for some 
countries (e.g. Newell and Joshi (1986), Dex (1987), McRae (1991) and Callender et al. 
(1996) for Britain), as an explanation.
Data show that there is a significant fall in the proportion of women with paid work 
after a first birth in Spain. Thus, permanent Career Break is found to be important for 
Spanish mothers. Employment rates drop from 47% one year before confinement to 32% 
when the baby is one year old. Moreover, there is hardly any recovery of employment for 
those women who leave work after motherhood since employment rates after 10 years are 
at about 35%. Therefore, Spanish drops are permanent rather than temporary. Around 
60-63% of women who were employed one year before motherhood, were at work after 
one year. Among the exits, we learn that about one third became unemployed and two 
thirds became inactive. More transitions into non-employment are expected to be unem­
ployment rather than inactivity for younger cohorts. Policies aimed at reducing youth 
unemployment in Spain would definitely help to increase staying-on rates in employment.
There is evidence of differences between cohorts. Whereas in young cohorts exit is exclu­
sively linked to childbearing, in old cohorts the drop in employment is already initiated 
at marriage. This means that traditional society in Spain, together with its joint taxation 
system, discouraged married women from working, independently of motherhood.
From the estimation we learn that the rise of fixed-term contracts has had a signifi­
cant negative impact on the likelihood of re-entry. This has policy implications since the 
government has the ability to modify the legislation and reduce this type of uncertainty. 
Results also suggest that labour market stability facilitates staying-on employed since both 
pre-birth permanent contracts and public sector raise the probability of returning to work.
Higher levels of education play a principal role in staying-on at work. These are the 
women with highest opportunity cost of leaving employment. They also earn more and
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are able to pay for childcare. Since female investment in education has increased substan­
tially, we expect that staying-on rates in employment will continue to rise.
Births in later years also raise post-first-birth employment, ceteris paribus. This could 
be caused by factors such as changes in taxation (from joint to separated in 1989) and 
social issues that make it more appealing for women who had births later in the period 
to remain employed.
Only 3% of recent mothers move from full-time to part-time jobs. We know that in 
other countries (e.g. Sweden and UK) these rates are much higher, which implies that 
the availability of part-time work in Spain is limited. If women are able to select the 
number of hours of employment, the choice becomes work full-time vs. part-time vs. non­
employment, instead of full-time vs. non-employment. We claim that post-birth employ­
ment rates would be higher in Spain if mothers were offered broader flexibility to combine 
childcare and work through part-time. This has implications for welfare policy, both in 
terms of facilitating part-time jobs and increasing the supply of childcare, either publicly 
provided or through tax credits.
4.6 European Comparison
4.6.1 Introduction
In this section we investigate the transitions of women from employment to non-employment 
after first birth (temporary or permanent Career Break). We analyse the factors that in­
crease or reduce employment after childbearing and, for fixed characteristics, how this 
depends on specific country elements. We also explore how and why the expected prob­
ability of employment after birth has evolved over time. We focus on Belgium, West- 
Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden since they exhibit substantial differences in policies 
and social customs.
This issue has been addressed in these countries (especially in Germany and Sweden). 
Our contribution is to make a comprehensive comparison and harmonise research on the 
likelihood of employment after first birth. We use the same data (Family and Fertility 
Survey) for each country and select identical variables, cohorts and time horizon. We 
trace the post-birth employment probability for a representative recent mother. That 
is, we determine the chances of employment after childbearing for a woman with certain 
characteristics and in a given country. Differences in predictions for employment across
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countries are caused by distinct policies and/or unobserved heterogeneity that we do not 
capture with our controls. Our aim is also to identify the effect of changes in policies on 
employment after birth.
The countries under examination differ in the rigidity of their labour markets (particularly 
the availability of part-time jobs), flexi-time, family taxation and subsidised childcare.57 
These factors have been shown to affect simultaneously fertility and female labour sup­
ply. For example, Del Boca (2002) uses panel data from the Bank of Italy to analyse how 
imperfections in the labour market and characteristics of the publicly-funded childcare 
system discourage both family formation and female labour participation in Italy. Apps 
and Rees (2001) find evidence that countries with individual rather than joint taxation 
are likely to have at once high fertility and female labour supply. They also show that 
family support through improved availability of alternatives for domestic childcare is more 
effective for female participation than direct child payments.
4.6.2 D ata and Constructed Variables
In order to have a comparable sample across countries, we use those cohorts and observ­
able years that are common among them. These are cohorts of people born between 1951 
and 1970,58 and observable calendar years up to 1993.59 In Sweden, we have women for 
five specific cohorts: 1949, 1954, 1959, 1964 and 1969. This means that we have not been 
able to completely homogenise cohorts. Nevertheless, we believe that our results are fairly 
comparable. Country-specific data collection has been explained in Subsection 3.5.2 in 
Chapter 3.
We select those explanatory variables60 that are comparable across our countries.61 These 
are the following: size of the city of origin (City), being religious (Religious), education, 
cohort, married at first birth (MarriedlC), monthly working experience from 15 years 
old to the pre-birth job (Experience), age at first birth and its square (AgeAtlC  and 
AgeAtlC2), age of first job (AgeAtlJob). All explanatory variables are measured one
57They have also differences in cultural-family rules. In Southern Europe, grandparents are more likely 
to live in the same household, providing indirect childcare. However, their effect on childcare could go 
either way if they require health assistance.
581949-69 for Sweden and 1952-70 for West-Germany.
59Notice that FFS’s interviews are done between 1995-96 in Spain and Italy, which means that we 
observe individuals from equal cohort longer in these two countries. We artificially constrain their history 
up to 1993.
60Full description of the variables in Table 4.24 in Appendix 4.8.
61 Further description of the variables also in Subsection 3.5.2 in Chapter 3.
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year pre-birth, except for education.62 Different levels of education are captured in four 
dummy variables: El, E2, ESVoc and ESGrPo. Our reference category is the lowest level 
El. Notice that category ESVoc does not exist neither in Italy nor in Sweden. We also 
control in every country regression for post-confinement duration dummies and calendar 
year dummies. Duration dummies capture the path of the staying-on rates in employment 
after a birth. The calendar year dummies explain the growth in a particular country of the 
forecasted probability, given the path described by the duration dummies. For example, 
if the year dummy for 1990 is positive in the regression for country x, this means that an 
individual in country x  is predicted to have a higher probability of staying-on employed 
after birth in 1993 than an individual with equal characteristics in 1972 (the reference 
year) at any month after birth.
For the estimation, we select those women who gave birth at least once. We have 1969 
observations in Belgium, 1350 in West-Germany, 2856 in Italy, 2470 in Spain and 2291 in 
Sweden.
4.6.3 D escriptive Statistics
In the previous section, we found that Spanish women’s employment rates diminish sub­
stantially around childbearing and that they do not recover. We now investigate tran­
sitions in countries with different policy regimes. In our basic analysis, we look at em­
ployment patterns after the first birth without controlling for subsequent fertility. In 
other words, the observed patterns may arise, at least in part, because of different future 
fertility patterns. Furthermore, the impact of exogenous variables on these employment 
patterns may operate either directly or via subsequent fertility.
62Education level is taken at the date an individual completes school, which could occur after birth. 
We were obliged to take this measure since schooling calendar is missing in Belgium, West-Germany and 
Italy. In the latter countries, only the highest level of education at completion date is reported. Despite 
this, we believe that this variable is adequate at capturing individual’s human capital at birth. First, 
most women are likely to exit schooling before childbearing. Second, for those who finish later, the final 
level achieved is a measure of their expectations in the labour market.
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T he W ithdraw al of W om en from W ork
In Figure 4.653 we present female employment rates64 around motherhood from Belgium, 
West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. We can notice immediately how dissimilar they 
are, not only in their starting point (24 months before birth) but also in their evolution. 
Future employment rates in Belgium65 for first-child mothers are about 80% two years be­
fore confinement and experience a slight decline around birth. Belgian employment rates 
stay at about 68% two years after motherhood. In ten years time, when the procreation 
process is likely to be over, they still have an employment rate of 65%. Thus, the exit 
rate from the labour market appears to be small.
Figure 4.6: Employment Rates Around First Birth — Country Comparison
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Swedish women experience a huge drop in employment around birth. This is due to the 
fact that Swedish women are responding as non-employed when they are on maternity 
leave. The same may partly happen in West-Germany. This is not the case in the other 
countries, where women on leave are accounted as employed. The picture shows the im­
pact of parental leave on labour force and how Swedish mothers recover their pre-birth
63We summarise labour market characteristics for women with and without children in 1998 in Table 
4.28 in Appendix 4.9. We also tabulate activity rates by marital status in 1991 and 1995 (Table 4.29). 
The purpose is to see if our results are in line with national statistics. However, note that this data do 
not coincide with our time horizon (approximately 1965-95).
64As in Figure 4.1 in the previous section, employment rates are computed taking into account cen­
soring. For example, there are some women not observed two yeaxs after birth. Thus, they have been 
subtracted from the total number of mothers in order to compute the rates.
65Belgian data was only collected in the Flemish and Brussels regions. Thus, it does not take into 
account the Walloon area. We would expect employment rates to be lower if this region was also included 
in the survey since unemployment rates are higher.
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levels. Actually, data show that ten years after the first child is born, 74% women in Swe­
den are at work. Thus, once the procreation process is finished, most of them are back in 
the labour market. German employment rates around childbearing fall considerably from 
70% to 36%. Spanish and German mothers are the groups who experience the greatest 
drop in post-birth employment rates. Ten years afterwards,66 their rates are 34% and 
40% respectively. We have to point out that German mothers are entitled to long and 
partly paid childcare leave, which is optional after full paid maternity leave. This could 
explain their low employment rates after motherhood.
We would like to know whether the Spanish pattern is typical of other South-European 
countries that have similar labour markets and social life. Figure 4.6 confirms that Spain 
is indeed closer to Italy than to Belgium or Sweden. Italian mothers’ employment rates 
decrease from around 51% to 40% and they remain at 42% after ten years. However, the 
decline in Spain is more significant since it starts at higher employment rates and ends at 
lower levels.
Figure 4.16 in Appendix 4.10 represents employment rates around birth by country and 
cohort.67 The largest cohort difference appears to be in Spain, whose rate of exit from 
employment around childbearing has significantly diminished. Curiously, in both West- 
Germany and Belgium, the profile of the two cohorts is very similar with actually slightly 
higher employment rates for older generations. This is probably due to the increase of 
unemployment in the 80s, when cohorts 1958-6468 where at the age of motherhood. Note 
that this increase in unemployment happens in Italy and Spain as well. However, their 
young cohorts experience greater employment rates after childbearing compared to their 
older counterparts. This suggests that the change in social patterns or policies towards 
higher participation offsets the negative impact of unemployment both in Spain and in 
Italy.
We compare transitions in the labour market after motherhood by examining women’s 
labour force status 12 months before birth and 24 months after.69 Those individuals not 
observed in the two periods are censored. We define four types of people: e-e means em­
ployed at both times, e-ne defines those employed before but not after confinement, ne-e 
for movements from non-employment to employment and ne-ne for those non-employed
66Note that in this period of time, further births are possible.
67We do not plot Sweden since in this country the sample is constructed with cohorts 49, 54, 59, 64 
and 69, and not with all cohorts from 1950 to 1970, as in the other countries.
68‘Young Cohort’ for the comparison in Belgium and West-Germany.
69We look at 24 months after birth since we want to ensure that we do not capture job protection 
policies in between.
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either before nor after birth. Note that non-employment includes both house work and 
unemployment. This is important for interpreting the meaning of the transitions. That 
is, in countries and cohorts with high female unemployment rates, a significant proportion 
of the transitions to non-employment are related not only to home oriented women but 
also to unemployed mothers. For example, we would expect that shifts e-ne are due to 
higher unemployment for later cohorts in Spain.70
Table 4.17: Female Unemployment rates: 1975-95 — Country Comparison1
Female Unemployment Rates
Countries 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Belgium 7.5 13.8 18.9 12.5 14.0
Germany 5.4 5.2 10.4 8.4 9.2
Italy 6.3 10.8 17.7 15.0 15.2
Spain2 4.83 10.2 25.7 24.2 30.9
Sweden4 2.0 2.3 2.9 1.6 6.9
1 Source: Eurostat Employment and Unemployment 
2Source for Spain: INEBase.
3Data from 1976 in Spain.
4Source for Sweden: Statistiska Centralbyran (Sweden).
Table 4.17 shows that Spanish women indeed have the greatest unemployment rates from 
the 80s and, therefore, they are a priori more likely to have transitions to non-employment 
linked to unemployment rather than home activities, compared to the other countries.
In Table 4.18 we observe transitions in and out the labour market around childbearing. 
In Belgium, 62.7% of first-birth mothers are employed pre and post-birth, which is the 
highest rate. As foreseen, Spain has the lowest rate, with only 27.6% women at work 
at both times. 51.1% of Swedish women do not leave employment, which is consistent 
with the result of 46.7% found by Wetzels (1999).71 West-Germany and Italy have rates 
of being at work in the two periods of 31.5% and 35.6% respectively. Transitions from 
employment to non-employment are greater in Sweden, where 26.8% mothers moved in 
this way, and in West-Germany, with 37.2%. These results are similar to those found by 
Wetzels (1999). She estimates (using other data sources) transitions of 29.3% for Sweden
70The proportion of women employed, unemployed and inactive has changed substantially since 1970 
in Spain. For example, 22% married women aged 20-30 were employed in 1977, 1% were unemployed 
and 77% were inactive. In 1987, the rates were 30%, 13% and 57%, respectively. In 1997, the proportions 
were 40%, 20% and 40%.
71 She looks at shifts between 3 months pre-birth and 24 months after birth.
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Table 4.18: Transitions Employment vs. Non-Employment around First Birth (from 1 
year pre-birth to 2 years post-birth) — Country Comparison1,2
Country n e-e e-ne ne-e ne-ne
Belgium 1756 62.7% 18.1% 4.8% 14.4%
West-Germany 1222 31.5% 37.2% 4.7% 26.6%
Italy 2658 35.5% 12.1% 5.5% 47.9%
Spain 2297 27.6% 19.3% 5.4% 47.8%
Sweden 2063 51.1% 26.8% 8.2% 13.9%
1 Excluding censoring.
o
e means Employment and ne means Non-Employment.
Table 4.19: Transitions Employment vs. Non-Employment around First Birth (from 1 
year pre-birth to 5 years post-birth) — Country Comparison1,2
Country n e-e e-ne ne-e ne-ne
Belgium 1411 58.2% 21.2% 7.4% 13.2%
West-Germany 957 31.6% 35.8% 7.2% 25.4%
Italy 2337 32.7% 14.2% 9.5% 43.6%
Spain 1987 25.4% 20.2% 7.4% 47.0%
Sweden 1710 53.3% 24.0% 10.1% 12.6%
1 Excluding censoring.
2e means Employment and ne means Non-Employment.
and 41.9% for West-Germany (GSOEP 1983-92). Many of these women are on maternity 
leave and are accounted in Sweden as non-employed. The same might be partly the case 
for childcare leave in Germany. Regarding the other countries, Spain has 19.3% women 
experiencing transitions to non-employment, Belgium 18.1% and Italy 12.1%. Table 4.18 
suggests that around half of mothers are out of work not only 12 months before birth 
but also 24 months after birth in Italy and Spain. In Belgium and Sweden, women reach 
the highest employment rates 12 months before maternity. Although there are significant 
shifts to non-employment from previous employed women in these two countries, the per­
centage of mothers out of work in both pre and post-birth is only about 13%. Germany 
is somewhere in between since 26.6% women do not work either before birth nor after it.
We calculate the proportion of women staying-on at work. We find that 78% of Bel­
gian mothers who worked 12 months before confinement are also employed 24 months 
after. The percentages are 46% in West-Germany, 75% in Italy, 59% in Spain and 66%
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in Sweden. The work by Saurel-Cubizolles et al. (1999), which focuses on data from the 
mid-nineties, finds that 78% of recent mothers have come back to work in Italy when the 
baby is one year old. For West-Germany and Sweden, Wetzels (1999) obtains a return 
rate of 44% and 61% respectively. Although she selects women who were employed three 
months before confinement (we take a criterion of one year), her results are in line with 
ours.
Since there is the possibility of childcare leave (especially in Sweden and West-Germany), 
we look also at transitions from one year pre-birth to five years post-birth in Table 4.19. 
However, this includes women with more children, which makes it more difficult to inter­
pret. We calculate the staying-on at work rates over this period as 73% in Belgium, 47% 
in West-Germany, 70% in Italy, 56% in Spain and 69% in Sweden. Note that the returning 
rates to work after first birth have slightly risen in Sweden, compared to the transitions we 
had with our previous three years horizon. This confirms that Swedish women make use 
of their leave but come back to work afterwards. Furthermore, more children have little 
impact on subsequent employment in Sweden. The percentages for Belgium, Italy and 
Spain diminish around three percentage points. West-Germany staying-on rates remain 
fairly constant.
Table 4.20: Transitions Full-time Employment vs. Part-time Employment around First 
Birth (from 1 year pre-birth to 2 years post-birth) — Country Comparison1,2,3
Country n ef-ef ef-ep ep-ef ep-ep
Belgium 992 78.9% 12.5% 1.8% 6.8%
West-Germany 211 73.5% 5.7% 20.8% 0.0%
Italy 752 83.0% 2.0% 0.3% 14.7%
Spain 564 83.0% 3.2% 1.4% 12.4%
Sweden 1032 38.5% 49.2% 1.9% 10.4%
1West-Germany has high rate of missing information.
n
Part-time if work less than 35 hours per week.
o
ef means Full-time Employment and ep means Part-time.
We would like to know whether recent mothers choose part-time work. Table 4.20 shows 
the movements between full and part-time work among those women who remained em­
ployed. Swedes’ preference for part-time work after birth is evident since about half of 
Swedish mothers moved from full-time to part-time job status. These shifts hardly exist 
in Spain and Italy, where only about 2-3% move. 12.5% of Belgian mothers became new
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part-time workers. Therefore, in Belgium and especially in Sweden, it is common to move 
to part-time positions after motherhood. This means two things: either the preferences 
of women are quite different across countries or flexibility and opportunity to transfer 
into part-time jobs is different. We think that the latter is more likely to be driving the 
result. Part-time work does not seem to be related to motherhood in Spain and in Italy, 
whereas it definitely is in Belgium and Sweden. We believe that some Spanish or Italian 
women might opt for participation around childbearing if part-time jobs were commonly 
available. Legislation in these two countries prevents employers from perceiving part- 
time work as advantageous, in terms of both costs and flexibility (see Ruivo, Gonzalez 
and Varejao (1998) and Tindara (1997)).
Is the Withdrawal from Work Due to Marriage or to Motherhood?
We have seen that their employment rates indicate that Spanish mothers initiate their 
exit from employment far before birth. We find similar results for Italy. We would like to 
see if the fall in employment rates around childbearing is caused only by the birth itself 
or if, by contrast, marriage plays an important role. In order to do so, we take mothers 
without children as a control group and we analyse their employment rates around the 
marriage date.
In Figure 4.7, we compare Belgium, West-Germany, Italy and Spain. We observe that 
recently married women in Spain experience a decline in their employment rates. Italian 
employment rates also drop, although they recover to some extent. Therefore, part of the 
decline in employment around childbearing may be explained by marriage, which suggests 
that these countries are more traditional.72 Belgian and German employment rates are 
not affected by marriage. Thus, their drop in employment rates around motherhood is 
due to the birth itself. In fact, employment rates in Belgium and West-Germany even rise 
before marriage, which means that women complete education, they find a job and then 
they marry.
The purpose of Table 4.21 is to display transitions between employment and non-employment 
around marriage for those women who do not have any child. Clearly, Spain (followed by 
Italy) is the country with the highest number of cases classified as employed 12 months 
before the marriage and non-employed 24 months after. Among those Spanish women 
who were employed before marriage, 71% are at work after. These rates are 94% in Bel­
gium, 90% in West-Germany and 71% in Italy.
72Recall that we are pooling all cohorts. We would expect this effect to be lower in younger generations, 
for the same levels of unemployment (See Figure 4.17 in Appendix 4.10).
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Figure 4.7: Employment Rates Around Marriage for Women Without Children — Coun­
try comparison
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Table 4.21: Transitions Employment vs. Non-Employment around Marriage (from 1 year 
pre-marriage to 2 years post-marriage)1,2 — Country Comparison
Country n e-e e-ne ne-e ne-ne
Belgium 285 70.9% 4.2% 18.9% 6.0%
West-Germany 198 68.7% 7.6% 19.9% 10.1%
Italy 266 55.3% 12.4% 10.9% 21.4%
Spain 164 47.0% 18.9% 9.8% 24.3%
1 Excluding censoring.ty
e means Employment and ne means Non-Employment.
We test whether there have been cohort changes in employment rates around childbearing 
and marriage. Figure 4.17 in Appendix 4.10 represents employment rates around marriage 
by country and by cohort. We actually find that there are some cohort variations but these 
are only noteworthy in Spain. Despite the sample being rather small, there is evidence that 
the employment rates of Spanish married childless women from cohort 1945-54 experience 
a significant decline close to marriage. The proportion of employed women six months 
before marriage is 66.7%, whereas the percentage is 37% afterwards. The respective rates 
are 65.2% and 62.3% for cohort 1955-64. Thus, one would expect to have a smaller effect 
of marriage itself on the drop of employment around childbearing in younger generations. 
This generational evolution in employment rates around marriage is not so important in
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the other countries.73
4.6.4 Econom etric R esults
Table 4.22 shows the marginal effects of the probability of employment after childbear­
ing.74 The model has been set out in Section 4.4 and it has been estimated separately for 
each country.
We observe that the higher the level of education75 achieved pre-confinement, the more 
likely are mothers to remain employed after childbearing. Interestingly, the coefficient 
for education is significant in all countries except for Sweden, which means that Swedish 
mothers’ employment after first birth is less affected by their differences in education. 
This result is in line with the work by Gustafsson et al. (1996). They show that human 
capital is not a main determinant for re-entry in Sweden, whereas it is in Germany and 
Great Britain. Sweden is characterised by its generous public childcare provision, which 
means that many women do not face the burden of childcare costs. By contrast, moth­
ers in the other countries who decide to remain employed must pay for private nursery. 
Without free public childcare, only those women with high earnings (or education here) 
will be able to afford childcare in order to stay-on employed. Consequently, high educa­
tion is a key determinant for post-birth employment in countries with poor governmental 
childcare provision. Accumulated experience (i.e. number of months worked up the birth) 
increases considerably the chances of returning to work. Simultaneously, those mothers 
who initiated their first job later have a greater probability of post-birth employment.
Our sociological factors report that religious women are less likely to stay-on at work,
73We are surprised about the rather small cohort variation in Italy. We would have expected a closer 
pattern with respect to Spain.
74The coefficients for the duration dummies and the year calendar dummies are reported in Table 
4.31 in Appendix 4.9. Since the model is estimated independently for each country, the year calendar 
dummies describe in each country the trend of the staying-on rates after childbearing. This table shows 
small size coefficients for the year calendar dummies (the omitted year is 1972) in Belgium (negative) 
and in Italy (positive), rather large and negative coefficients in Sweden, and large coefficients in West- 
Germany (negative) and in Spain (positive). This suggests that, for example, a Spanish woman in 1993 is 
more likely to stay-on employed after birth than a Spanish woman in 1972, ceteris paribus. The opposite 
happens in West-Germany.
75It would be interesting to control for partner’s education as a proxy for the effect of external income 
on female labour supply. However, partner’s education is only available at the interview’s date (not 
retrospectively). Although this could be a good proxy for Spain or Italy (where most women are married 
when childbearing and there are few divorces), it is not for Sweden or West-Germany. In Section 4.5, 
we control for partner’s education and find that it is not significant. Signs of the coefficients show that 
Spanish women whose partner have medium education are less likely to work after childbearing, ceteris 
paribus, compared to those whose partners have no qualifications. However, mothers with graduate 
husband’s are more likely to be employed.
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Table 4.22: Probability of Employment After First Birth: following 96 Months — Country 
Comparison
Variables Probit After I s* Birth: Marginal Effects1,2
Belgium W-Germany Italy Spain Sweden
City3 
Religious 
Marriedl C 
Experience4 
AgeAtlJob 
AgeAtl C 
Age A t 1C2
-0.082** (0.036) 
-0.084** (0.030) 
0.043 (0.058) 
0.007** (0.002) 
0.069** (0.018)
-0.018 (0.049)
-0.0009 (0.0009)
-0.011 (0.021) 
-0.023 (0.022) 
-0.082** (o.oso) 
0.012** (0.002) 
0.129** (0.019) 
-0.045 (0.038) 
-0.001** (0.006)
0.023 (0.024) 
-0.069* (0.039) 
-0.014 (0.042) 
0.003** (0.0005) 
0.031** (0.006) 
-0.057 (0.027)
-0.001 (0.0005)
0.030 (0.043) 
-0.044 (0.062) 
-0.047 (0.055) 
0.001* (0.0007) 
0.004 (0.006) 
-0.003 (0.048) 
-0.0001 (0.0009)
-0.009 (0.024) 
0.004 (0.019) 
-0.036* (0.020) 
0.002** (0.0006) 
0.027** (0.008) 
0.064 (0.040) 
-0.002** (0.0006)
Education5 
E2
ESVoc
E3GrPo
0.036 (0.034) 
0.131** (0.040) 
0.193** (0.041)
0.117** (0.046) 
0.207* (0.112) 
0.225** (0.111)
0.079** (0.027) 
0.074 (0.050)
0.108** (0.051) 
0.248** (o.ioi) 
0.256** (0.111)
0.009 (0.071) 
0.028 (0.070)
Cohorts6 
19547 
1956-608 
1961-659 
1966-7010
0.008 (0.037) 
0.023 (0.063) 
-0.021 (0.108)
0.015 (0.040) 
0.072 (0.074) 
-0.003 (0.104)
-0.004 (0.030)
-0.006 (0.046)
-0.076 (0.062)
-0.014(0.057) 
-0.053 (0.104) 
-0.248* (0.159)
-0.0003 (0.08I) 
-0.004 (0.157) 
-0.041 (0.229) 
-0.103 (0.294)
Log likel. -8191.7 -6977.5 -9257.2 -9357.5 -10976.0
N  subjects 1969 1350 2856 2470 2291
N  obs. 10153 6883 10643 9808 12063
^Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
1 Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors adjusted for individual clustering.
cy
Duration dummies, year dummies and interactions not reported.
3Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants).
Accumulated number of months worked up to the birth.
5Omitted category is the lowest level (El ) .
6Omitted category is Cohort 1951-55 (Cohort 1952-55 for West-Germany and Cohort 1949 for Sweden).
<7
Cohort 1954 for Sweden only.
8 Cohort 1959 for Sweden.
9 Cohort 1964 f or Sweden.
10 Cohort 1969 for Sweden.
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ceteris paribus, in all countries, particularly in Belgium and Italy. The size of the city 
where the individual grew up has hardly any effect, except for Belgium, where it reduces 
the probability of staying-on employed.
Until now we have made no attem pt to separate out the effect of subsequent fertility 
patterns on post-birth employment from other more direct effects. Thus, variables in­
fluencing post-first birth employment can operate either directly or via their impact on 
subsequent fertility. To give some idea of the implications, we estimate the probability of 
employment after first birth only for those women who remain with one child. Of course, 
this means we are selecting a sub-sample based on a variable which may be endogenous to 
employment. Nevertheless, the subsequent results will still be informative. Table 4.32 in 
Appendix 4.9 shows the results for this sub-sample. With this new estimation, we observe 
that religion loses generally the negative impact that it had in the estimation with the 
whole sample. This suggests that the religion effect is operating via its impact on sub­
sequent fertility. The coefficients on the remaining characteristics change little but both 
estimations differ substantially in the duration and calendar year dummies. We examine 
these differences in the next subsection.
4.6.5 Simulation
In this section we focus on two issues. First, we are interested in whether the probability 
of post-birth employment has experienced variations over time within each country. For 
instance, do mothers in 1990 have a greater probability of post-birth employment than 
their counterparts in 1973? Second, we would like to take a representative individual and 
observe her probability of post-birth employment, given that she is mother in either of 
these countries.76
For the first exercise, we take an average individual and we compare the predicted prob­
76We are aware that the coefficients of each variable for a specific country might reflect not only the 
country-specific impact of that variable on the staying-on rates but also other country-specific effects 
not controlled for in the model. Then, we could interpret that a particular variable affects differently 
post-birth employment in two countries but this is partly due to the coefficients being misleading. That 
is, if there are characteristics not included in the model that are correlated to an included variable, the 
coefficients of the included one will be bias. This will be captured in the error term and will produce 
endogeneity. To decrease the magnitude of this potential problem, we control for year calendar dummies. 
They account for all the common effects to all individuals in the country and hopefully eliminate the size 
of error and its link to other included variables. Then, the bias is eliminated and country comparison is 
more reliable. Notice, however, that this still does not control for certain specific effects that are related 
to some particular individuals. Ideally, we should incorporate interactions between the year calendar 
dummies and the other characteristics. We decide not to do this because it would require many variables 
for the number of observations we have.
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abilities of employment in three years: 1973, 1983 and 1993. In Figure 4.8, mothers have 
a secondary qualification, whereas in Figure 4.9 they have a graduate or post-graduate 
degree. The rest of the women’s characteristics are the same. Figure 4.8 reveals that 
the likelihood of being employed has changed differently across time in these countries. 
Belgian mothers whose attainment level was a secondary qualification experience a rise 
between 1983 and 1993. Interestingly, Spanish women’s predicted employment increased 
significantly between 1973 and 1983. By contrast, the probability of post-birth employ­
ment has declined over time in West-Germany and has remained fairly constant in Italy 
and Sweden.
We observe in Figure 4.9 that the chances of being employed after childbearing among 
Belgian, Italian and Swedish graduates and post-graduates women hardly increased over 
time. These graphs show that the shift in predicted individual employment after child­
bearing in Belgium has been greater for the group of women with a secondary qualification. 
Although mothers with a complete university degree are still much more likely to stay-on 
at work, mothers with a lower education qualification increased their probabilities with 
higher speed. In Spain, mothers with a university degree augmented their chances of com­
ing back in a similar proportion to those with a secondary qualification. The pattern is 
different in West-Germany, where the shifts over time in post-birth predicted employment 
are similar between graduate and secondary school levels and occurred in the opposite 
direction (downwards). In West-Germany, graduate women are more likely to be at work 
after childbearing but the variation over time has been equal for these two educational 
groups, which experienced a decline in post-birth employment.
As shown in Table 4.22, graphs reveal that graduate Swedes have greater probability of 
post-birth employment but this is not significantly different from mothers with secondary 
qualification. Italian mothers who were at work before birth with at least a graduate 
degree have a predicted post-birth employment rate of 90-100%.77 We observe that there 
has been important changes in the estimated probability of employment after childbearing 
across years and countries. We will further explore this variation in Subsection 4.6.6.
For our second exercise, Figure 4.10 compares the predicted post-birth employment rates 
across countries for women with a secondary qualification in 1973 and 1993. Notice that
77We have also calculated the probability of being employed after childbearing without conditioning 
the sample to those mothers who were at work before birth in the selection equation. This predicted 
post-birth employment rate for Italy is much lower. This implies that in Italy is crucial to be employed 
before birth in order to be employed after. It is the country where we observe that this effect is the 
largest.
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Figure 4.8: Monthly Probability of being Employed after First Birth Conditional on 
Being Employed 12 Months Before, Mothers with Secondary Qualifications — Years and 
Country Comparison1
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1 Swedish mothers are reporting to be non-employed when they are on maternity leave. This explains 
the huge drop of employment after childbearing.
Spain is the only country to experience a large shift upwards. Thus, Spain has had a clear 
change in behaviour within 1973-93. It is surprising the low predicted levels of employ­
ment after childbearing in West-Germany and their decline in latter periods. However, as
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Figure 4.9: Monthly Probability of being Employed after First Birth Conditional on Being 
Employed 12 Months Before, Mothers with Graduate or Post-graduate Degree — Years 
and Country Comparison1
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1 Swedish mothers are reporting to be non-employed when they are on maternity leave. This explains 
the huge drop of employment after childbearing.
reported by Ondrich et al. (1996), “since 1979 German federal maternity leave and benefit 
policy has given women incentives to stay at home and take care of their newborn and 
youngest children. In 1986 this leave and benefit policy was changed in several ways, turn-
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Figure 4.10: Monthly Probability of being Employed after First Birth Conditional on 
Being Employed 12 Months Before, Mothers with Secondary Qualifications — Country 
Comparison1
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1 Swedish mothers are reporting to be non-employed when they are on maternity leave. This explains 
the huge drop of employment after childbearing.
Figure 4.11: Monthly Probability of being Employed after First Birth Conditional on 
Being Employed 12 Months Before, Mothers with Secondary Qualifications who Only 
Had One Child Ever — Country Comparison1
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1 Swedish mothers are reporting to be non-employed when they are on maternity leave. This explains 
the huge drop of employment after childbearing. Year 1988 for Sweden.
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ing it into a powerful instrument for delaying mother’s return to work after childbirth”. In 
their paper, they show that the rise in the generosity of maternity leave has had the effect 
that mothers interrupt their careers for longer periods. This could also explain our results.
Another point is how the predicted probability of being employed after childbearing 
evolves in the subsequent months. We observe a decrease with post-birth time in Belgium, 
Italy and Spain. This may be due to the enlargement of families, which impacts negatively 
on female participation. By contrast, both German and Swedish women’s employment is 
predicted to raise with post-birth time.
Figure 4.11 replicates Figure 4.10 for those women who had only one child.78 We ob­
serve that, in Belgium, the declining trend in the predicted probability of employment 
after first birth partly disappears when we base our analysis on single child women. This 
makes sense since drops in employment after first birth are likely to be caused by more 
births. In Belgium, however, there seems not to be much difference between those moth­
ers who only had ever one child and the whole sample of mothers, especially in 1993. In 
West-Germany, the post-birth time profile does not vary but, both in 1973 and in 1993, 
the probabilities increase by about 20% and 10% respectively for all post-birth periods in 
the sample of single child mothers. Italian mothers with only one child ever have a slight 
increase on post-birth employment in 1993,79 compared to the whole group. This suggests 
that extra children in 1993 do not have a big negative impact on post-birth employment 
in Italy. Sweden experiences a parallel upwards shift in 1973 for the restricted sample 
of mothers with only one child, although this disappears in 1993. Spanish single child 
mothers have a post-birth employment rate around 30% greater than the whole group of 
mothers in 1973. The gap is 15% in 1993. This suggests that in Spain in 1973 there are 
two groups: one, who have only one child and are more committed to the job market. 
The other group have more than one child and are substantially less committed. This 
effect is reduced in 1993. Note that the distinction between single child mothers and all 
mothers is more muted in the other countries.
4.6.6 Policy Evaluation
We would like to explain the impact of family-friendly policies and female unemployment 
rates on the observed changes in post-birth employment across countries and years. We 
take the year calendar dummy coefficients obtained in the probit estimation of employ­
78Notice that the sample restricted to single-child-ever mothers is likely to have a higher proportion of 
young cohorts compared to the whole sample since they are more likely to have only one child so far.
79We are not able to interpret the result for Italy in 1973.
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ment after childbearing for each country80 and regress them on some potential explana­
tory variables. These are: the proportion of women who completed tertiary education 
(FHE),81 a constructed maternity leave indicator (Leave),82 a dummy accounting for the 
taxation system (Tax),83 female unemployment rates (Unemrf), the proportion of female 
part-time work over all employed women (FvsP), country dummies and a linear trend.84 
We focus on the period 1982-93.
The proportion of women with completed tertiary education (FHE) is aimed to cap­
ture the evolution in the society. Those countries with larger numbers of women with 
a university degree are more likely to have more females in paid work since this is well- 
established in their culture. That is, with this variable we want to make possible that not 
only changes in policies have a role in the rise in post-birth employment but also changes 
in the way of living.
One particular problem arises with this investigation. Swedish women are reporting to be 
non-working when they are on leave. This is not a problem as long as the pattern of leave 
remains unchanged, for then this distortion would be picked up by the duration dummies, 
leaving the year time dummies unaffected. Hence, if maternity leave laws (these are shown 
straightaway by the employment rates around birth in the Swedish case) did not change 
much during this period, then the duration dummies would capture the maternity leave 
factor and the year dummies would capture other economic aspects that matter. How­
ever, if maternity leave rights changed dramatically over this period, then the year time 
dummies might be distorted by this and, consequently, the analysis of this section would 
be corrupted when we investigate the main factors that had an impact on the year time 
dummies. In order to confirm that the Swedish year time dummies are appropriate, we 
calculate the employment rates around birth for Swedish women who had a birth in 1980, 
1985 and 1990 (see Figure 4.18 in Appendix 4.10). Since they are very close, maternity 
leave appears to have similar effects over the period. Thus, we are confident that the 
Swedish time year dummies account for the relevant economic factors and the duration 
dummies capture the maternity leave pattern.
80The yeax calendar dummies are reported in Table 4.31 in Appendix 4.9. They show the within 
country growth in the prediction of staying-on rates for two individuals with equal characteristics but 
different years.
81We use the Barro-Lee data set.
82This variable is calculated as follows: (number of weeks in maternity leave*replacement rates) -f 
(number of weeks in childcare leave*replacement rates).
83The dichotomous is one if the country has a separate taxation system in a particular year and zero 
if it has a joint one.
84 Year dummies have been used instead of a linear trend and the main results were not significantly 
affected.
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Table 4.23: OLS Regression of Probit’s Year-Country Dummies Estimates on Policies, 
Labour Market, Country dummies and Linear Trend — Country Comparison
Model OLS
All Sample
Country Dummies Country Dummies & Policies
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
FHE1 23.838** 6.086
Leave2 -0.042 0.027
Tax3 p I—1 o 00 * * 0.050
Unemrf4 0.889 0.709
FvsP5 1.878** 0.674
West-Germany6 -0.670** 0.045 0.931** 0.372
Italy 0.116** 0.045 1.258** 0.299
Spain 0.971** 0.045 2.030** 0.251
Sweden -0.239** 0.045 0.899 0.972
Linear Trend -0.041** 0.010
Cte -0.020 0.032 1.795** 0.510
R-squared 0.9662 0.9800
N  observations 55
*Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
1 Proportion of female with completed tertiary education.
O
Constructed maternity leave indicator.
q
Dummy: 1 if separate taxation system; 0 if joint.
4Proportion of female unemployment.
5Proportion of female in part-time positions.
6Country omitted category is Belgium.
Table 4.23 (model with policies) shows that the education levels, the proportion of female 
part-time and the taxation system are the main factors that explain the variation in time 
of post-birth employment.85 A positive coefficient in country x means that, after control­
ling for other relevant factors (policies), country x would have experienced an increase in 
the predicted probability of staying-on employed, compared to the comparison country 
(Belgium).
85We estimated the same equation with a broader interval of time 1973-93. The proportion of female 
with tertiary education and separate taxation had also a positive impact on the increase in re-entry in 
employment after childbearing. Unemployment rates were negative and significant, which we believe that 
it is due to its flatness pre-1982. Since education and taxation have a strong effect no matter how broad 
the period is considered, we are confident that these are the main explanatory factors to the variability 
of post-birth employment across time.
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS AFTER MOTHERHOOD 153
We observed in Section 4.6.5 that Spanish women experienced a rise in post-birth pre­
dicted employment. Table 4.23 suggests that this could be due to the increase in the 
proportion of women with tertiary education. This country has also moved into a sepa­
rate taxation system in 1989. By contrast, West-Germany remains under a joint taxation 
system, which reduces the incentive for married mothers to work. There is evidence that 
separate taxation has a positive impact on post-birth employment. Finally, there is also 
some evidence that the proportion of part-time work has had a positive impact.
In Table 4.23 we observe that the inclusion of education, labour market factors and 
policies contributes substantially (by 41%) in improving the unexplained part of the re­
gression. Notice also that in the regression with only country dummies, the calendar year 
dummies are just explained by country variation. Thus, in the regression without policies, 
a positive coefficient in country x means that country x  experienced larger growth over 
time in the forecasted probabilities, compared to the benchmark (Belgium). This does 
not mean that country x  has greater staying-on rates after birth compared to Belgium 
but that country x has had a greater increase.
It is interesting to observe that West-Germany has a negative and significant coefficient 
in this regression, whereas it becomes positive and equally significant in the model with 
policies. This suggests that over this period of time, our variables explain the negative 
trends in post-birth employment in West-Germany compared to the trends of the omitted 
category (Belgium). Furthermore, these country dummies show that Italy and especially 
Spain had larger gains in post-birth employment compared to the benchmark.
We also observe that the inclusion of the whole set of policy variables remove the sig­
nificant difference between Belgium and Sweden and made these two countries converge. 
If we add sequentially to the regression each policy to disentangle what contributes to 
the convergence of Sweden and Belgium, we observe that the constructed maternity leave 
indicator (Leave is the responsible for the switch of the sign from negative and significant 
to positive. This means that the increase in the generosity in the Swedish maternity leave 
may have had a negative impact on the Swedish year calendar dummies.
Finally, we examine an alternative approach for assessing the impact of the Swedish data 
on the final policy results. This consists of re-estimating the probability of staying-on em­
ployed in Sweden with interactions between the calendar year dummies and the duration 
dummies. We then use these new calendar year estimates for Sweden in the regression 
on policies. First, note that we find that the added interactions are not significant, which
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS AFTER MOTHERHOOD 154
is in line with the previously discussed view that the year calendar dummies are actually 
picking up the right effect for Sweden. Second, the new regression on policies (see Table 
4.33 in Appendix 4.9) arises similar conclusions as Table 4.23, except that the variable 
for Separate taxation has a smaller coefficient.86
4.6.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this section we focused on the transitions from employment to non-employment after 
motherhood in five countries: Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Our 
main purpose was to understand the factors that determine the differences in their prob­
abilities of staying-on in employment and how these probabilities have evolved over time. 
We observe cohorts born between 1951 and 1970 and use the same data source for each 
country in order to develop a comprehensive analysis.
From our comparison, we find that Spain and West-Germany are the countries with 
by far the highest long-term decline in employment rates after first child. We find that 
of those German mothers who were employed one year before first birth, only 46% are 
at work two years afterwards. The proportions are 78% in Belgium, 75% in Italy, 66% 
in Sweden and 59% in Spain. Although the staying-on rates on a two-year horizon are 
not much apart in Spain and Sweden, they differ in two main aspects. First, Swedish 
mothers have higher pre-birth employment rates. Second, Spanish drops are permanent 
rather than temporary. This means that once the procreation process is finished, more 
Swedish mothers are at work.
From those women who are employed both before and after confinement, we observe 
that there are noticeable differences across countries in transitions full-time vs. part-time. 
In Belgium, 13% women move from full-time to part-time after birth of a first child. The 
rate is 49% in Sweden. Only about 3% do so in Italy and Spain, and 5% in West-Germany. 
We believe that this reflects disparity in the free choice of the number of working hours, 
rather than these countries being apart in female preferences. The lesson is that post­
birth employment rates would be higher in West-Germany, Italy and Spain if mothers 
were offered broader flexibility to combine childcare and work part-time. In that case, 
we might have more mothers moving into part-time employment instead of into inactivity.
In our probit estimation, we observe that women with graduate degrees are more likely to
86Year calendar dummy coefficients for the new Swedish estimation are on average more negative. Since 
Sweden has a Separate taxation throughout this period, we expect that the positive effect of this variable 
on the regression will be smaller in this new estimation.
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be at work after childbearing in all countries, except for Sweden. In the latter, education 
does not significantly raise the chances of post-birth employment. This is due to the fact 
that Swedish women are eligible for public childcare. This means that mothers with low 
education find it worthwhile being at work since they do not need to pay childcare by 
themselves. We also find that the number of months worked up to motherhood increase 
the probability of being employed after first birth. Thus, longer accumulation of human 
capital increases the probability of post-birth employment.
A representative mother who was at work before birth has a different predicted post­
birth probability of employment depending upon the country where she lives. There are 
also relevant changes over time. Belgian and especially Spanish mothers increased their 
probability of post-birth employment, ceteris paribus. The opposite movement occurred 
in West-Germany. Italy and Sweden remained fairly invariable over time.
This section attempts to separate out the effect of subsequent fertility patterns on post­
birth employment from other more direct effects. We do this by estimating the probability 
of employment after first birth for those women who remain with one child. This reveals 
that in Spain (especially for earlier cohorts) there are two different groups of mothers. One 
that have only one child and are committed to the job market. The other have more than 
one child and are less attached to it. This distinction is more muted in the other countries.
We observe that the predicted probability of being at work varies substantially across 
countries and years. We then explore the factors that could explain this. We find that 
the increase in completed female tertiary education, the separate taxation system and 
the proportion of part-time contracts consistently explain the observed changes. This has 
important policy implications. For instance, West-Germany might experience an increase 
in post-birth employment if it moved into a separate taxation regime. Results also show 
that maternity leave does not significantly impact on post-birth employment. Note that 
all these countries have the right of reinstatement in the period 1973-93 but they differ in 
its generosity and length. We believe that a too long period of leave is counterproductive 
since it postpones return, which reduces female skills and might be a further disincentive 
to re-entry. The availability of long maternity leave should be accompanied by public 
offered childcare (as in Sweden) or childcare tax relief (as in Belgium) so that women 
have the simultaneous choice of being at work and/or on leave. Besides, childcare should 
be flexible and accommodate mothers’ needs in their working time.
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4.7 Summary of Main Findings
This chapter analysed the employment transitions after childbearing. We investigated 
empirically the factors that affect the likelihood of staying in employment. We have also 
investigated differences across countries and periods. In particular, we have discussed the 
policies that cause the dissimilarities in the evolution of post-birth employment patterns.
We next summarise the main results for the Spanish analysis:
•  There is no evidence that women move towards a less rewarding job after childbear­
ing (Downward Occupational Mobility) because of the lack of voluntary part-time 
jobs.
•  Instead, 40% of mothers experience transitions to non-employment (mostly perma­
nent Career Break) and one third of those movements go to unemployment.
•  Labour market stability (i.e. permanent or public sector contracts) raises the staying- 
on rates. Policies that reduce the number of fixed-term contracts are likely to in­
crease female post-birth employment.
The country comparison reveals the following:
• Post-birth employment rates would be expected to be higher in West-Germany, Italy 
and Spain if mothers were offered the free choice of part-time work.
• In countries with limited public childcare, staying-on employed is far more likely for 
high educated women since they can afford to pay private childcare. It is interesting 
to find that Sweden is the only country where post-birth employment is not related 
to the level of education. Recall that Sweden is also the most generous country in 
terms of its availability of public childcare.
• Belgian and especially Spanish women have increased their probability of staying- 
on employed after a birth over time. The opposite has occurred in West-Germany, 
whereas Sweden and Italy have stayed fairly constant.
• The increase in female education levels, the change from a joint to an individual 
taxation system and the rise in part-time jobs have had a positive impact on the 
staying-on rates. By contrast, extending the period of childcare leave (as in West- 
Germany) has had a rather negative effect on the probability of remaining at work 
after motherhood.
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4.8 Appendix A: Labels for the Variables
Table 4.24: Variable Labels, FFS
Temporary* Proportion of female fixed-term contracts at national level
Experience Accumulated number of months worked up to the birth
Unemrf Female regional unemployment rates
OcHIGH* Dummy (1 if high level occupation 1 year before birth)
AgeAtl C Age at first child in years
AgeAtl C2 Square of age at first child
AgeAtl Job Age at first job
Marriedl C Dummy (1 if married at first birth)
El Dummy (1 if highest education is primary degree; omitted category)
E2 Dummy (1 if highest education is secondary degree)
ESVoc Dummy (1 if highest education is vocational tertiary degree)
ESGrPo Dummy (1 if highest education is university degree)
E1P* Dummy (1 if husband’s highest education is primary degree; omitted)
E2P* Dummy (1 if husband’s highest education is secondary degree)
E3VocP* Dummy variable (1 if husband’s highest education is vocational degree)
ESGrPoP* Dummy (1 if husband’s highest education is university degree)
Religious Dummy (1 if individual’s is religious)
NW* North-West region
NE* North-East region
CMadrid* Madrid region
C* Centre region
E* East region
Canaries* Canaries Islands region
S* South region (Omitted category)
City** Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants)
FHE** Proportion of female with completed tertiary education at country level
Leave** Weeks maternity*replacement rates +  weeks childcare*replacement rates
Tax** Dummy (1 if separate taxation system)
FvsP** Proportion of female part-time labour
Cohort X - Y Individual is born between year X  and Y
^Variable only for the Spanish analysis.
** Variable only for the European comparison analysis.
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Table 4.25: Variable Labels, EPA1
Employer Dummy (1 if employer; 0 employee)
Public Dummy (1 if she works at the public sector)
Permanent Dummy (1 if permanent contract)
Fulltime Dummy (1 if she worked more than 35 hours per week)
Tenure Months worked in particular pre-birth job
OcHIGH Dummy (1 if high level occupation 1 year before birth)
Age Age in years
Age2 Square of age
E l Dummy (1 if highest education is primary degree; omitted category)
E2 Dummy (1 if highest education is secondary degree)
ESVoc Dummy (1 if highest education is vocational tertiary degree)
ESGrPo Dummy (1 if highest education is university degree)
Nationality Dummy (1 if individual’s is Spanish)
Married Dummy (1 if married)
N W North-West region
NE North-East region
CMadrid Madrid region
G Centre region
E East region
Canaries Canaries Islands region
S South region (Omitted category)
Year 1988-90 Interview done between 1988-90 (Omitted category)
Year 1991-93 Interview done between 1991-93
Year 1994-96 Interview done between 1994-96
1 Survey only for the Spanish analysis.
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4.9 Appendix B: Tables
4.9.1 The Spanish Case
Table 4.26: Change in Occupational Status Around First Birth (%), Cohort 1945-60, FFS 
— Spanish Females
1st Job After1 Occupational Status 12 months Before
Not Working Working
High Moderate Low Very Low
Not Working 97.1 6.4 22.0 40.1 50.8
Good 0.2 93.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Average 0.0 0.0 77.1 0.6 0.0
Low 1.4 0.0 0.2 58.7 0.8
Very Low 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.6 48.4
Total Number 555 31 132 167 120
1l*t job hold in observed period. Individuals might be censored before return.
4.9.2 European Comparison
Table 4.27: Standard Taxing Reliefs in 1990 — Country Comparison1
Countries Married’s Relief Children’s Relief Childminder’s Relief
Belgium V yj V
Germany V yj yj
Italy V* y/ X
Spain yj y/ X
Sweden s X 4 X
1 Source: OECD (1993).
2Husband’s spouse credit is not given if wife’s income exceeds fixed limit.
O
Husband’s tax credit tapers off to zero as spouse’s income increases.
4Cash transfers.
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Table 4.28: Labour Force Status of Female Aged 20-49 Years Old, By Number of Children 
in 1998 — Country Comparison1
LFS Belgium Germany Italy Spain Sweden2
0 Child
Employed
Unemployed
Inactive
73.0%
8.8%
18.1%
81.2%
6.1%
12.7%
66.9%
7.9%
25.2%
65.8%
15.2%
18.9%
74.1%
6.3%
18.0%
1 Child 0-2
Employed
Unemployed
Inactive
65.5%
9.6%
24.9%
47.6%
3.0%
49.2%
45.5%
7.7%
46.8%
40.2%
12.8%
47.0%
34.9%
6.5%
57.1%
2 Children youngest 0-2
Employed
Unemployed
Inactive
68.0%
8.1%
23.9%
43.8%
9.4%
44.4%
41.1%
7.0%
51.8%
36.5%
12.3%
51.3%
38.5%
6.8%
53.2%
3+ Children youngest 0-2
Employed
Unemployed
Inactive
45.6%
8.6%
45.8%
29.9%
2.3%
67.8%
29.9%
6.4%
63.7%
23.4%
11.7%
64.9%
39.3%
4.3%
54.7%
1Source: Eurostat. Labour Force Survey. Results 1998. Theme 3. Table 11. 
2Self-constructed with 1992-92 FFS survey.
Table 4.29: Activity Rates of Women Aged 25-49 Years Old, By Marital Status — Coun­
try Comparison1,2
Year Marital Status Belgium Germany Italy Spain Sweden3
1991
1995
Single
Married
Single
Married
84.0%
65.1%
84.2%
69.4%
86.2%
61.7%
86.1%
69.7%
78.6%
51.7%
70.3%
52.0%
82.7%
42.7%
82.7%
51.0%
79.9%
80.7%
1Source 1991: Eurostat. Labour Force Survey. Results 1991. 3C. Table 04. 
2Source 1995: Eurostat. Labour Force Survey. Results 1995. 3C. Table 04. 
3Source for Sweden: Self-constructed with 1992-92 FFS survey.
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Table 4.30: Probability of Employment After First Birth: following 96 Months (Women 
whose Retrospective History Covers the Entire 96 Months) — Country Comparison
Variables Probit After 1st Birth: Marginal Effects1,2
Belgium W- Germany Italy Spain Sweden
City3 
Religious 
Marriedl C 
Experience4 
AgeAtl Job 
AgeAtl C 
AgeAtl C2
-0.058 (0.042) 
-0.082** (0.036) 
-0.182** (0.043) 
0.011** (0.002) 
0.113** (0.023) 
-0.239** (0.072) 
0.003* (0.002)
-0.025 (0.035) 
-0.029 (0.036) 
0.008 (0.078) 
0.020** (0.002) 
0.224** (0.034) 
-0.258** (0.086) 
0.0008 (o.ooi)
0.012 (0.028) 
-0.064 (0.046) 
0.028 (0.049) 
0.003** (0.0006) 
0.031** (0.007) 
0.039 (0.039) 
-0.0008 (0.0008)
0.059** (0.023) 
-0.138** (0.036) 
-0.029 (0 .051) 
0.0006* (o.ooo3) 
0.0007 (o.ooi) 
-0.002 (0.040) 
0.002 (0.0008)
0.046 (0 .029) 
0.006 (0.022) 
-0.031 (0.024) 
0.0010 (0.008) 
0.021** (0.010) 
0.074 (0.050) 
-0.002* (o.ooo9)
Education5
E2
ESVoc
ESGrPo
-0.0017 (0.034) 
0.116** (0.038) 
0.136** (0.054)
0.177* (0.092) 
0.249* (0.149) 
0.422** (0 .120)
0.059** (0.027) 
-0.0007 (0.058)
0.079** (0.025) 
0.153** (0.064) 
0.171** (0.085)
-0.0001 (0.071) 
-0.066 (0.078)
Cohorts6 
19547 
1956-608 
1961-659 
1966-7
0.041 (0.037) 
0.110** (0.050) 
dropped
0.061 (0.067) 
0.208* (0.125) 
0.040 (0.203)
-0.018 (0.036) 
-0.025 (0.060) 
-0.108 (0.095)
-0.012(0.064) 
-0.105 (0.126) 
-0.275 (0.187)
-0.028 (0.095) 
-0.063 (o.i84) 
-0.114 (0.262) 
dropped
Log likel. -5312.7 -6068.6 -7301.0 -7034.5 -7563.6
N  subjects 1062 688 2056 1684 1410
N  obs. 6372 5983 8412 7548 8460
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
1 Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors adjusted for individual clustering.
2Duration dummies, year dummies and interactions not reported.
3Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants).
4Accumulated number of months worked up to the birth.
5Omitted category is the lowest level (El ) .
6Omitted category is Cohort 1951-55 ( Cohort 1952-55 for West-Germany and Cohort 1949 for Sweden).•j
Cohort 1954 f or Sweden only.
8 Cohort 1959 for Sweden.
9 Cohort 1964 f or Sweden.
Cohort 1969 for Sweden.
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Table 4.31: Duration Dummies and Year Calendar Dummies in the Model of Table 4.22 
— Country Comparison
Variables Probit After l sf Birth: Coefficients1
Belgium W-Germany Italy Spain Sweden
D62 -0.074 0.024) -0.031 0.015) -0.031 (o.oio) -0.043 (0.022) 0.212 0.031)
D12 -0.082 0.035) -0.009 0.027) - 0 .1 0 1  (0.016) -0.089 (0.039) 0.955 0.056)
D24 -0.256 0.054) 0.004 0.048) -0.133 (0.025) -0.109 (0.062) 1.424 0.089)
D48 -0.308 0.093) 0.059 0.095) -0.187 (0.044) -0.248 (o.ii3) 1.332 0.157)
D96 -0.452 0.174) 0.221 0.190) -0.268 (0.086) -0.369 (0.217) 1.656 0.308)
Year 73^ -0.113 0.240) -0.321 0.195) 0.145 (0.125) 0.220 (0.363) -0.217 0.231)
Year74 -0.098 0.239) -0.071 0.218) 0.024 (0.135) 0.481 (0.403) -0.233 0.263)
Year75 -0.057 0.243) -0.179 0.219) -0.038 (0.143) 0.675 (0.388) -0.231 0.292)
Year76 0.003 0.247) -0.156 0.228) 0.077 (0.129) 0.395 (0.386) -0.413 0.319)
Year77 -0.077 0.252) -0.159 0.248) 0.166 (0.130) 0.489 (0.384) -0.377 0.354)
Year78 -0.113 0.258) -0.322 0.259) 0.144 (0.133) 0.492 (0.376) -0.177 0.391)
Year79 -0.066 0.268) -0.223 0.260) 0.117 (0.138) 0.598 (0.384) -0.274 0.428)
Year80 -0.217 0.279) -0.416 0.285) 0.107 (0.145) 0.837 (0.402) -0.336 0.465)
Year81 -0.157 0.295) -0.383 0.304) 0.079 (0.151) 1.112 (0.416) -0.357 0.500)
Year82 -0.115 0.310) -0.498 0.321) 0.093 (0.155) 0.937 (0.425) -0.293 0.542)
Year83 -0.157 0.295) -0.628 0.339) 0.099 (0.164) 0.950 (0.443) -0.291 0.577)
Year84 -0.142 0.335) -0.623 0.359) 0.164 (0.171) 1.01 9 (0.462) -0.192 0.612)
Year85 -0.081 0.351) -0.697 0.376) 0.054 (0.177) 0.977 (0.484) -0.271 0.653)
Year86 -0.186 0.369) -0.676 0.394) 0.072 (0.187) 1.081 (0.499) -0.304 0.691)
Year87 0.037 0.385) -0.693 0.417) 0.085 (0.194) 0.967 (0.517) -0.209 0.725)
Year88 -0.036 0.401) -0.647 0.433) 0.134 (0.203) 0.885 (0.537) -0.076 0.763)
Year89 - 0 .0 1 2 0.421) -0.812 0.460) 0.085 (0.211) 0.931 (0.554) -0.260 0.801)
Year90 -0.123 0.434) -0.754 0.479) 0.088 (0.217) 0.989 (0.578) -0.240 0.841)
Year91 0.042 0.456) -0.779 0.500) 0.085 (0.224) 0.942 (0.597) -0.408 0.876)
Year92-934 0.496 0.697) -0.778 0.518) 0.101 (0.234) 0.789 (0.625) -0.300 0.912)
^Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
1 Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors adjusted for individual clustering.
Duration dummies. Omitted variable: D3 
3Year Calendar Dummies. Omitted variable: Year72.
4We take year 1992 and 1993 together to increase the number of observations in this cell.
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Table 4.32: Probability of Employment After First Birth: following 96 Months (Women 
who Only Had One Child Ever) — Country Comparison
Variables Probit After l sf Birth: Marginal Effects1,2
Belgium? W- Germany Italy Spain Sweden
City4 
Religious 
Marriedl C 
Experience5 
AgeAtl Job 
AgeAtl C 
AgeAtl C2
-0.125
0.026
0.015
0.002
0.011
0.210
-0.004
-0.003 (0.037) 
0.012 (0.035) 
-0.129** (0.050) 
0.010** (0.003) 
0.103** (0.029) 
-0.018 (0.059) 
-0.002** (o.ooi)
0.035 (0.034) 
-0.038 (0.040) 
-0.003 (0.054) 
0.002* (o.ooi) 
0.025** (o.oi2) 
-0.017 (0.041) 
-0.0001 (o.ooo7)
0.023 (0.064) 
-0.059 (0.072) 
0.106 (0.103) 
0.002* (o.ooio) 
0.006 (0.005) 
0.016 (0.078) 
-0.0009 (o.ooi)
-0.094** (0.042) 
0.011 (0.040) 
-0.031 (0.041) 
0.004** (o.ooi) 
0.041** (o.oi4) 
0.059 (0.056) 
-0.0007 (o.ooo9)
Education6 
E2
ESVoc
ESGrPo
0.133
0.228
0.298**
0.186** (0.085) 
0.300 (0.219) 
0.406** (0.206)
-0.012 (0.045) 
0.025 (0.084)
0.109 (0.074) 
0.348** (o.io3) 
0.310** (0.132)
-0.038 (o.ni) 
0.045 (0.108)
Cohorts^ 
19547 
1956-608 
1961-659 
1966-7010
-0.107
-0.094
-0.145
-0.004 (0.069) 
0.003 (0.125) 
-0.042 (0.172)
0.030 (0.050) 
0.035 (0.087) 
-0.028 (o.i5i)
-0.185 (0.128) 
-0.204 (o.i98) 
-0.491** (0.211)
0.327* (o.i7i) 
0.542** (0.249) 
0.748** (0.175) 
0.720 (0.125)
Log likel. -2070.7 -2601.7 -2623.8 -2022.1 -2172.6
N subjects 663 574 965 711 600
N obs. 2938 2640 2901 2138 2530
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
I Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors adjusted for individual clustering.
2Duration dummies, year dummies and interactions not reported.
3Fail in calculating second derivative, no standard deviation reported.
4Dummy (1 if individual’s locality up to 15 had >=100.000 inhabitants).
Accumulated number of months worked up to the birth.
6Omitted category is the lowest level (El) .
7Omitted category is Cohort 1951-55 ( Cohort 1952-55 for West-Germany and Cohort 1949 for Sweden).
8 Cohort 1954 f or Sweden only.
9 Cohort 1959 for Sweden.
10 Cohort 1964 f or Sweden.
II Cohort 1969 for Sweden.
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Table 4.33: OLS Regression of Probit’s Year-Country Dummies Estimates on Policies, 
Labour Market, Country dummies and Linear Trend — Country Comparison
Model OLS
All Sample
Country Dummies Country Dummies & Policies
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
FHE1 33.089** 7.138
Leave2 -0.016 0.032
Taxz 0.063 0.059
Unemrf4 1.357 0.831
FvsP5 1.729** 0.790
West-Germany6 -0.670** 0.053 1.118** 0.437
Italy 0.116** 0.053 1.429** 0.351
Spain 0.971** 0.053 2.316** 0.294
Sweden7 -0.209** 0.053 -0.002 1.140
Linear Trend -0.043** 0.012
Cte -0.020 0.037 1.120** 0.598
R-squared 0.9541 0.9727
N  observations 55
* Significant at 10% level.
**Significant at 5% level.
1 Proportion of female with completed tertiary education.ty
Constructed maternity leave indicator.
3Dummy: 1 if separate taxation system; 0 if joint.
4Proportion of female unemployment.
5Proportion of female in part-time positions.
6 Country omitted category is Belgium.
7The year calendar dummies for Sweden have been estimated with a probit model 
with interactions between the year calendar dummies and the duration dummies.
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4.10 A ppendix C: Graphs
4.10 .1  T he Spanish C ase
Figure 4.12: Monthly Probability of being Employed after First Birth Conditional on 
being Employed 12 Months Before, By Cohort — Spanish Females
o Cohort 1945-49 a Cohort 1960-64
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Figure 4.13: Monthly Probability of being Employed After First Birth Conditional on 
being Employed 12 Months Before, Year-Regional Dummies, By Skill Profile — Spanish 
Females
o  Low Education & Occupation Level a High Education Level 
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Figure 4.14: Monthly Probability of being Employed After First Birth Conditional on 
being Employed 12 Months Before, Year-Regional Dummies, By Year — Spanish Females
o Year 1966 a Year 1995
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Figure 4.15: Monthly Probability of being Employed After First Birth Conditional on be­
ing Employed 12 Months Before, Year-Regional Dummies, By Cohort in 1966 — Spanish 
Females
o  Cohort 1945-49 a  Cohort 1960-64
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4.10 .2  E uropean C om parison
167
Figure 4.16: Employment Rates Around Birth, By Cohort — Country Comparison
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Figure 4.17: Employment Rates Around Marriage for Women Without Children, By 
Cohort — Country Comparison
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Figure 4.18: Employment Rates Before and After First Birth — Swedish Females
a 1985
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Chapter 5
Female Participation in the UK: 
1974-2002
5,1 Introduction
Female participation rates have increased substantially in the UK between 1984 and 2002. 
The statistics show that the rise in female labour supply has occurred mainly among mar­
ried women with children. In this chapter, we seek to find an explanation for this evolution 
and identify the groups of women with greater rises in employment.
The analysis is undertaken with two aims in mind. First, we investigate the overall 
sources of the increase in female participation. We wish to know the extent to which this 
rise has been caused by changes in the characteristics of the female population or whether 
it has primarily been due to changes in participation behaviour. Second, we analyse the 
relationship between family-friendly policies and the employment of married women with 
children. We focus on this subgroup of women since they have experienced the greatest 
growth in employment. In particular, we seek to isolate the birth cohorts whose mothers 
have had most rises in employment and link those to changes in policies.
Most of the recent work is focused on the evaluation of the impact of specific taxation poli­
cies (e.g. WFTC) on female participation (Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (2000)) 
and are estimated for specific single years. Less research has been done to analyse the 
increasing rates of female participation from the 1980s onwards. The aim of this chapter 
is to fill in this gap and learn more about the trend. How much of the increase is explained 
by the female population acquiring those characteristics that make them more likely to 
be in the labour market? How much is due to the evolution of behaviour or anything else 
that we have not been able to capture in our specification such as maternity leave and
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taxation policies? To explore these issues, we follow the approach of Gomulka and Stern 
(1989) in their analysis of the employment of married women in the UK between 1970 and 
1983 using the Family Expenditure Survey. Other questions addressed in this chapter are 
focused on married women with young children. When did this group of women start to 
increase employment? How it was related to changes in policies? Which type of mothers 
experienced rises in employment?
The structure of Chapter 5 is as follows: we review some literature on female labour 
supply in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes briefly the main trends in female participa­
tion in the UK. Section 5.4 disentangles how much of the increase in female participation 
in the UK is due to changes in characteristics and how much is caused by changes in 
behaviour. Section 5.5 aims to identify those birth cohorts whose married women experi­
enced an increase in employment. It also seeks to differentiate across groups of mothers. 
We write some concluding remarks in Section 5.6.
5.2 Previous Literature
Many authors are concerned about the micro-based factors that determine the labour 
supply decision. For example, Greenhalgh (1977) concentrates on the post-war period 
1951-71 and estimates a labour supply function for married women using the New Earn­
ings Survey 1971. She finds that the elasticity with respect to female wages (1.35) is 
larger in absolute terms than the elasticity with respect to husband’s income (-0.86). 
This means that a rise in wages (keeping relative wages constant) leads to an increase in 
participation. Joshi (1986) uses the Women and Employment Survey in 1980 to analyse 
female participation in Britain. What is new from her study is that she constructs an 
index of each woman’s earning potential and looks at its impact on female participation. 
She also pays special attention to the effect of work interruptions on female low pay.
In a series of papers, Blundell, Ham and Meghir investigate female labour supply at 
the individual level with cross-sectional data (British Family Expenditure Survey). Blun­
dell, Ham and Meghir (1987) estimate a cross-sectional model for married female labour 
supply that embodies the possibility that there are unemployed workers who want to work 
at their perceived market wage but are unable to find a job. This means that zero hours 
of work represent not only non-participation but also unemployment. They find signifi­
cant differences with respect to the model that takes as equivalent the probability of zero 
hours and not having positive desired hours of work. The same authors have extended 
this setting to discouraged workers (Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1998)).
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Another branch of literature analyses the trends in female participation. Joshi, Layard 
and Owen (1985) build a time-series of aggregate data (1950-81) to explain the increasing 
number of women at work. They analyse the impact of wages, education, and fertility on 
female employment. They show that fertility had a small effect in the period 1951-70, 
whereas the decline in the number of children produced a significant rise in employment 
between 1971 and 1981. Evans (1998) studies the fall in unemployment in Britain, which 
he suggests, is mostly due to the decrease in female unemployment. He finds that the de­
cline in female unemployment is associated with a fall in their inflow rate, which is highly 
concentrated among women with young children. He argues that the latter is caused by 
the reduction of market frictions that women experience after childbearing.
Very little research has been done up to now to investigate the trends in female partici­
pation in the period 1974-2002. This chapter updates and analyses the rising in female 
participation between 1974 and 2002.
5.3 Trends in Female Participation
The participation rate of women aged between 16 and 59 years old increased from 65% in 
1984 to 72% in 2002. This trend has not been the same for all women. Table 5.1 shows 
different rates of female participation rates according to a set of characteristics. For ex­
ample, single women have experienced a decline in participation rates of 8 percentage 
points (from 76% to 68%), whereas married women have seen participation rates rise by 
12 percentage points (from 62% to 74%). There are also significant differences depend­
ing on the number of children in the household. Those women without any dependent 
children in the household have fairly constant participation rates across this period (from 
74% to 77%). In contrast, the rise in participation has been substantial for women with 
dependent children. Rates have increased from 62% to 71% for women in households with 
one dependent child, from 56% to 69% for those with two, and from 40% to 51% for those 
with three or more dependent children. Thus, there is evidence that part of the increase 
in total participation rates has been driven by both married women and women who live 
in households with dependent children.
In the period 1984-2002, the gap in participation across education levels has widened. 
Female participation rates for the highly educated have increased 9 percentage points 
(from 79% to 88%), whereas those for women without qualifications have dropped by 10 
percentage points (from 58% to 48%).
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Table 5.1: Female Participation Rates (%) in the UK1 by Category in 1984 and 2002
Years Total Marital Status Dependent Children Qualifications
Married Single One Two Three + None Yes No
1984 65 62 76 62 56 40 74 79 58
2002 72 74 68 71 69 51 77 88 48
1A11 female aged between 16 and 59 years old in the LFS survey. For the estimation in Section 5.4, 
we take a sub-sample of female aged 16-59 who are either the heads of the household or their partners. 
They have an increase of participation from 62% to 73%.
The youngest group of women (those aged between 16 and 24 years old) have experi­
enced a decline of 5 percentage points in participation rates due primarily to the increase 
in the enrolment in higher education. The rest of the age groups (25-34, 35-44 and 45-54) 
have increased their participation, especially for those women aged between 25-34 (their 
rates move from 60% to 75%).
5.4 Female Labour Force Participation in the UK: 
Evolving Characteristics or Changing Behaviour?1
5.4.1 Introduction
This section aims to answer the first question of the chapter, which is to measure the 
extent to which the rise in female participation in the period 1984-2002 has been caused 
by changes in the characteristics of the female population or whether it has primarily been 
due to changes in participation behaviour. Our methodology is inspired by Gomulka and 
Stern (1989) who analyse the employment of married women in the UK between 1970 and 
1983. They disentangle the source of the rise in employment into two channels. First, 
changes in the variables describing the female population and, second, changes in the 
coefficients that capture the probability of being employed. They find that the increase 
in employment was mostly due to changes in the way the probability of employment of 
married women was determined. Interestingly, our results suggest that, between 1984 
and 2002, changes in the distribution of the micro variables contribute to two thirds of 
the growth in female participation, whereas one third is explained by changes in behaviour.
Another objective of the section is to develop a method for forecasting female partic­
1This section draws on joint research with Brian Bell for a project at the Bank of England. I would 
like to thank him for his collaboration and instructive comments.
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ipation. We use the estimated coefficients from our models and the estimated growth 
of the explanatory variables to predict the female participation rate in 2003 and 2004. 
Results suggest that the female participation rate will continue to rise by around 0.4-0.7 
percentage points over the next two years.
For our analysis, we use the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which interviews about 60,000 
households per year and has a rich description on labour force status, education and 
household structure, though not on incomes and wages. These variables have been made 
comparable across all years. Our data are not a panel, but a collection of annual cross 
sections.
The remainder of this Section is as follows: in Subsection 5.4.2 we examine the data 
and the choice of variables in our model. Subsection 5.4.3 explains the model and the 
empirical methodology. In Subsection 5.4.4 we outline the results of the estimation for 
female participation and in Subsection 5.4.5 we replicate those for males. Subsection 5.4.6 
presents the forecasting approach. We conclude in the final subsection.
5.4.2 D ata  and Constructed Variables
We use the LFS from 1984 to 2002 and limit our sample to women aged between 16 and 59 
years old, who axe either the head of the household or the partner of the head. The LFS 
only provides a direct link between children and adults for heads of households and their 
partners. Since we are interested in the effect of children on participation, we therefore 
restrict our sample to heads and their partners to ensure that the children we account for 
belong to the individual. We also undertook the analysis for the whole group of females 
aged 16-59 and results were very similar. The annual number of women aged 16-59 in 
the sample is about 46,000. Our selection criteria reduce the sample to around 36,000 
annual observations.
The dependent variable is one if a woman participates and zero otherwise. The percent­
age of women participating in our sample (aged between 16-59 who are either the head 
or their spouse) increases from 62% in 1984 to 73% in 2002. The explanatory variables 
are:2 age, education, ethnicity, region, children, marital status, if lone parents, education 
and employment status of the partner. We control for age using interval dummies (16-19, 
20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54 and 55-59). We take the age group 35- 
39 as our reference group. Education is constructed in nine categories, from the lowest
2The definition and label of the explanatory variables are summarised in Appendix 5.7.
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to the highest, as follows: Edul (no qualifications, our omitted category), Edu2 (other 
professional/vocational qualifications), Edu3 (CSE), Edu4 (completed apprenticeship, in­
cluding City and Guilds), Edu5 (‘O’ level), Edu6 (mid vocational, ONC, OND), Edul 
(‘A’ level), Edu8 (high vocational, BTEC, HNC, HND and nurses) and Edu9 (degree, 
including teachers).
Demographic characteristics are marital status (Married takes value 1 if the individ­
ual is married or in cohabitation, 0 otherwise), Non-White (dummy with value 1 being 
non-white), number of children in each age group (NdepO-2, Ndep3~4, Ndep5-10 and 
Ndep 11-15), dummies 0-1 if the woman has at least a child in each of the age groups 
(DdepO-2, Ddep3~4, Ddep5-10 and D depll-15) and a dummy for being a single parent 
(HOHSingle). For those women who are married or in cohabitation, it is important to 
control for their partner’s education (EduPl-EduP9) and employment status (0-1 dummy 
EmpP). This gives an indicator of their external income,3 which theory predicts will have 
a substantial impact on female participation decisions. By doing this, we assume that 
females take their partner’s income as exogenous in making their participation decision, 
rather than modelling a joint family problem. Finally, we control for region of residence 
(Regionl-Regionl2).
5.4.3 M ethodology
As mentioned in the introduction, we wish to disentangle the source of increase of female 
participation into two main effects: changes over time in the measured characteristics and 
changes in the coefficients of the model. We follow the approach of Gomulka and Stern 
(1989), which in turn uses the methodology of growth accounting proposed by Stoker 
(1985). The aim is to decompose the change of an aggregate variable (here the proportion 
of women who participate) into a change of the behavioural micro model (coefficients of 
the probit estimation for a series of cross-sections) and a change in the distribution of the 
micro variables (education, fertility, marital status, etc).
The coefficient estimates for each year differ because behaviour evolves over time; that is, 
people with the same characteristics do not react in an identical way in different years. 
This may reflect the fact that some factors that may influence female decisions have been 
excluded from our specification. For instance, some policy regulations (i.e. maternity 
leave and taxation) have changed between 1984 and 2002 and are likely to affect female
3The LFS lacks income and wage variables for the whole period 1984-2002. Thus, partners’ edu­
cation and employment status is a proxy for external income whenever the individual is married or in 
cohabitation.
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Table 5.2: History of Institutional Changes linked to Female Participation in the UK: 
1979-2002
Years New Policies
1979 • Introduction of the Right of Reinstatement (possibility to return to the same 
job after motherhood) for specific eligibility conditions.
• Introduction of the Maternity Pay for specific eligibility conditions.
1987 •  Maternity Pay is extended.
1988 •  Family Credit (in-work-benefits) replaced Family Income Supplement 
(dating from 1971) with increased generosity.
1990 •  Joint taxation is substituted by separate taxation for married couples.
1994 • The Right of Reinstatement is applicable to all working women, no matter 
how long they are employed. Extra leave is possible under certain conditions.
1999 •  Working Family Tax Credit replaces Family Credit, with increased generosity 
and child-care support.
2000 •  The Right of Reinstatement is extended and the eligibility for 
the longer leave is relaxed.
•  Working Family Tax Credit increased in generosity.
choices, ceteris paribus. A summary of the main policy changes is shown in Table 5.2. 
Further information is given in Table 5.20 and 5.21 in Appendix 5.8, when we deal with 
the increase of employment for married women with children.
To illustrate the mechanism, we first show the decomposition for the linear case (due 
to Oaxaca (1973)). We assume that our dependent variable y can be explained by a 
linear regression as follows
y = (3X + e (5.1)
where (3 is the vector of coefficients, X  the vector of exogenous variables and e the error 
term. This equation is valid for each year. Then, for a given year
y = p x (5.2)
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where /3 is the ordinary least-squares estimate of /? and y and X  axe the means across the 
observed individuals. This linear form can decompose changes of y into changes in /? and 
changes in X . That is, we can decompose the variation in two given periods, indexed by 
0 and 1 in the following way:
y1 -  y° = 0 1 -  p ° )X l +  (.X 1 -  X°)/3° (5.3)
The first term shows the change that comes from the changes in the coefficients at con­
stant values of the variables, which is the contribution of a shift in behaviour. The second 
term captures the difference arising from changes in the variables, at constant coefficients, 
which measures changes in the average population.4
As in Gomulka and Stern (1989), our dependent variable is dichotomous and we use 
a probit model. This means that, for our decomposition, the change in the aggregate 
proportion of women who participate depends not only on the change in the means of 
the variables but also their distributions. The expected value of a binary variable y , that 
takes value one when a woman participates in the labour market and zero otherwise, at 
given set of characteristics and year is a function of X  and j3
Pr(y = l\X) = m X )  (5.4)
For a probability density function for X , <j>(X), then the expectation in the population of 
the variable y is
E(y) = J  mx)4>(X)dX.  (5.5)
If /? is a consistent estimate of /?, and X  is a random sample (this could be another sample 
than the one used to estimate /?), then it can be shown that the right hand side of (5.5) 
can be consistently estimated by the sample average across individuals i
y = f 0 , X )  = ± ' £ f & X 'l (5-6)
i
The left-hand side of (5.5) is estimated consistently by the sample mean y.
As with the linear case, we have that the change in the expected value of y in two 
different years, 0 and 1, can be written as
4Alternative, we can decompose equation 5.3 as y 1 — y° — 0 1 — /3°)X° +  (X 1 — X 0)/?1.
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E i y ^ - E i y 0) = J ( f ( P \ X ) - f ( p ,X ) ) 4 > 1( X ) d X + J ( 4 , \X ) - f> ° ( X ) ) f ( f ,X ) d X  (5.7)
The first integral in (5.7) measures the effects of changes in the values of the coefficients 
given the distribution of the explanatory variables. The second part evaluates the impact 
of a change in the distribution of the explanatory variables for given values of the coeffi­
cient, P°.
We disentangle the change in the average value in the sample y1 — y° as:
y1 -  f  =  ( /0 9 \  X 1) -  f i t3°, X 1)) + ( f i t3°, X 1) -  709°, X 0)) (5.8)
where /(/?*, X J) is the average across the sample of the predicted probability using 
the coefficients . In our analysis, /( /? , X J) is a 19 x 19 matrix.
We would also like to know the contribution of the different variables to the change 
in the predicted probability. That is, suppose we find that changes in the explanatory 
variables between two given years explain a significant part of the increase in female par­
ticipation. Then, the next step is to identify which variables are driving the result. That 
is, is the increase mainly due to, for instance, the increase of female education or is it 
rather caused by a change in fertility? In order to calculate this, we use the marginal 
effects of our probit estimation. These provide the change in the probability for an in­
finitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete 
change in the probability for dummy variables. In this exercise, one leaves the rest of the 
variables at their means. The mechanism is as follows. First, we compute the difference 
between each explanatory variable in two years, say for example 1984 and 2002. We then 
multiply each difference by the estimated marginal effect in 1984. This will give us the 
increase in probability of participation due to the change in that variable between the two 
years while keeping the rest of the variables at their means.
5.4.4 Empirical R esults
Table 5.15 in Appendix 5.8 reports the proportions and standard deviations of all variables 
used in the analysis. It shows the increase in female education, the decline in fertility and 
the drop in married-cohabiting women. Table 5.16 in Appendix 5.8 shows the marginal 
effects of the probability of female participation for each variable and year. We observe 
that the women aged between 30 and 34 and between 35-39 (our reference group) are 
more likely to participate. There is also evidence that non-whites have a smaller proba­
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bility of participating and this negative effect became stronger from the late 80s onwards. 
The regional dummies show that higher participation is predicted in southern areas and 
this pattern persists across the years.
Unsurprisingly, higher levels of education increase the probability of participation. More­
over, the positive effect of education is increasing across time since the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are becoming consistently larger. That is, those without any qualification (our 
base group) are less likely to participate, ceteris paribus, in 2002 than in 1984, compared 
to someone with education.
The structure of the family has an important role in explaining female participation. 
The number of dependent children in each age category, 0-2, 3-4, 5-10 and 11-15 reduces 
the probability of participation.5 This negative effect is larger the younger the age of 
the children. Simultaneously, fertility dummies (e.g. DdepO-2 is 1 if the individual has 
at least a child between 0-2 years old) are also negative up to the age of ten. In these 
dummies, the comparison group is childless women. Notice that these children dummies 
appear to be more significant and greater in absolute value in the earlier years. One 
possible explanation could be that the negative effect of young children is falling in later 
years, due to, for example, changes in maternity and taxation policies.
Married women are less likely to participate.6 However, those with working partners, 
for given partner’s education, have a positive effect that partly offsets this negative effect. 
If we take partner’s income as exogenous (we assume that the decision to participate is not 
simultaneously decided within a couple), we would expect to find that higher partners’ 
income reduces the probability of participation. Although we do not have this informa­
tion, we proxy it with partner’s education. We find that those women whose partner have 
the highest qualifications are those who are less likely to participate, ceteris paribus.
In Table 5.3, we report the decomposition of female participation growth.7 If we read 
along a row we observe the average of the predicted probabilities for year-sample i and 
coefficients of the probit between 1984 and 2002.
5Notice that the causality between number of children and female participation could go either way. 
Also, our analysis inevitably omits the relevant variable ‘preference for work’. Since the number of 
children is negatively related to ‘preference for work’, the estimator for number of children is likely to be 
biased downwards.
6It is interesting to know if the probability of participation for married and single women is different 
with respect to the number of children. We re-estimated the model including interactions between marital 
status and number of children in each age category. Results show that married women with children are 
more likely to participate than single women with children, ceteris paribus.
7Standard errors are roughly 0.2  in all cells.
Table 5.3: Predicted Sample: Percentage of Female Participation in the UK using Coefficients for Year j  and Sample for Year i
Sample
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Coefficient Year 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2
1984 62.3 62.7 63.8 65.1 65.6 65.8 66.3 66.3 67.6 68.7 67.5 67.3 65.9 64.1 64.1 63.9 64.0 64.4 63.3
1985 62.2 62.7 63.9 64.9 65.8 65.9 66.4 66.6 67.5 68.6 67.6 67.3 65.9 64.3 64.0 64.0 64.1 64.5 63.5
1986 62.4 63.0 64.1 65.0 65.9 66.0 66.6 66.7 67.7 68.7 67.7 67.4 66.0 64.4 64.0 64.0 64.2 64.8 63.6
1987 62.6 63.1 64.2 65.3 66.0 66.1 66.7 66.8 67.9 68.8 67.8 67.5 66.3 64.6 64.5 64.4 64.5 65.1 63.9
1988 63.0 63.6 64.7 65.7 66.6 66.7 67.3 67.5 68.4 69.3 68.4 68.2 66.7 65.3 65.0 65.1 65.2 65.8 64.7
1989 63.6 64.2 65.5 66.4 67.3 67.5 68.1 68.4 69.2 70.1 69.3 69.1 67.8 66.4 66.2 66.2 66.4 66.9 65.8
1990 64.0 64.6 65.9 66.9 67.8 68.0 68.6 68.9 69.8 70.7 69.9 69.7 68.5 67.2 67.1 67.1 67.3 67.8 66.6
1991 63.7 64.4 65.7 66.5 67.5 67.7 68.2 68.7 69.3 70.3 69.5 69.2 68.0 66.7 66.5 66.6 66.9 67.3 66.3
1992 64.8 65.3 66.6 67.6 68.4 68.6 69.2 69.5 70.3 71.2 70.5 70.2 69.2 68.0 68.0 68.0 68.2 68.6 67.7
1993 64.2 64.7 66.1 67.0 67.9 68.1 68.6 69.0 69.7 70.6 69.9 69.6 68.7 67.4 67.4 67.5 67.7 68.1 67.2
1994 64.9 65.4 66.8 67.8 68.7 68.9 69.4 69.9 70.5 71.3 70.7 70.5 69.6 68.6 68.6 68.7 68.9 69.4 68.5
1995 65.3 65.8 67.1 68.2 69.0 69.3 69.8 70.3 70.9 71.7 71.1 70.9 70.4 69.5 69.6 69.7 69.9 70.2 69.5
1996 65.4 66.0 67.3 68.5 69.3 69.5 70.1 70.6 71.2 72.1 71.5 71.2 70.9 70.0 70.2 70.3 70.5 70.6 70.1
1997 66.0 66.6 67.9 69.1 69.9 70.1 70.8 71.3 71.8 72.6 72.1 71.9 71.6 70.8 71.0 71.2 71.3 71.5 70.9
1998 66.1 66.7 68.0 69.2 70.0 70.2 70.9 71.4 71.9 72.7 72.2 72.1 71.7 70.9 71.2 71.4 71.5 71.7 71.1
1999 66.6 67.1 68.4 69.6 70.5 70.7 71.3 71.8 72.3 73.1 72.7 72.5 72.1 71.4 71.6 71.8 72.0 72.2 71.6
2 0 0 0 66.6 67.1 68.4 69.6 70.5 70.8 71.3 71.9 72.4 73.2 72.8 72.6 72.2 71.5 71.8 72.0 72.2 72.4 71.8
2 0 0 1 67.0 67.3 68.6 69.7 70.7 70.9 71.4 71.8 72.5 73.2 72.8 72.6 71.9 71.0 71.2 71.4 71.6 72.3 71.3
2 0 0 2 67.4 67.9 69.2 70.3 71.3 71.5 72.0 72.6 73.1 73.8 73.5 73.3 72.9 72.2 72.5 72.7 72.9 73.2 72.6
P ii1 62.3 62.7 64.1 65.3 66.6 67.5 68.6 68.7 70.3 70.6 70.7 70.9 70.9 70.8 71.2 71.8 72.2 72.3 72.6
1 Pii stands for the mean of the predicted probability for year * using the coefficients estimated for the same year i.
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For example, the first row takes the sample of 1984 and gives (from left to right) the mean 
of the predicted probability of participation, taking the coefficients previously estimated 
with sample 1984, then using those coefficients estimated with sample 1985 and so on. 
This tells us the average forecast probability of female participation if our explanatory 
variables had remained as in 1984, but the behaviour (captured by the coefficients) or 
other non-specified variables (such as maternity or taxation policies) had changed across 
years.
Down the table, we fix the coefficients and look at the mean of the predicted proba­
bilities for changes in the distribution of characteristics. That is, changes due to changes 
in the explanatory variables from 1984 to 2002. For instance, the first column fixes the 
coefficients estimated in 1984, and calculates the mean of the probabilities for different 
year samples. Consequently, the diagonal entry corresponds to the mean of the predicted 
probability for the year using the coefficients estimated for that year and unsurprisingly 
are equal to the mean of female participation in the sample.
From Table 5.3, we can conclude that around two thirds of the increase in female par­
ticipation between 1984 and 2002 is associated with changes in the characteristics of the 
female population. The other third is attributed to changes in the coefficients. This pro­
portion is found as follows. By subtracting the first row from the last row in Table 5.3, 
we obtain, for each coefficient, the increase that it is caused by changes in characteristics 
between 1984 and 2002. These differences are in the range 5.1-9.3 percentage points. The 
average of these numbers (6.6 percentage points) gives an approximation of the growth 
in female participation in the period 1984-2002 because of changes in the distribution of 
variables.
Similarly, by subtracting the first column from the last column, we have for each sample 
year, the difference that it is caused by changes in coefficients. These numbers range 
between 1.0 and 5.2 percentage points. If we average these differences, we obtain 3.3 
percentage points growth between 1984 and 2002 due to behavioural changes. Therefore, 
we find that changes in the structure of the population explain two thirds of the growth 
in female participation between 1984 and 2002, whereas one third is associated to changes 
in behaviour or other unspecified variables in our model. This is in marked contrast to 
the results of Gomulka and Stern (1989). Their results show that a major part of the 
growth in married women’s employment between 1970 and 1983 is generated by changes 
in coefficients.
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Interestingly, most of the increase in female participation between 1984 and 2002 takes 
place in 1984-92 (about 8 points of the total 10 percentage points). Notice in Table 5.3 
that, in the 80s, changes in coefficients (i.e. behaviour) contribute significantly to the 
participation growth, whereas the majority of the growth in the 90s is driven by char­
acteristics.8 This suggests that periods of big rises in participation are those in which 
the coefficients (changes in behaviour or in other uncontrolled factors) move significantly. 
If changes in policies cause changes in the coefficients, we expect that new policies had 
a greater impact on the growth in participation in the 80s compared to the 90s, since 
changes in coefficients had a major role in female participation growth in the 80s.9 There 
is scope for further research in order to identify the elements that cause part of the one 
third rise in female participation that is associated with changes in coefficients. This goes, 
however, beyond the scope of this section.
It is important to recognise that the separation between the effect of the coefficients 
and characteristics on participation growth could be biased if the characteristics are not 
pre-determined but evolve in response to changes in the coefficients. For example, in a 
given year, people might decide to marry less because they learn that they will have lower 
probability to participate. Similarly, women might decide to study longer because they 
perceive that education increases their probability to participate. We believe, however, 
that the size of this mechanism is generally small and is unlikely to affect the overall 
conclusions of this section.
Since we find that changes in the distribution of the variables have an important role 
in explaining the growth of female participation, the next step is to disentangle which of 
these variables have been the main influences. As explained in Section 5.4.3, we use the 
concept of marginal effects. As an illustration, we select the marginal effects in 1984 and 
we multiply them by the change in the explanatory variables between 1984 and 2002. This 
is done in Table 5.17 in Appendix 5.8 and has the following interpretation. For instance,
8As an illustration, we divide the whole period 1984-2002 into 1984-91 and 1992-2002 and calculate 
the increase in female participation related to characteristics and behaviour. We find that about two 
thirds of the whole period rise due to changes in characteristics happens between 1992 and 2002. By 
contrast, changes in coefficients between 1984 and 1991 contribute significantly to the rise in female 
participation. However, this positive effect is partially offset by the small negative impact that changes 
in behaviour have on female participation between 1992 and 2002, which makes that in the whole period 
1984-2002, changes in coefficients account for less than changes in characteristics.
9Table 5.2 shows the chronological calendar of new policies. For example, the right of reinstatement 
(a period of unpaid leave after which the mother has the right to return to her previous job) is qualified 
from 1980 onwards and in 1994, conditions for its eligibility are relaxed. In 1988, the Family Credit (in­
work benefits for children) replaced the Family Income Supplement with increased generosity. In 1990, 
taxation moved from a joint basis (the sum of the earnings of a couple) to a separate basis, which was 
expected to increase participation among married women.
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if the variable NdepO-2 has a negative marginal effect in 1984, and the average number 
of children between 0 and 2 decreases in the period 1984-2002, we will have a positive 
contribution of this variable to the overall growth. In Table 5.17 we observe that changes 
in female education (its rise) explain the major increase in female participation associated 
with changes in the population. This is followed by the fertility explanatory variables, 
whose decline is also related to a significant growth in female participation. Note that the 
drop in the proportion of married women implies an increase in participation. However, 
this rise is offset by the negative effect of the education level of these women’s partners.
5.4.5 Evidence on M ale Participation
In marked contrast to the rise in female participation, male participation has declined 
from 89.5% in 1984 to 83.7% in 2002. Interestingly, only about 1 percentage point of the 
drop in 5.8 percentage points has occurred in the 80s and most of the fall was from 1993 
onwards.
Although the analysis of male participation is beyond the scope of this section, for com­
parison we have reproduced the prediction of participation for different year coefficients 
and samples for men (Table 5.4). This exercise allows us to identify whether the decline in 
male participation is mainly caused by changes in characteristics or if it is due to changes 
in coefficients.
Table 5.4 shows that the pattern for males is explained by changes in coefficients, in 
contrast to our conclusions regarding female participation. Variation in coefficients be­
tween 1984 and 2002 generate a decline in male participation of about 8.7 percentage 
points, whereas changes in characteristics account for an increase of male participation of 
about 2.9 percentage points. Therefore, had behaviour10 not changed, the net trend in 
characteristics would have caused a slight increase in male participation. Notice that from 
the total decline in the predicted participation in the period 1984-2002 due to coefficients, 
only one fifth occurs in the 80s and the rest from 1991 onwards. Changes in characteristics 
have a smoother impact on the probability of male participation, with three fifths of the 
changes happening in the 80s.
10Or other unobserved factors not accounted for in the model.
Table 5.4: Predicted Sample: Percentage of Male Participation in the UK using Coefficients for Year j  and Sample for Year i
Sample
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Coefficient Year 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2
1984 89.5 88.7 88.6 88.4 88.5 87.7 87.1 87.1 87.3 86.3 85.1 84.5 81.3 79.4 78.6 78.7 78.8 79.2 78.5
1985 89.7 88.9 88.8 88.6 88.7 87.9 87.4 87.3 87.5 86.5 85.4 84.8 81.6 79.8 79.1 79.2 79.2 79.6 79.0
1986 89.3 88.5 88.2 88.0 88.1 87.3 86.6 86.7 87.1 86 .0 84.9 84.2 80.8 78.8 78.0 77.9 77.9 78.2 77.6
1987 89.6 88.8 88.5 88.3 88.5 87.6 87.0 87.1 87.3 86.4 85.2 84.5 81.3 79.3 78.6 78.5 78.6 78.9 78.3
1988 89.6 88.8 88.5 88.3 88.5 87.7 87.1 87.2 87.3 86.3 85.3 84.5 81.3 79.5 78.8 78.7 78.7 79.2 78.5
1989 90.2 89.5 89.4 89.2 89.2 88.6 88.1 88.1 87.9 87.1 86.1 85.5 82.7 81.0 80.5 80.5 80.6 81.2 80.4
1990 90.5 89.8 89.7 89.5 89.6 88.9 88.5 88.4 88.3 87.4 86.5 85.9 83.3 81.7 81.2 81.2 81.3 82.0 81.1
1991 90.6 89.9 89.8 89.6 89.6 89.9 88.6 88.5 88.4 87.5 86.6 86.0 83.4 81.7 81.2 81.3 81.3 82.1 81.2
1992 90.8 90.2 90.1 89.8 89.9 89.4 89.0 88.9 88.6 87.8 87.0 86.4 83.8 82.2 81.8 81.9 81.9 82.8 81.8
1993 90.8 90.2 90.2 89.9 90.0 89.4 89.1 88.9 88.7 87.9 87.1 86.4 83.9 82.4 81.9 82.0 82.0 82.8 82.0
1994 91.0 90.5 90.5 90.2 90.3 89.8 89.5 89.3 88.9 88.1 87.4 86.8 84.5 83.1 82.7 82.8 82.8 83.8 82.8
1995 91.1 90.6 90.6 90.3 90.3 89.9 89.7 89.4 88.9 88.2 87.5 86.9 85.1 84.0 83.6 83.8 83.8 84.4 83.8
1996 90.9 90.4 90.3 90.0 90.1 89.6 89.3 89.1 88.7 88.0 87.3 86.6 84.9 84.1 83.7 83.8 83.9 84.2 83.8
1997 91.3 90.7 90.7 90.3 90.5 90.0 89.8 89.6 89.1 88.4 87.7 87.1 85.5 84.4 84.1 84.2 84.3 84.7 84.2
1998 91.2 90.6 90.6 90.2 90.4 89.9 89.7 89.5 89.0 88.2 87.6 87.0 85.4 84.3 84.0 84.1 84.2 84.6 84.1
1999 91.0 90.5 90.5 90.1 90.3 89.8 89.6 89.4 88.8 88.1 87.5 86.9 85.3 84.2 83.9 84.0 84.1 84.6 84.0
2 0 0 0 91.1 90.5 90.5 90.1 90.3 89.8 89.6 89.4 88.8 88.1 87.5 86.9 85.3 84.2 83.9 84.0 84.1 84.6 84.0
2 0 0 1 90.6 90.1 90.0 89.5 89.9 89.4 89.2 88.9 88.2 87.6 87.0 86.4 84.2 82.5 82.3 82.3 82.4 83.8 82.4
2 0 0 2 90.9 90.4 90.3 89.9 90.1 89.7 89.5 89.2 88.6 87.9 87.2 86.7 85.1 83.8 83.6 83.7 83.7 84.4 83.7
Pii1 89.5 88.9 88.2 88.3 88.5 88.6 88.5 88.5 88.6 87.9 87.4 86.9 84.9 84.4 84 84 84.1 83.8 83.7
1 Pii stands for the mean of the predicted probability for year i using the coefficients estimated for the same year i.
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5.4.6 Forecasting Female Participation
Forecasting labour force participation is important to understand the fluctuations of other 
variables of interest such as employment, unemployment and wages. As discussed in Cut­
ler and Turnbull (2001), the trends in participation rates for females and males move 
in offsetting ways. This makes it desirable to predict participation for women and men 
separately. In this section, we forecast female participation11 for the years 2003 and 2004.
Results in Section 5.4.4 are estimated with a probit model, which has the property that 
the average of the predicted probabilities for participation for all individuals in the sample 
is approximately equal to the proportion of individuals who participate in that sample. 
However, because the probit is non-linear, this number is not equivalent to the predicted 
probability of participation of the average individual.12 The latter depends on the distribu­
tion of the characteristics. As we explain later in the text, we forecast female participation 
for the average individual and we want this to be comparable to the proportion of women 
who participate. That is, we need a linear model and we consequently estimate a linear 
probability model.
Although the linear probability model is known to have two main problems (heteroskedas- 
ticity and the fact that predicted values can fall out of the band [0,1]), it works better 
with very large samples (Maddala (1991)) such as the LFS. Table 5.18 in Appendix 5.8 
replicates Table 5.3 for the linear probability model and shows the predicted probability of 
female participation for different year coefficients and samples. We observe that these two 
tables are very close, which suggests that forecasting with the linear probability model 
will be acceptable, especially since we are interested in the average of the explanatory 
variables.
To produce a forecast for female participation rate we need to project forward the aver­
age of every observable characteristic used in our estimation. Figure 5.5 in Appendix 5.9 
shows the evolution across years of some of the explanatory variables in the model. The 
top left graph illustrates changes in the distribution of ages in the working age female 
population (16-59). We observe that female population is ageing in our sample since 
the proportion of women in their 20s declines, whereas those in their 50s increases across
11 We have not attempted to predict male participation. This section applies a method for forecasting 
that relies on the coefficients being relatively constant over time. In Section 5.4.5 we found evidence that 
changes in male participation rates are mostly driven by changes in coefficients. Thus, the method used 
for predicting females’ participation (see below) would not be adequate for predicting male participation.
12 The average individual is a person who is characterised by the average of all explanatory variables in 
a given sample year.
CHAPTER 5. FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN  THE UK: 1974-2002 185
years. The top right graph shows the rising trend in female education. We see the decline 
in fertility in the bottom left graph, as well as the drop in the proportion of women who 
are either married or cohabiting (bottom right graph).
We focus the projection analysis on the period 1993-2002.13 We generate a two-step 
ahead forecast of female participation.14 For example, we take the coefficients estimated 
for 2002 and apply the projection of the mean of the explanatory variables for 2004 in 
order to get the forecast in female participation for 2004. Starting earlier in 1993 allows 
us to evaluate the accuracy of our method since we can compare out turns for female 
participation with the forecast.
The projection of the mean of the explanatory variables is done as follows. We take 
the average growth rate over the previous three years for each average explanatory vari­
able and apply this rate to calculate the numbers for the next two years.15 For example, in 
1993 we want to know the projected average characteristics for 1995. We use the average 
growth between 1990 and 1992 and apply this growth to the 1993’s average characteristics 
to obtain the 1995’s ones.
Once we have the projection of the average individual two years ahead (say X t+2), we 
multiply them with the coefficients estimated with the sample at year t (/3t) to obtain the 
forecast of female participation for year t  +  2. Table 5.5 shows the actual participation
A _  A i
rates (pt+2X t+2), the forecast (ptX t+2), the total error (TEt+2) and also how much of the 
error is due to the fact that the model at t is not able to explain what happens in t +  2 
(X t+20t+ 2 — Pt ) ) -  The latter means comparing the predicted probability with coefficients 
estimated at t and the average of the real sample at t +  2 (ptX t+2) vs. the actual partic­
ipation rate. If this part of the error is small, the majority of the error is caused by the 
projection of characteristics.16 By contrast, if this part contributes more on the error, it
13Since the 80s are characterised by big changes in the coefficients, this methodology of forecasting is 
expected to behave badly for this period. We have produced forecasts for the 80s in order to check if this 
is the case. We find that, for example, the forecasting error for 1989 is 2.2, much bigger than the errors 
we have in the 90s. This is why we base our forecasting exercise on the period 1993-2002.
14Note that in Section 5.4.4 we found that changes in coefficients are less important than changes in 
characteristics to explain female participation trend in the 90s. This means that coefficients from 2002 
should be relatively good at predicting participation for 2004. However, Section 5.4.5 shows that male 
coefficients are driving most of the changes in participation from 1993, which makes it less reliable to 
trust previous coefficients to forecast men’s participation.
15We assume that the relatively close past determines the characteristics of the following two-three 
years. We believe that this is more adequate than taking another criterion that weights more the distant 
past.
16This would imply that the criterion for projecting them is not capturing the real path and one should 
think of an alternative method.
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Table 5.5: Forecasting Female Participation in the UK1
Year t +  2 P t + 2 X t + 2 P t X t + 2 P t X t + 2 T H t + 2 X t + 2 0 t + 2  ~  Pt ) P t ( X t + 2 — X t + 2)
1995 70.9 70.6 71.8 0.3 -0.9 1.2
1996 70.8 71.6 71.4 -0.8 -0.6 -0.2
1997 70.8 71.4 71.9 -0.6 -1.1 0.5
1998 71.2 72.3 71.8 -1.1 -0.6 -0.5
1999 71.8 72.3 71.4 -0.5 0.4 -0.9
2000 72.1 72.3 71.7 -0.2 0.4 -0.6
2001 72.3 72.9 71.4 -0.6 0.9 -1.5
2002 72.6 72.7 72.9 -0.1 -0.3 0.2
2003 72.8
2 0 0 4 73.3
1 Measure of fit: MSE =  0.37 
is the model that causes the inaccuracy.
The total error in forecasting is:
TEt+2 =  Pt+2^ t+2 — PtXt+2 (5-9)
Adding and subtracting ptX t +2 and adjusting terms yields:
T E t + 2  = X t + 2 0 t + 2  — Pt )  +  P t ( X t + 2 — X t + 2) (5.10)
The first part of the sum of the decomposition of the total error in forecasting is the
inaccuracy caused by the coefficients being wrong. The second part is due to the fact
that the projection of the characteristics is misleading.
Notice that we estimate the probability of female participation controlling for microe­
conomic variables. This implies that the constant term in our linear probabilistic model 
captures the cyclical movements of the macroeconomic variables. Therefore, using the 
constant for 2002 to predict female participation for 2004 might cause an error since we 
apply the macroeconomic characteristics of 2002 to 2004 and these could be rather differ­
ent. Fortunately, the constant term is quite smooth across all years,17 which implies that 
the impact of the non-captured macroeconomic variables is rather homogenous. Ideally, 
one would like to model the constant term so that this effect is eliminated. Nevertheless,
17The constant term is mostly around 0.6 in all years, with a minimum value of 0.54 and a maximum 
value of 0.82.
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because of the few observations, we believe that modelling the constant term will have a 
poor contribution here and we therefore proceed without addressing this issue.
The failure to fit the past history has an important impact on the ability to forecast the 
future. Some adjustments have been proposed in the literature (Clements and Hendry 
(1998); Clements and Hendry (2002)). For example, the so-called ‘intercept corrections’ 
that consist of projecting into the future past forecast errors to get the model ‘back on 
track’. This involves finding a sequence of residuals (which are in general the forecasts of 
future values for the residuals) that would enable the model to reproduce the recent past 
history. In Table 5.19 in Appendix 5.8 we adjust the forecast with a constant adjustment 
based on the average of the last three years forecasting errors.18 Results are discussed 
later in the text.
We recognise that forecasting the age distribution as it is done here could be subject 
to the criticism that age is not a random variable and depends on the cohorts. In order to 
assess if this causes a greater error in predicting female participation, we have decomposed 
the error across the observable characteristics to identify those that contribute more to it. 
That is, we aim to check if the age distribution produces a systematic bigger increase in 
the error compared to the other variables. If this were the case, we should think of another 
method of predicting age. Since the decomposition of the errors in each year turns out 
to be no larger for age than for the rest of characteristics, we keep age prediction as it is 
carried out with the other covariates.
Similarly, another way of improving the out-of-sample female participation forecast is 
to smooth the coefficients in order to flatten their errors. We have reproduced the fore­
casting by taking the average of the coefficient between t and t — 1 in order to predict 
participation for t +  2. That is, the new forecasting value is determined by P ^t~ iX t +2  
where /?“,*_i =  . Since the errors from the forecasting using are very close
to those using j3t (slightly smaller) we rely on the prediction as previously described.
In Table 5.5, we observe that female participation is predicted to be 72.8 in 2003 and 
73.3 in 2004. Thus, female participation will continue rising by around 0.7 percentage 
points in the next two years. The adjusted forecast value (see Table 5.19 in Appendix 
5.8) is 73.0 for 2004, which implies an increase of 0.4 percentage points between 2002 and 
2004. The mean squared error (MSE) is 0.37 for the forecast without adjustment and 
0.41 for the adjusted one. It is not clear-cut that the adjusted forecast provides a better
18The forecasting for year 2004 is adjusted with the average errors of 2001 and 2002.
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projection for the female participation rate in 2004. We therefore predict that the rise in 
female participation between 2002 and 2004 will be in the range of 0.4-0.7.
Interestingly, with another methodology,19 Cutler and Turnbull (2001) estimated an in­
crease of female participation in the range 0.4-0.7 percentage points between 2000 and 
2002. Figure 5.1 shows female participation rates and the two-step ahead forecast (with 
and without adjustment) of the female participation rate. Our model is more accurate in 
the final years.
Figure 5.1: Two-step Ahead Forecast of the Female Participation Rate in the UK1,2
 © Female Participation Rate -& 2-step ahead Forecast
 b 2-step ahead Adjusted Forecast
73
70
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Years
1 We adjust the forecast adding the average of the last three forecasting errors.
2 The adjustment for 2004 consists of adding the average error of 2001 and 2002.
19Schweitzer and Tinsley (2002) propose a forecasting approach that uses both micro-level and aggre­
gate data. They find that their estimator outperforms conventional macro-econometric forecasts. But 
since they predict total participation (both male and female above the age of 16), it is difficult to compare 
their results with ours.
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5.4.7 Sum mary and Conclusions
In this section, we have looked at two main issues. First, we analyse the increase in 
female participation between 1984 and 2002. Second, we make a two-step ahead forecast 
of female participation rates.
We decompose the growth in participation into two sources. On the one hand, changes 
in the characteristics of the female population such as education, fertility and marital 
status. On the other hand, changes in the coefficients that capture both differences in be­
haviour across these years and changes in other variables not included in our specification.
Female participation in our sample (aged between 16-59 who are either the heads or 
their spouse) rises from 62% to 73% during the period. We find that two thirds of the 
growth in female participation is associated with changes in the female population struc­
ture. The main contributors amongst the characteristics are the increase in education 
and the drop in fertility.
The other third of the rise in female participation is due to changes in the coefficients. 
This means a variation in behaviour (women with same observable variables respond dif­
ferently across these years) and/or a change in other variables not accounted for in the 
model. The pattern is rather different from men, whose decline in participation is mainly 
driven by changes in behaviour, especially after 1993.
Most of the increase in female participation between 1984 and 2002 take place in 1984-92 
(about 8 points of the total 10 percentage points). Interestingly, in the 80s, changes in 
coefficients (i.e. behaviour) contribute significantly to the participation growth, whereas 
the majority of the growth in the 90s is driven by characteristics. This implies that peri­
ods of greater female participation growth are those in which changes in the coefficients 
have a significant impact.
Given that changes in coefficients contribute less to female participation trends in the 
last few years, we can use the predicted coefficients in a particular year to forecast female 
participation two years ahead. Our forecasting approach implies an increase of female 
participation of about 0.4-0.7 percentage points between 2002 and 2004.
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5.5 The Em ploym ent o f M arried M others in G reat 
Britain: 1974-200020
5.5.1 In trod u ction
Employment rates of married mothers (see Figure 5.2 and Table 5.6) have risen dramati­
cally over the last twenty years. This increase in participation of married (or cohabiting) 
mothers is far in excess of that experienced by other women and is especially marked 
among those with children aged under five.21 For example, married mothers’ employment 
rates have risen by 15% since 1983, with employment of married mothers with children 
under the age of one rising by a staggering 40%. The purpose of this section is to analyse 
the impact of changes in maternity policies, take home pay and childcare on the labour 
market participation of mothers in Great Britain over this period. Our approach con­
sists of isolating those birth cohorts whose mothers experienced significant increases in 
employment and relate those to changes in policies. Furthermore, we aim to differentiate 
the type of mothers who had significant rises in employment.
Figure 5.2: Female Employment Rates in Great Britain: 1974-20001,2
i Single Without Children 
3 Married Without Children
i Single With Children 
Married With Children
Youngest Child <1 .. Youngest Child 1-3 a  Youngest ChHd 4
- Youngest Child 5*10 Youngest Child 11-15
19 7 4 -7 6  1 9 7 7 -7 9  1 9 8 0 -8 2  1 9 8 3 -8 5  1 9 8 6 -8 8  19 8 9 -9 1  19 9 2 -9 4  199 5 -9 7  1998 -01  
Y e a r s
All Sample
1
Y e a r s
Married
1 All Sample =  women aged 16-59.
2 Married =  both married and women in cohabitation aged 16-59.
As we have shown in Section 5.4, changes in policies seem to have had a greater impact 
in the 80s and beginning of the 90s. Recall that these were found to be the years where 
changes in coefficients had contributed more to the rise in female participation. If we
20This section draws on joint research with Paul Gregg and Jane Waldfogel. I would like to thank 
them for their collaboration and instructive comments.
21 From now on we will call married those women who are not only married but also cohabiting.
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think that variation in coefficients partly reflects changes in policies not accounted for 
in the model, the analysis in the previous section seems to confirm that whatever new 
legislation was enacted in the last 20 years, it was probably more effective before 1992.
The results of this section suggest that maternity rights have had a profound effect on 
employment but this has operated interactively with mothers’ wage opportunities. Mater­
nity rights have induced a behaviour change to return to work in the first year post-birth, 
among many mothers who would have otherwise gone back to work when their children 
were age 3 to 5. This effect has been most marked among better-educated and higher-paid 
mothers and has strengthened as real wages have risen through time.
The rest of the section is set out as follows. Subsection 5.5.2 provides an overview of 
the policies and institutions in the period 1974-2000 in order to explore possible causal 
candidates for the change in mothers’ employment. Subsection 5.5.3 describes data and 
methodology used in our analysis. In Subsection 5.5.4 we identify relative employment 
shifts by the presence and age of children for married women, controlling for characteris­
tics. In Subsection 5.5.5 we isolate the effective policies by exploring the timing of when 
they came into effect and the variation in impact across groups more or less affected. We 
interpret these results in Subsection 5.5.6 and conclude in Subsection 5.5.7.
Table 5.6: Female Employment Rates in Great Britain: 1974-2000
1974-76 1977-79 1989-91 1998-01 A (2000-1974)
Married Without Children 65.1 67.8 74.0 74.0 8.9
Married With Children 47.3 50.4 60.9 69.7 22.4
5.5.2 Policy and the Em ploym ent o f Married M others 
Right of Reinstatement and Maternity Leave
The 1974-79 Labour government passed two key employment provisions with concern to 
mothers expecting a child (both contained in the Employment Protection Act of 1975).22 
These were Maternity Leave (a period of paid leave from employment) and the Right of 
Reinstatement (RofR - effectively a period of unpaid leave after which the mother has the 
right to return to her previous job).
22See Harries (1975) for a summary of the introduction of the main maternity rights in the Employment 
Protection Act (1975).
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Maternity leave legislation entitles women in employment who meet specific qualifying 
conditions (these have changed through the period of study) to receive a certain number 
of weeks of maternity pay after stopping work for childbirth. According to her recent 
employment history, a woman will be paid either by her employer through the Statutory 
Maternity Pay (SMP) or by the Department of Social Security through the Maternity 
Allowance (MA). Employers may also choose to make maternity payments in addition 
to the statutory minimum, or they may make payments to women who do not fulfill the 
statutory requirements through Contractual Maternity Pay {CMP). Many employers also 
attached return-to-work conditions to the receipt of CMP. Table 5.20 in Appendix 5.8 
summarises the main changes in maternity leave legislation. For the most part, these 
have been intended to facilitate post-birth employment.
Payments under MA become more generous between 1979-2000 and in 1987, Maternity 
Pay was relabelled Statutory Maternity Pay {SMP) with minor administrative changes. 
In 1994, the eligibility for 6 weeks pay with 90% of the salary was relaxed. Women no 
longer needed to have continuously worked for 2 years/16 hours per week or 5 years/8-16 
hours per week with the same employer. Therefore, the only criterion was to have worked 
for 26 weeks.
The second provision was the RofR and protection from unfair dismissal related to preg­
nancy.23 This gives the right to return to the same job at any time up to 29 weeks after 
childbirth. In order to be eligible for this right, a mother had to have had two years 
of continuous employment prior to the 11th {15th from 1987) week before the expected 
week of confinement {EWC). In 1994,24 the RofR after 14 weeks leave was extended to 
all pregnant women, regardless of their hours of work or length of service (raised to 18 
weeks in 2000). Those with longer tenure were entitled to an extended RofR period of 
29 weeks. Thus, there has been an important reduction in the conditions women need to 
meet in order to qualify for maternity leave.
Taxation
Some taxation changes affect married women disproportionately and, to the extent changes 
affect part-time workers more, these may have a differential impact on married mothers 
who are more likely to work part-time.
Both employers and employees pay National Insurance {NI) to cover the cost of cer­
23The Right of Reinstatement was qualified through the Employment Act in 1980 (Daniel (1981)).
24In October 1994 the government was forced to implement the EU Pregnant Workers Directive.
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tain social security benefits. As reported in Adam and Frayne (2001), prior to the 1985 
reform, a person paid no N I if earnings were below the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL). But 
once she crossed the line, a fixed percentage of total earnings (not just on income above 
the line) was due. Hence, in 1985 (in 2002 prices) no N I was due on earnings of £71.99 
per week or below. However, at earnings of £72.00, NI of £14.00 was due, £6.48 (9%) 
from the employee and £7.56 (10.45%) from the employer. This step increase in N I pay­
ments was called an entry fee to gain access to N I benefits. This step created significant 
bunching in the labour market at this lower earnings limit and discouraged the use of 
part-time work, except for very short hours or the lowest paying jobs. In 1985, there was 
a reduction in the liability to £7.20 (5% employee and employer); this was cut to £2.88 
in 1989 (2% employee and employer). In 1997, the government eliminated the jump in 
the liability on entering the N I system. These changes may have made part-time work 
more attractive to employers and employees and may have become especially beneficial 
to mothers.
The unit over which income tax is calculated may have an effect on the incentives to 
work within a married couple. Prior to 1990, the basis was the sum of the combined 
earnings of the couple {Joint) and, from 1990, the assessment was undertaken separately 
{Separate). Separate taxation gives a two earner couple a larger tax-free range than a 
one-earner couple on the same income. Hence, the marginal and average tax rates are 
usually higher under a Joint system. An extra tax allowance for one earner in a married 
couple (the Married Couples Allowance, MCA) was progressively reduced in value after 
1990 and finally abolished in 2000. The introduction of Separate taxation is expected to 
increase the number of two-earner couples. Since the greatest gain is over the tax-free 
zone on income (the personal allowance), this effect may particularly encourage part-time 
employment.25
Table 5.21 in Appendix 5.8 summarises the history of financial support for children in 
the UK. In-work benefits are likely to have an impact on mothers’ participation. At the 
beginning of our sample period there was the Family Income Supplement (FIS), first in­
troduced in 1971. This was modified substantially in 1988 with the Family Credit {FC) 
and in 1999 with the Working Families’ Tax Credit ( WFTC). These in-work child benefit 
payments are all assessed on joint income for couples. These systems have become pro­
gressively more generous over the period and are likely to have the obverse effect from the 
tax changes since they are raising average and marginal deduction rates. However, these
25 Under the British Joint taxation there was an earned income allowance that made it more similar 
to a Separate system. This means that the change in taxation only had an impact on those couples that 
were not eligible for this allowance.
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negative effects only apply where there is a working partner on a low income. Thus, they 
tend to discourage part-time work (two full-time jobs normally lifts people well above 
qualification) among mothers with low earning partners.
In summary, both the N I  reforms and the switch in taxation from a joint to a separate 
assessment have dramatically reduced the taxation of part-time employment for married 
women, which in turn has made part-time work more attractive for those with children. 
At the same time, the more generous in-work child benefit systems go the other way but 
only for mothers with low earning partners.
Childcare Legislation
The role of the government regarding childcare has changed substantially between 1979 
and 2000.26 Under the successive Conservative Governments (1979-92), policy was lim­
ited to the regulation of childcare provision. In 1983-87, there was a program devoted to 
under-fives for disadvantaged families. In 1988, the Children Bill required local author­
ities to review day care provision in their area. The Children Act in 1989 improved the 
Children Bill by obliging local authorities {LA) to register and inspect childcare services. 
Over the period the number of LA nurseries actually fell and there was an expansion of 
child minding and private and voluntary nurseries. Thus, 1979-1992 was characterised 
by the state regulating childcare rather than facilitating the services themselves.
During John Major’s government (1992-97), the target was to make the private and 
voluntary sectors (and not the state) the providers of childcare. That is, the government 
wanted to concentrate on the demand rather than the supply of day care through childcare 
vouchers. From 1997, the Labour Government rejected the sole development of private 
childcare provision and accepted the need for a national childcare policy. The Working 
Families’ Tax Credit in 1999 provides an explicit tax credit supplement for eligible child­
care. Eligibility means that day care must be provided by registered childminders, private 
nurseries or after-school clubs on school premises, run by the school or LA. In addition to 
this, the government undertook to provide a free half-day childcare place for all four year 
olds by 1999 in schools and this has recently been extended to 3 year olds. If the child is 
with a private/voluntary carer the equivalent cost of provision by a school is met by the 
state. Furthermore, LAs have been encouraged to increase provision of after-school clubs 
and holiday schemes.
Both the improvement of quality requirements for day care centres in the 80s and 90s
26See Randall (2000) for further information.
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and the introduction of childcare working credits are expected to have had a positive 
impact on mother’s employment. The former make mothers less reluctant to use exter­
nal childcare, as they know that the quality is regulated by the state. The latter (from 
1993 on) reduces mothers’ opportunity cost in their labour supply decision. However, any 
significant impact of childcare supply on mothers’ employment decisions is likely to be 
restricted to the 90s and probably only to the period after 1999.
5.5.3 D ata and M ethodological Approach
We use the General Household Survey (GHS), which is a repeated annual cross-sectional 
study of private households in Great Britain. In particular, we use all surveys released 
from 1974 to 2000/01. The General Household Survey has experienced several modi­
fications during this extended period. Major efforts have been undertaken to create a 
consistent database and build up new variables that unify all changes. The construction 
of the variables is explained in Appendix 5.7. The main advantages of the GHS database 
are its long history and its detailed information on birth histories of mothers. The GHS 
surveys contained responses from approximately 12,000 households per year prior to 1994 
and 9,000 households annually thereafter.
Within any year we have information on 2500-3000 mothers27 with children aged 0 to 
15 and around 350 with a single year age group per year. As these samples are getting 
quite small we create 3-year cohorts of births. For instance, all births in 1980, 1981 and 
1982 are grouped into a single cohort. Information on this birth cohort at age 5 will 
therefore reflect data on births in 1980 from survey year 1985, births in 1981 from survey 
year 1986 and births in 1982 from survey year 1987. We then track the birth cohorts in 
successive years, and although this is not true panel data, we are sampling from the same 
population of births as the children age, creating a pseudo-panel.
This approach differs from looking at mothers by the age of youngest child in that the 
mother remains identified as member of the original birth cohort as well as the new one 
if there is a subsequent birth. This means that we are always sampling from a constant 
population. In the analysis, birth order and the numbers of older and younger siblings 
are always included as control variables. The main advantage is that we can see far 
more clearly any persistence of responses to changes in behaviour when the children were 
younger. This should be clear to the reader as we deal with the actual data.
27Around 2000 mothers in the 1998 and 2000 GHS release.
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Figure 5.2, in the introduction, showed the evolution of female employment by mari­
tal status and age of the youngest child. Substantial gains in employment were made by 
married mothers, which were largely not apparent for single or married women without 
children. These gains were of the order of 15 percentage points on average but were 
mainly concentrated among women with young children. The point here is to identify the 
reason for this movement, especially if it is linked to various policies.
Note that employment paths could have been driven by changes in specific character­
istics across time in each of these groups. For instance, a rise in employment of married 
women with children could be due to the fact that this group is increasing their education 
across time. Therefore, we need to condition on observable characteristics.28 There are 
also external common factors (e.g. economic performance) that could be driving the em­
ployment rate changes. This is why it is important to select a comparison group through 
all the analysis. We take married women without children as our reference group since 
they are affected by the aggregate economic cycle and policy changes unrelated to children 
but not by child-related policies.
Hence, we are using a standard difference in difference technique but assessing changes 
over successive cohorts where a range of different policies may have cumulative effects. If 
after this benchmarking against similar married women without children we still observe 
an upward trend in mothers’ employment, the aim is to relate it to changing institutional 
policies or labour market opportunities. First, we identify both the time and the specific 
birth cohorts for which any policies kicked in. Second, we focus on sub-groups who are 
likely to be more or less affected by aspects of policy change.
5.5.4 Em ploym ent o f Married W om en w ith  Children 1974—2000
We base our analysis on three-year grouped birth cohorts between 1974 and 2000 (1974- 
76, 1977-79, 1980-82, 1983-85, 1986-88, 1989-91, 1992-94, 1995-97 and 1998-2001) and 
track these birth cohorts as the child ages from 0 to 15.29 We then test for how large ‘em­
28In Figure 5.6 in Appendix 5.9 we observe a significant increase in the employment pattern of married 
women with children once we control for observable characteristics.
29For the testing and marginal effects’ graphs, we always ensure that we have at least 18 months of 
observations. Note that this is relevant for two reasons. First, the release of GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 
and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data. For example, the release 2000-01 has data from 
April 2000 to March 2001, which implies that January to March is missing for year 2000 and, April to 
December is missing for year 2001. Second, the later the survey years are, the younger the birth cohorts 
that these year surveys can comprise. Because of these two facts, for birth cohorts 1986-88, we only 
consider up to age of child is 12; for 1989-91 up to age of 9; 1992-94 up to age of 6 ; 1995-97 up to age 
of 3; 1998-2001 up to age of 0.
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ployment gaps’ of mothers in these birth cohorts are, relative to married women without 
children but with similar characteristics.
The initial focus is on the impact of the introduction of maternity leave and pay rights in 
1979. So our first two birth cohorts are pre-maternity rights. First, we investigate whether 
there was any significant relative gain by married mothers before maternity rights for any 
age (i.e. whether the 1974-76 birth cohort is significantly different from the birth cohort 
1977-79).30 If these two birth cohorts are not different, we can merge them into one 1974- 
79, as this creates a larger sample to use as our base, making comparisons more robust. 
For this testing, we group the ages of the children in: 0-4, 5-10 and 11-15. For example, 
we test whether birth cohort 1980-82 is significantly different from 1974-79 for children 
age 0 to 4 (or 5 to 10, or 11 to 15). Tests for whether the birth cohorts for 1974-76 and 
1977-79 differ are rejected for all age groupings together and separately. Therefore, in all 
results from here on we merge them into a single birth cohort from 1974-79 and continue 
the analysis by comparing the later birth cohorts with it.
Figure 5.3: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Employment, By Children’s Birth 
Cohorts and Age1 — Married Females in Britain
o 1974-79 a 1980-82 □ 1983-85 ♦ 1986-88
. 1989-91 o 1992-94 1995-97 o 1998-01
- .1
-.2
- .4
-.5
-.6
10 12 13 14 15
C h i l dA g e
1 Comparison group are all married childless women.
Married women without children have seen modest increases in employment rates over 
the period, from 65% in 1974-76 to 74% in 1998-2001. Figure 5.3 shows the employ­
ment gaps of married mothers with children in each birth cohort against the benchmark
30Previous birth cohorts 1962-64, 1965-67, 1968-70 and 1971-73 are calculated and included in regres­
sions but the coefficients are not reported.
CHAPTER 5. FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN  THE UK: 1974-2002 198
of married women without children who have the same observable characteristics, from 
1974-79 to 1998-2001. In the 1974-79 period, mothers employment always lay below the 
employment of married women without children. However, there is a very pronounced 
arc shape since the excess deficit is 50% for women with children under 1 but narrowed 
to just over 20% by age 5, and to 10% at age 11, where the gap stabilises.
The are three main points from Figure 5.3. First, the steady rise of employment among 
mothers with children age 0 and 1. Nevertheless, there is the concern that, after the 
introduction of maternity rights, mothers might report to be employed when they are on 
leave, and move to inactivity when the period of leave expires. This mechanism would 
lead to increases in the observed employment rates among recent mothers that are partly 
fictitious. However, Figure 5.3 shows that there is a rise when the child is aged 1 that is 
parallel to that of age 0. Since women whose child is one year old can not be on maternity 
leave, this means that the increase at age 0 is not just more mothers saying they are on 
maternity leave but not actually returning to work.31 Second, there is little increase in 
employment at age 5 and above relative to married women without children. This makes 
clear that the relative employment gain of married mothers is confined to those with 
young children. Third, the change in the first post-maternity leave period is very modest 
but the impact appears to have increased progressively since.
Table 5.7 reports both the mean gap of the coefficients for each birth cohort relative to 
the base 1974-79 for the age groups 0-4, 5-10, 11-15 and 0-15, and the joint significance 
of these cohort specific age effects (p-value). We observe that the average difference be­
tween the base 1974-79 cohort and the 1980-82 cohort is 3 percentage points up to age 4 
and significant, but around 1.5 points at older ages and not significant. The average gap 
widens to 4.5 points in 1983-85 for age 0-4 and reaches 13 points for the 1992-94 cohort. 
Notice that this is the last cohort to have reached age 5 by 2000 since the subsequent 
cohorts only cover children up to age 3 (1995-97) and age 0 (1998-2001). Each successive 
cohort has added 2 to 3 percentage points to that of the previous one in reducing the 
employment deficit with respect to married women without children. Thus, it appears to 
be a sustained catch up at a broadly constant rate.
Table 5.7 also shows that there are no significant cohort effects once the children are 
aged between 5 and 10 or older than 11 years old, at any point in time. This suggests
31 Figure 5.7 in Appendix 5.9 confirms this view since it shows that employment rates after birth are 
rather flat within any cohort but gradually shift upwards across cohorts. There is, however, a slight 
decline of mothers’ employment rates in 1998-01, which suggests that more generous maternity leave 
periods could have some positive bias effect for this birth cohort.
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Table 5.7: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 in All Married 
Sample — Females in Britain
Base 1974-79 Age Child Employed Mean Gap
=1'
p-value
Fulltime 
Mean Gap
=12
p-value
0-4 0.0311 0.0001 0.0131 0.0001
1980-82 5-10 0.0187 0.3490 0.0139 0.031411-15 0.0152 0.6104 0.0085 0.2738
All 0.0215 0.0041 0.0120 0.0001
0-4 0.0454 0.0000 0.0147 0.0000
1983-85 5-10 0.0101 0.0792 0.0121 0.105811-15 0.0088 0.9323 0.0196 0.0428
All 0.0208 0.0000 0.0153 0.0000
0-4 0.0804 0.0000 0.0290 0.0000
1986-883 5-10 0.0008 0.1199 0.0103 0.160611-15 0.0349 0.2577 0.0257 0.1521
All 0.0367 0.0000 0.0198 0.0000
0 - 4 0.1043 0.0000 0.0322 0.0000
1989-914 5-10 0.0270 0.0637 0.0218 0.007411-15
All 0.0656 0.0000 0.2703 0.0000
0-4 0.1300 0.0000 0.0384 0.0000
1992-945 5-10 0.1090 0.0001 0.0592 0.000011-15
All 0.1240 0.0000 0.0443 0.0000
0-4 0.1708 0.0000 0.0521 0.0000
1995-976 5-1011-15
All 0.1708 0.0000 0.0521 0.0000
0-4 0.2856 0.0000 0.0740 0.0000
1998-0l 7 5-1011-15
All 0.2856 0.0000 0.0740 0.0000
1 Reference group: all childless married women.
ty
Reference group: all childless married women. Note that the dependent variable in 
this column is Fulltime, whereas in all other tables is Employed.
o
Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
4Only up to the age of 9.
5Only up to the age of 6 .
6Only up to the age of 3.
Only up to the age of 0.
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that there has been a marked shift in the pattern of return to work after birth, from moth­
ers whose child is 3 to 5 years old to mothers whose child is 0 years old. This means that 
women make use of maternity rights and they do not delay anymore to first return to work 
when their child is over 5. This type of response to having maternity rights is also found 
by Burgess, Gregg, Propper and Washbrook (2002) in a study using a panel of births in 
the Avon district from 1991-92. Graphically this appears like a ramp being raised with 
the pivot point at age 5. Hence, there are progressively smaller gains in employment (with 
respect to married women without children) at ages 2 to 6, and little further rise once the 
children are aged 5 or 6. Furthermore, this process has not yet stopped with the last two 
cohorts, who have not reached age 5 yet, posting gains fully in line with past cohorts.
To summarise, there is a behavioural change towards more women successively returning 
to work within the first year after birth, instead of staying out of employment until the 
child is 5 years old. The rise is more pronounced for birth cohort 1980-82, which clearly 
highlights the role of the introduction of maternity rights policies. However, the smooth 
delayed reaction for the subsequent three year birth cohorts suggests that there are other 
factors interacting.
Before moving on to explore what else has been important, we first investigate the pat­
tern of full-time employment by mothers over these cohorts. Full-time employment is 
considered to be 30 hours or more per week. Table 5.7 and Figure 5.4 report the same 
information for full-time employment only. The upward slope of employment as the child 
ages is markedly shallower for full-time employment and the initial deficit relative to mar­
ried women without children is smaller. This implies that a sizeable part of the initial 
employment deficit is from lower part-time as well as full-time work.
More importantly, there is a very small decrease in the relative full-time employment 
deficit over time and it is broadly the same for ages above and below 5. Hence, almost 
all the increase in mothers’ employment when children are under 5 is stemming from in­
creases in part-time employment. Burgess et al. (2002) show that around 75% of returners 
in the first year post-birth do so to part-time work in a cohort of births in 1991-92. This 
is despite the fact that there is no legal right to return to part-time jobs if the mother was 
employed full-time prior to the birth. The observed change in behaviour toward increased 
employment in the first year after birth, mainly restricted to part-time work, is consistent 
with the NI changes from 1985, 1989 and 1997 and the switch to separate taxation in 
1990, which reduced the tax burden on part-time work for married women relative to 
full-time work.
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Figure 5.4: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Full-time Employment, By Children’s 
Birth Cohorts and Age1 — Married Females in Britain
o 1974-79 A 1980-82 a  1983-85 . 1986-88
* 1989-91 o 1992-94 1995-97 o 1998-01
- . 1  -
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-.6  -
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1 Comparison group are all married childless women.
In summary, it is clear that maternity policies have had a big impact on employment 
behaviour after a birth with a sharp shift in employment returns to the first year post­
birth from the period 2 to 5 years post-birth. However, this has happened in a progressive 
way through time and is largely restricted to increases in part-time work relative to mar­
ried women without children with similar characteristics, which is probably a response to 
the changes in tax treatment of part-time work for second earners over the period.
5.5 .5  Iso la tin g  E ffective  P o lic ies  
F irst B irth  vs. H igher O rder B irth
Maternity rights have been extended through the period most notably in 1994 with the 
ending of the longer qualifying period for mothers working less than 16 hours prior to 
the birth to be eligible for the full 29 weeks with RofR. Furthermore, there was a more 
limited period (14 week-long) even for those with less than 2 years tenure.
One way of exploring this change in the required tenure to be eligible for maternity rights, 
without knowing the employment status of mothers before the birth, is to look at mothers 
for whom it was a first or second or subsequent birth. The data reported in Burgess et al. 
(2002) confirms the expectation that only 8% of women were working part-time prior to 
their first birth in 1991. In contrast, 30% of women worked part-time before a second or 
later birth. Part-time workers generally have shorter tenure, which means that many of
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the women working prior to a second birth will have limited job tenure. However, the data 
in Table 5.8 shows a marked increase in employment amongst first births after 1994.32 
Thus, it is surprising to see the divergence in employment patterns between first and 
second births from 1994 onwards. This suggests that the extension of maternity rights 
from 1994, aimed to cover more part-time workers, has not been fruitful in increasing 
early return among mothers of second or higher order children (who are highly likely to 
be part-time workers). This may be because the change in eligibility for maternity rights 
for part-time workers only applies to those with less than 16 hours employment per week. 
Hence, this change may be too marginal to be observed in such aggregate data.
Childcare Support
Childcare policy involved little direct provision or extra financial support until the in­
troduction of childcare vouchers in 1995 (Randall (2000)).33 This, as well as the later 
guaranteed half day childcare places in 1999, were focused exclusively on 4-year-olds. Al­
though it might be early to evaluate the most recent change, there is no extra jump in 
the employment of the mothers of 4-year-olds in cohorts reaching that age in the middle 
to late 90s (see Figure 5.3). Therefore, there is evidence that these policies did not raise 
employment for this group of mothers. We would like to point out, however, that the aim 
of providing childcare of a reasonable quality to all 4-year-olds whose parents wanted it 
was not primarily to raise mothers’ employment.
Level of Education, Age at First Birth and Predicted Wage
The major candidates for progressively raising the use of maternity rights through time, 
other than changing tastes, are rising wages and taxation changes. These can make work 
more worthwhile and increase the cost of not staying in one’s old job.34 To explore which 
groups have been more responsive, we repeat the earlier analysis but split mothers by 
education, age at first birth and predicted wage. We investigate these alternatives as 
returns to education and experience have risen over this period (see Schmitt (1995) or 
Machin (1999)). Rising returns to education are likely to imply that the wage is increasing 
returns to working relative to the cost of childcare, which is generally provided by low 
skilled labour. Furthermore, returns to experience are likely to be eroded or lost by an 
extended separation from the labour market after child birth.
32See also Figures 5.8 and 5.9 in Appendix 5.9.
33The vouchers experiment was short-lived since the Labour government rapidly repudiated it. The 
vouchers scheme helped the establishment of the Labour’s Early Years Development and the universalising 
of the provision for 4- and ultimately 3-years-olds (Randall (2000)).
34 Akin to the cost of job loss literature see Farber (1993), Kuhn (2002), Gregg and Wadsworth (2002), 
Nickell, Jones and Quintini (2000).
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Table 5.8: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 by Parity — 
Females in Britain
Base 1974-79 Age Child 1st Birth1 Mean Gap p-value
2nd* B irth2 
Mean Gap p-value
0-4 0.0189 0.0016 0.0400 0.0012
1980-82 5-10 0.0407 0.0802 0.0489 0.000511-15 0.0223 0.4134 0.0281 0.2697
All 0.0281 0.0027 0.0396 0.0000
0-4 0.0511 0.0001 0.0695 0.0000
1983-85 5-10 0.0508 0.0175 0.0667 0.000011-15 -0.0012 0.9967 0.0320 0.1339
All 0.0347 0.0004 0.0567 0.0000
0-4 0.1081 0.0000 0.1116 0.0000
1986-883 5-10 0.0785 0.0000 0.4460 0.000211-15 0.0319 0.5064 0.0558 0.1713
All 0.0827 0.0000 0.0721 0.0000
0 - 4 0.1641 0.0000 0.1420 0.0000
1989-914 5-10 0.1399 0.0000 0.0606 0.004611-15
All 0.1520 0.0000 0.1012 0.0000
0-4 0.2243 0.0000 0.1800 0.0000
1992-945 5-10 0.2236 0.0000 0.1797 0.000011-15
All 0.2241 0.0000 0.1799 0.0000
0-4 0.2819 0.0000 0.2136 0.0000
1995-976 5-1011-15
All 0.2819 0.0000 0.2136 0.0000
0-4 0.4407 0.0000 0.2678 0.0000
1998-017 5-1011-15
All 0.4407 0.0000 0.2678 0.0000
1 Reference group: all childless married women.ft
Reference group: all childless married women.
O
Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
4Only up to the age of 9.
5Only up to the age of 6 .
6Only up to the age of 3.
7Only up to the age of 0.
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Table 5.9: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 by Education 
Level — Females in Britain
Base 1974-79 Age Child High Education1 Mean Gap p-value
Low Education2 
Mean Gap p-value
1980-82
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0688 0.0089 
0.0042 0.7832 
0.0250 0.2436 
0.0309 0.0647
0.0208 0.0085 
0.0183 0.3041 
0.0132 0.3747 
0.0175 0.0336
1983-85
o-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0794 0.0005 
0.0089 0.5225 
0.0530 0.1174 
0.0381 0.0026
0.0337 0.0054 
0.0121 0.0402 
-0.0124 0.7969 
0.0111 0.0083
1986-883
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0950 0.0000 
0.0066 0.4602 
0.0812 0.0921 
0.0521 0.0005
0.0727 0.0000 
-0.0042 0.0399 
0.0062 0.8639 
0.0270 0.0000
1989-914
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.1151 0.0000 
0.0156 0.5475
0.0653 0.0000
0.0948 0.0000 
0.0294 0.3244
0.0621 0.0000
1992-945
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.1743 0.0000 
0.0908 0.0934
0.1504 0.0000
0.1128 0.0000 
0.0976 0.0728
0.1084 0.0000
1995-976
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.2285 0.0000 
0.2285 0.0000
0.1593 0.0000 
0.1593 0.0000
1998-007
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.3581 0.0000 
0.3581 0.0000
0.2728 0.0000 
0.2728 0.0000
1 Reference group: childless married women with high education.
2Reference group: childless married women with low education.
3Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
4Only up to the age of 9.
5Only up to the age of 6 .
6Only up to the age of 3.
7Only up to the age of 0 .
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Table 5.10: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 by Age At 
First Birth — Females in Britain
Base 1974-79 Age Child >=Mean Gap
301
p-value
< 3 0 2 
Mean Gap p-value
0 - 4 0.0539 0.0175 0.0304 0.0011
1980-82 5-10 0.0128 0.5161 0.0230 0.425111-15 0.0112 0.2803 0.0190 0.2568
All 0.0252 0.0284 0.0241 0.0084
0-4 0.0902 0.0048 0.0434 0.0000
1983-85 5-10 0.0381 0.2282 0.0112 0.272911-15 0.0361 0.6531 0.0109 0.8259
All 0.0493 0.0283 0.0212 0.0006
0-4 0.1494 0.0000 0.0748 0.0000
1986-883 5-10 0.0211 0.0194 0.0041 0.135211-15 0.0506 0.2826 0.0409 0.0945
All 0.0750 0.0000 0.0369 0.0000
0-4 0.1913 0.0000 0.0953 O.QOOO
1989-914 5-10 0.0791 0.0581 0.0249 0.204811-15
All 0.1352 0.0000 0.0601 0.0000
0-4 0.2142 0.0000 0.1232 0.0000
1992-945 5-10 0.1764 0.0074 0.1098 0.000711-15
All 0.2034 0.0000 0.1194 0.0000
0-4 0.2698 0.0000 0.1641 0.0000
1995-976 5-1011-15
All 0.2698 0.0000 0.1641 0.0000
0-4 0.3595 0.0000 0.2881 0.0000
1998-007 5-1011-15
All 0.3595 0.0000 0.2881 0.0000
1 Reference group: all childless married women.
A
Reference group: all childless married women.
3Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
4Only up to the age of 9.
5Only up to the age of 6 .
6 Only up to the age of 3.
7Only up to the age of 0.
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Table 5.11: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 by Predicted 
Wage — Females in Britain
Base 1974-79 Age Child
Lower 1 /3 1 
Mean Gap p-value
Medium 1 /32 
Mean Gap p-value
Higher 1 /33 
Mean Gap p-value
0 - 4 0.0137 0.2513 0.0291 0.0155 0.0559 0.0116
1980-82 5-10 -0.0246 0.7000 0.0258 0.3217 0.0094 0.156811-15 0.0106 0.9201 0.0030 0.9801 0.0173 0.4078
All -0.0016 0.7004 0.0197 0.1672 0.0264 0.0219
0 - 4 0.0423 0.1765 0.0288 0.3088 0.0608 0.0018
1983-85 5-10 -0.0130 0.6977 -0.0140 0.0921 0.0069 0.542911-15 -0.0004 0.1436 -0.0002 0.9835 0.0152 0.6207
All -0.0004 0.1436 0.0037 0.3441 0.0263 0.0306
0-4 0.0089 0.2505 0.0773 0.0000 0.0984 0.0000
1986-884 5-10 0.2664 0.0425 -0.0431 0.0078 -0.0038 0.350311-15 -0.0377 0.6768 0.0483 0.5675 0.0424 0.2558
All 0.1084 0.1322 0.0172 0.0000 0.0426 0.0000
0 - 4 -0.0297 0.2659 0.0988 0.0000 0.1102 0.0000
1989-9l 5 5-10 -0.1866 0.2205 0.0289 0.2587 0.0057 0.095311-15
All -0.1082 0.2008 0.0639 0.0000 0.0579 0.0000
0-4 0.0102 0.3171 0.1177 0.0000 0.1396 0.0000
1992-946 5-10 0.1754 0.5946 0.1592 0.0080 0.0649 0.143811-15
All 0.0574 0.1174 0.1296 0.0000 0.1182 0.0000
0-4 0.0435 0.5403 0.1751 0.0000 0.1935 0.0000
1995-977 5-1011-15
All 0.0435 0.5403 0.1751 0.0000 0.1935 0.0000
0-4 0.2672 0.0000 0.2512 0.0000 0.3702 0.0000
1998-008 5-1011-15
All 0.2672 0.0000 0.2512 0.0000 0.3702 0.0000
1 Reference group: childless married women in lower 1/3 predicted wage.
2Reference group: childless married women in medium 1/3 predicted wage. 
3Reference group: childless married women in higher 1/3 predicted wage.
4Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
5 Only up to the age of 9.
6Only up to the age of 6 .
Only up to the age of 3.
O
Only up to the age of 0.
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The literature of the cost of job loss highlights how separation from employment results 
in lower earnings on return to the labour market. This research also points out that this 
penalty rises with the duration of the period out of work and never fully recovers (see Gre­
gory and Jukes (2001), or Borland, Gregg, Knight and Wadsworth (2002)). Furthermore, 
Nickell et al. (2000) show that these costs of separation have risen over this period and 
are more marked for more highly educated workers. Thus, the rising returns to education 
and experience, and the growing wage penalty associated with loss of employment among 
these groups make continued attachment to the labour market increasingly worthwhile.
The rising returns to education and age can be combined by looking at the position 
of the mother in the distribution of wages predicted by her characteristics. This has the 
advantage of also capturing the increasing prevalence of higher education and delayed 
first child birth in the population of mothers.
Tables 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 report the changing employment patterns for the normal cohorts 
split by education,35 age at first birth and predicted wage. The better-educated mothers 
see larger increases in employment in the first two birth cohorts. Afterwards, there is 
broad equivalence across the groupings or even a slight narrowing in favour of the less 
well educated. Older mothers (at first birth) are those that have changed their behaviour 
most as a result of the advent of maternity rights. This is more pronounced than for 
better-educated mothers and the gap between younger and older mothers is maintained 
throughout the period. Using predicted wage terciles shows a broadly monotonic pattern 
with the higher predicted wage groupings having a more rapid response, although the 
lowest grouping is somewhat unstable. The picture appears to be that the third with the 
highest potential wage responded to maternity rights legislation most strongly in the first 
two cohorts, with some modest further gains thereafter. The middle third in the pre­
dicted wage distribution made significant gains between 1986 and 1991, a period of more 
rapidly rising wages and wage inequality, whereas the lowest earning third sees virtually 
no increase in employment.
Real wages of women within the lowest earning tercile have risen (much more than for 
men -  Machin (2003)) over this period despite rising wage inequality. The fact that the 
employment behaviour amongst these women has not changed, despite extended rights 
for part-time workers, may suggest that the cost of childcare is a limitation for them. 
As wages in the caring professions largely fall in the lowest tercile of wages, the cost of 
childcare is likely to have risen in line with earnings of lowest paid workers. Since earn­
35For education, see also Figures 5.10 and 5.11 in Appendix 5.9.
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ings have risen faster for higher paid women than for the lowest paid, the relative cost of 
childcare has declined for better paid groups but not for the lowest paid.
Partner’s Employment Status
The final area of variation we explore is partners’ status. Women with non-working 
partners face very different incentives to work relative to those with working partners, 
especially for part-time work. This follows from the UK welfare system which has little 
dependence on insurance benefits and, instead, relies on a joint income test for a couple. 
The family unit loses welfare payments pound for pound (apart from a small disregard) 
until the family welfare entitlement is exhausted. However, the existence of an in-work 
support system for families with children complicates this issue. Under FIS and FC prior 
to 1992, if one earner in a couple worked 24 hours per week or more, then they could 
receive in-work support, which was withdrawn at 70p in the pound for net earnings above 
a threshold. This eases work disincentives for mothers with non-working partners. How­
ever, the high withdrawal rate reduces incentives to work whenever the partner has a low 
paid job. Reliance on these in-work systems was never very extensive since only around 
10% of couples with children was claiming this benefit.
These systems have become more generous and coverage of couples with children on 
FC/W FTC  has grown over time. As this support will be entirely restricted to situations 
where the partner is working with a low paid job, we might expect these schemes to di­
minish employment growth among this particular group.
The employment situation for mothers according to their partners status and education 
is shown in Tables 5.12 and 5.13. There is no evidence that the occupation and education 
status of the partner matters in the observed change in behaviour among women with 
young children. However, those with a non-working partner show very minimal relative 
employment gains over the period, even though the comparison is being made relative to 
those childless couples with non-working partners. Hence, the disincentive effects of wel­
fare withdrawal means that mothers with non-working spouses are not utilizing maternity 
leave rights.
CHAPTER 5. FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN  THE UK: 1974-2002 209
Table 5.12: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 by Partner’s 
employment and Partner’s occupation level — Females in Britain
Base 1974-79 Age Child
Employed in High1 
Mean Gap p-value
Employed in Low2 
Mean Gap p-value
Non-Employed3 
Mean Gap p-value
1980-82
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0227 0.1600 
0.0084 0.2117 
0.0263 0.5126 
0.0185 0.1968
0.0502 0.0000 
0.0298 0.1992 
0.0020 0.0778 
0.0275 0.0000
0.0117 0.7913 
0.0181 0.8051 
0.0220 0.9207 
0.0173 0.9778
1983-85
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0504 0.0002 
0.0088 0.3535 
0.0157 0.8264 
0.0240 0.0060
0.0393 0.0145 
0.0146 0.3280 
-0.0134 0.0198 
0.0136 0.0737
-0.0264 0.6945 
0.0366 0.0764 
0.0204 0.8765 
0.0113 0.4374
1986-884
0 - 4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0864 0.0000 
-0.0156 0.0119 
0.0343 0.6637 
0.0313 0.0000
0.0549 0.0002 
0.0162 0.7837 
0.0821 0.1090 
0.0413 0.0019
0.0650 0.1667 
0.0208 0.5373 
-0.1046 0.2661 
0.0185 0.2542
1989-9l 5
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0956 0.0000 
0.0290 0.0122
0.0623 0.0000
0.1014 0.0000 
0.0028 0.4664
0.0521 0.0000
0.0334 0.7260 
0.0733 0.3596
0.0533 0.5718
1992-946
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.1342 0.0000 
0.0897 0.0470
0.1215 0.0000
0.1179 0.0000 
0.0948 0.0757
0.1179 0.0000
0.0400 0.4388 
0.1854 0.0624
0.0816 0.1622
1995-977
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.1635 0.0000 
0.1635 0.0000
0.1798 0.0000 
0.1798 0.0000
0.0425 0.4574 
0.0425 0.4574
1998-00s
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.2572 0.0000 
0.2572 0.0000
0.3456 0.0000 
0.3456 0.0000
0.0651 0.2969 
0.0651 0.2969
1Reference group: childless married women with employed partner in high occupation.ft
Reference group: childless married women with employed partner in low occupation.
o
Reference group: childless married women with non-employed partner.
4Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
5Only up to the age of 9.
6Only up to the age of 6 .
y
Only up to the age of 3.
Q
Only up to the age of 0.
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Table 5.13: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 by Partner’s 
education — Females in Britain
Base 1974-79 Age Child High Education1 Mean Gap p-value
Low Education2 
Mean Gap p-value
1980-82
0 - 4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0149 0.0229 
-0.0038 0.4137 
0.0068 0.9746 
0.0053 0.2284
0.0414 0.0000 
0.0352 0.0579 
0.0198 0.5768 
0.0324 0.0000
1983-85
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0408 0.0325 
0.0082 0.3127 
0.0269 0.5919 
0.0242 0.1044
0.0460 0.0001 
0.0182 0.0364 
-0.0070 0.9116 
0.0191 0.0005
1986-883
0 - 4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0610 0.0004 
-0.0133 0.0495 
0.0063 0.7652 
0.0183 0.0007
0.0853 0.0000 
0.0085 0.2909 
0.0531 0.3244 
0.0449 0.0000
1989-9I 4
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.1044 0.0000 
0.0233 0.3630
0.0639 0.0000
0.0960 0.0000 
0.0298 0.0557
0.0629 0.0000
1992-945
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.1327 0.0000 
0.0606 0.1402
0.1121 0.0000
0.1262 0.0000 
0.1417 0.0002
0.1306 0.0000
1995-976
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.1969 0.0000 
0.1969 0.0000
0.1571 0.0000 
0.1571 0.0000
1998-007
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.3508 0.0000 
0.3508 0.0000
0.2607 0.0000 
0.2607 0.0000
1 Reference group: childless married women with partner with high education. 
2Reference group: childless married women with partner with low education.
3Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
4Only up to the age of 9.
5Only up to the age of 6 .
6Only up to the age of 3.
7Only up to the age of 0 .
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5.5.6 Interpretation and E xpectations for Current Policy Re­
form
The results presented earlier in Table 5.7 suggest that mothers with children born between 
1992-94 had employment rates (up to the child reaching age 4) which were on average 13% 
higher than in 1974-79. This equates to an average increase in labour market experience 
for this cohort of mothers of just 6 months. Even allowing for two births, this does not 
amount to a huge change over the average woman’s lifetime. However, the impact on cur­
rent job tenure may be greater as the RofR will keep contact with the previous employer. 
We also observe a rise in the proportion of employed mothers with one child under 1 and 
tenure longer than one year. These are women who have remained in the same job after 
motherhood and did not interrupt their employment, except for the legitimate maternity 
leave period, which maintains their human capital. The percentage of employed mothers 
with tenure greater than one year jumps from 61% for birth cohorts 1974-79 to 78% for 
1980-82, reflecting the introduction of RofR. This proportion stays rather constant until 
the birth cohorts 1992-94, when it rises to 82.5%. Then the percentage increases smoothly 
until 88% for birth cohorts 1998-01, perhaps a reflection of the relaxation of the eligibility 
conditions for the RofR and MA.
Up to the child reaching age 4, there are two observed effects. First, more women with 
short tenure are working because of the RofR. Second, those who would have worked 
anyway are increasingly coming back to the same employer on return to work. Notice 
also that some women did return to work shortly after a birth even in 1974-79 and these 
are likely to be those who were strongly attached to the labour market and thus had long 
job tenure. These twin effects make it rather difficult to determine what will happen to 
average tenure amongst those in work with children under age of 4. However, by age 
5, the first effect weakens and we are left with just the effect of increased return to the 
original employer.
Following the same methodology as described in Subsection 5.5.3, we estimate the prob­
ability (conditioned on being employed) of having tenure less than one and tenure more 
than five years. The results are presented in Table 5.14. For reasons given above, we focus 
on the group of mothers whose youngest child is aged between 5 and 10 years old. There 
are immediate positive consequences on their expected tenure profile.36 The proportion
36 We would expect that for mothers, an increase in tenure will have a positive effect on their wages (this 
is not straightforward for other groups of population that are more likely to change job whenever they 
are offered an increase in their current wage). Furthermore, we would also expect rises in mothers’ wages 
since they accumulate more experience by returning earlier to their jobs. However, we have estimated 
wages using the same methodology and we have found no significant reductions in wage deficits for
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of mothers with children aged 5 to 10 with tenure less than one year falls by 5 percentage 
points for the 1989-91 cohort. More importantly, the proportion with tenure in excess 
of 5 years rises sharply by 8 percentage points of working mothers. The increase in job 
tenure is most marked when children of each cohort are aged 5 to 6, which is consistent 
with the contact with the pre-birth employer being maintained.
From April 2003 maternity rights legislation is being revamped. The changes involve 
extending the period of flat-rate paid leave to 26 weeks, increasing the generosity of the 
payment and extending the RofR period to reach to one year post-birth. The legislation 
also requires employers to consider favourably requests to return to part-time employ­
ment, except when there is a clear over-riding business case against such a move.
On the basis of the past experience shown here, we expect that these changes might 
lead to an increased incidence of returning to work by mothers in the first year after 
birth. Furthermore, we expect that this increase in employment will mainly be part-time 
work. These amendments will probably not have any observable impact on employment of 
mothers once the child is about 5 or 6 years old since the changes in behaviour primarily 
involve switches in timing of return up to age 5 but not much thereafter.
The evidence presented also suggests that the employment patterns of mothers with 
characteristics that place them within the lowest paying third of mothers will not be 
substantially affected by these reforms alone. This does not mean that the recently rise in 
low wages does not have any observable effect. Rather, the evidence is consistent with a 
perception that it is the relative wage that matters, with the relativity being with respect 
to the wage of the likely carers of pre-school children. In other words, the cost of childcare 
has been prohibitive to mothers with low potential earnings. This may be reinforced by, 
first, a higher incidence of worklessness amongst their partners and, second, by the like­
lihood that the wage gap between the current job and future replacement is lower than 
for better-educated women or those with more experience. However, it is possible that 
the explicit subsidy of childcare costs in WFTC  since 1999 and the expansion of state 
provision of low cost care in poorer neighbourhoods (as part of the National Childcare 
strategy) will mean that employment rates for mothers with low potential earnings will 
now begin to rise.
married mothers with young children vs. childless married women. This could be explained by the fact 
that most of the increase in mothers’ employment is part-time work, which is found to be worse paid in 
the literature (e.g. Ferber and Waldfogel (2000)).
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Table 5.14: Tests whether Later Birth Cohorts are Different from 1974-79 by Tenure
Base 1974-79 Age Child Tenure < 1 Year1 Mean Gap p-value
Tenure > 5 Years2 
Mean Gap p-value
1980-82
0 - 4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0300 0.0826 
-0.0305 0.0093 
-0.0320 0.0498 
-0.0120 0.0015
-0.0268 0.3505 
0.0275 0.1115 
0.0377 0.0135 
0.0137 0.0179
1983-85
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0502 0.0033 
-0.0172 0.5152 
-0.0226 0.0900 
0.0022 0.0089
-0.0462 0.0002 
0.0483 0.0002 
0.0482 0.0043 
0.0187 0.0000
1986-883
0 - 4
5-10
11-15
All
0.0096 0.0274 
-0.0239 0.2296 
-0.0015 0.9504 
-0.0076 0.0776
0.0134 0.1520 
0.0548 0.0010 
0.0089 0.2972 
0.0318 0.0014
1989-914
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
-0.0314 0.0125 
-0.0471 0.0069
-0.0392 0.0004
0.0576 0.0000 
0.0756 0.0000
0.0667 0.0000
1992-945
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
-0.0525 0.0019 
-0.0626 0.0459
-0.0554 0.0006
0.0745 0.0000 
0.1080 0.0090
0.0841 0.0000
1995-976
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
-0.0485 0.0367 
-0.0485 0.0367
0.5840 0.0001 
0.5840 0.0001
1998-007
0-4
5-10
11-15
All
-0.0427 0.1352 
-0.0427 0.1352
-0.0580 0.1859 
-0.0580 0.1859
1 Reference group: all childless married women with tenure less than one year.
2Reference group: all childless married women with tenure more than five years. 
3Only up to the age of 12 to ensure that we have at least 18 months of observations.
The GHS in 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-01 does not include the whole annual data.
4Only up to the age of 9.
5Only up to the age of 6.
6Only up to the age of 3.
7Only up to the age of 0.
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5.5.7 Conclusions
Maternity rights legislation introduced by the 1974-79 Labour government has trans­
formed the employment patterns of around two thirds of new mothers. In other words, 
there has been a dramatic increase in part-time employment of women with higher po­
tential wages in the first year after a birth. However, this transformation has been largely 
dependent on the increase in relative earnings and a reduction in the taxation of part-time 
work by second earners within couples, which occurred through the Conservative years.
Those women with low potential earnings have seen no increase in employment. Nor 
have those with non-working partners. The reforms to maternity rights legislation due to 
come into force in April 2003 are mainly intended to change the work-life balance choices 
facing mothers, allowing them to stay at home longer whilst receiving an income and a 
right to return to the same job. The likely consequence of these reforms on mothers’ 
employment behaviour will be to induce some mothers (who would have otherwise stayed 
at home until the child reached 3 to 5) to return part-time after one year.
The differential rewards to maintenance of labour market attachment and the relative 
cost of childcare to take-home pay mean that it is higher earning women who take ad­
vantage of such rights. The total effect on the labour market experience of mothers over 
their lifetime is modest. However, the preservation of contact with the pre-birth employer 
has a sizable impact on longer job tenure patterns up to when children reach around age 
of 10.
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5.6 Summary of Main Findings
First, this chapter comprised an empirical investigation of the rising trends in female 
participation in the UK over the period 1984-2002. Using the LFS, we found the following 
key results:
• Two thirds of the growth in female participation in the period 1984-2002 is associ­
ated with changes in the female population structure, mainly the rise in education 
and the drop in fertility.
• However, greater changes in participation rates occur in those years when variation 
in the coefficients (i.e. because of new policies or unobserved heterogeneity), namely 
behaviour, have a significant impact.
• Female participation is forecasted to increase around 0.4-0.7 percentage points be­
tween 2002 and 2004.
Furthermore, this chapter analysed the rise in married mothers’ employment in Britain 
over the period 1974-2000. We identified (using the GHS) the birth cohorts whose mothers 
experienced increases in employment, compared to the base group of childless married 
women. We also investigated which groups were further affected. Our results reveal the 
following:
• After the introduction of maternity rights legislation, there has been a massive rise 
in part-time employment in the first year after the birth. However, this has been 
restricted to mothers with higher potential wages.
• Neither women with low earnings nor those with non-working partners have experi­
enced any increase in employment. This is because their relative wages with respect 
to childcarers have not improved over this period.
• The latter suggests that it is required state childcare provision for poor households 
in order to increase the employment of mothers with low potential earnings.
• Maternity rights have resulted in longer job tenure for mothers, which is noticed 
once their younger child is about 5 years old.
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5.7 Appendix A: Labels for the Variables
5.T.1 Female Labour Force Participation in the UK: Evolving  
Characteristics or Changing Behaviour?
• Age: 0-1 dummies indicating if individual belongs to each age band. These are Agl6- 
19, Ag20-24, Ag25-29, Ag30-34, Ag35-39, Ag40~44, Ag45~49, Ag50-54, and Ag55-59. 
The base group is Ag35-39.
• Non-White: dummy 0-1 where 1 means non-white.
• Regions: twelve 0-1 dummies, being Regionl being the reference group. Regionl (North 
East), Region2 (Yorkshire), RegionS (East Midlands), Region4 (East Anglia), Region5 
(London), Region6 (South-East), Region7 (South-West), Region8 (West Midlands), Re- 
gion9 (North West), RegionlO (Wales), Regionl 1 (Scotland) and Regionl2 (Northern 
Ireland).
•  Education: nine 0-1 dummies, being the lowest level Edul the base group. These 
are Edul (no qualifications, our omitted category), Edu2 (other professional/vocational 
qualifications), EduS (CSE), Edu4 (completed apprenticeship, including City and Guilds), 
Edu5 (‘O’ level), Edu6 (mid vocational, ONC, OND), Edu7 (‘A’ level), Edu8 (high 
vocational, BTEC, HNC, HND and nurses) and Edu9 (degree, including teachers).
•  Number of dependent children in age bands. NdepO-2 (number of dependent children 
aged between 0 and 2 years), Ndep3~4 (number of dependent children aged between 3 
and 4), Ndep5-10 (number of dependent children aged between 5 and 10), Ndep 11-15 
(number of dependent children between 11 and 15).
•  Children 0-1 dummies if a woman has at least one child in each of the age groups. 
These are DdepO-2, Ddep3~4, Ddep5-10 and Ddepll-15.
•  Married: dummy 0-1 if the individual is either married or in cohabitation.
•  Partner employment status (EmpP): 0-1 dummy that takes value one for those female 
whose partner is employed, zero otherwise.
•  Partner education status: group of nine 0-1 dummies (EdulP-Edu9P) for the level 
of education of the partner (same categories than for the female), with the lowest level 
EdulP  being the omitted variable.
•  HOHSingle: 0-1 dummy for those individuals who are single parents.
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5.7.2 The Em ploym ent of Married M others in Great Britain: 
1974-2000
•  Education: Four 0-1 dummies that capture the highest education level achieved by each 
individual. Edul is 1 if the person has a postgraduate, graduate, pgce or any other high 
degree. Edu2 is 1 if she/he has a nursing degree or A level. EduS is 1 if she/he obtained 
an O level or equivalent. Edu4 is 1 if the person has not have any qualification or is 
missing or the person did not attend school.
•  Tenure: Three 0-1 dummies. TenureLl is 1 if the person has been less than one year 
in the current job, Tenurel-5 is 1 if she has been from 1 to 5 years, and TenureM5 is 1 
if more than five.
•  Labour Force Status: Employed is 1 if the person is employed, 0 otherwise; Fulltime is 
1 if the person works 30 or more hours, 0 otherwise; Empfull is 1 if individual is employed 
full-time, 0 if employed part-time or inactive.
•  Wage and income: Wkeamgr is the weekly earnings of the individual. In order to 
make feasible the comparison for all years, this variable has been converted into prices 
of December 2001 by using the retail price index (rpi); Wagehrs is the hourly wages 
(in December 2001 units); Extlnc is the individuals’ external income. That is, that 
income that provides from outside his/her working activities. This variable has been 
also transformed into units of December 2001; MissEI is dummy that takes value one if 
external income is missing, 0 otherwise; E l is the external income where missing values 
have been substituted by the median external income value (in per thousands).
•  Age: interval dummies (Agl6-19 , Ag20-24, Ag25-29, AgS0-34, Ag35-39, Ag40~44, 
Ag45~49, Ag50-54 and Ag55-59).
•  Social variables (dummies): Married is 1 if the person is married or cohabiting. Before 
1986, it only includes marriage, since the option cohabitation is not given in the survey; 
Non-White is 1 if the individual is not white; Immigrant is 1 if immigrant.
•  Regions: 10 dummies. 1 ( North), 2 (Yorks Humber), 3 (West), 4 ( East Midlands), 5 
(West Midlands), 6 (Eastern), 7 (London), 8 (South West), 9 (Wales) and 10 (Scotland).
• Unemrm: Yearly-regional male unemployment rate.
• Children: Agyestch is the age of the youngest child; NSibll is 1 if number of other 
siblings is one; NSibl2M is 1 if number of other siblings is two or more.
•  Interactions between age of the youngest child bands, marital status and year (periods 
of three years jointly): SNC‘t ut+ 2’ is 1 if the individual is single without children in year 
from ‘t ’ to ‘t+ 2 ’; M N C V ‘t+ 2’ is 1 if married (or cohabiting) without children in year 
from ‘t ’ to ‘t+ 2 ’; S C U l-‘t ut+ 2’ is one if single with youngest child under one in year from 
‘t ’ to ‘t+ 2 ’; M C U l-‘t ut+ 2’ is 1 if married with youngest child under one in year from ‘t ’
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to ‘t+ 2 ’; SC13-‘t ’ct+ 2’ or MC13-ct ut+2} is 1 if youngest child is between one and three 
for single and married respectively; SC4~‘t ut+ 2’ or M C 4-‘t ut+ 2’ is 1 if youngest child 
is four; SC510-‘t ut-h2’ or MC510-<t ut+2f is 1 if youngest child is between five and ten; 
SC1115-‘t ut+2’ or MC1115-‘t ut+ 2’ is 1 if youngest child is between eleven and fifteen.
• Interactions between age of each child at survey time and their birth cohorts: b‘t ut+ 2ua’ 
is 1 if the individual has a child born between ‘t ’ and ‘t+ 2 ’ with age ‘a’ (‘a ’ is from 0 to 
15) at the survey date.
• Year dummies
• Childcare information: Yearly-regional per thousand children under five: England 
(North, Central, South and London), Wales and Scotland. Nursery: Day nurseries look af­
ter under fives for the length of the adult working day. They may be run by Social Services 
Departments (or Education Departments), voluntary organizations, private companies or 
individuals as a business, community groups as a co-operative enterprise, employers in 
the public or private sectors including local authorities and Government Departments for 
their workforce, or any of these bodies on a partnership basis; Childmind: Childminders 
look after children aged under five and school age children outside school hours and in the 
holidays on domestic premises, usually the childminder’s own home. Parents and child­
minders negotiate terms and conditions; Playgroup: Playgroups provide care for children 
aged between three and five, although some may take children aged two and a half. They 
are normally on part-time basis.
5.8 Appendix B: Tables
5.8.1 Female Labour Force Participation in th e UK: Evolving  
Characteristics or Changing Behaviour?
Table 5.15: Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables — Females in the UK
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
N. Observ 37016 37793 37761 37171 37650 37320 35997 35636 38821 39448 38738 37698 36420 37137 36446 36083 35125 34227 34503
A gl6 -19 0.01
(0.098)
0.009
(0.092)
0.008
(0.090)
0.007
(0.083)
0.008
(0.089)
0.006
(0.078)
0.006
(0.076)
0.004
(0.065)
0.008
(0.086)
0.007
(0.083)
0.007
(0.082)
0.007
(0.085)
0.007
(0.086)
0.007
(0.085)
0.008
(0.089)
0.007
(0.086)
0.007
(0.082)
0.007
(0.082)
0.006
(0.078)
AgZO-24 0.084
(0.278)
0.081
(0.273)
0.077
(0.267)
0.075
(0.263)
0.071
(0.256)
0.067
(0.250)
0.061
(0.239)
0.058
(0.234)
0.073
(0.261)
0.068
(0.253)
0.068
(0.252)
0.065
(0.247)
0.058
(0.233)
0.056
(0.230)
0.054
(0.225)
0.051
(0.220)
0.052
(0.222)
0.049
(0.216)
0.053
(0.224)
Ag25-29 0.13
(0.337)
0.135
(0.341)
0.131
(0.338)
0.13
(0.337)
0.128
(0.335)
0.129
(0.335)
0.128
(0.334)
0.128
(0.334)
0.137
(0.344)
0.138
(0.345)
0.135
(0.342)
0.131
(0.338)
0.127
(0.333)
0.126
(0.330)
0.120
(0.325)
0.116
(0.320)
0.110
(0.313)
0.101
(0.301)
0.099
(0.298)
Ag30-34 0.143
(0.350)
0.144
(0.351)
0.144
(0.351)
0.143
(0.350)
0.140
(0.347)
0.140
(0.347)
0.143
(0.350)
0.144
(0.351)
0.148
(0.355)
0.155
(0.362)
0.156
(0.362)
0.153
(0.360)
0.155
(0.362)
0.157
(0.364)
0.164
(0.361)
0.156
(0.363)
0.151
(0.358)
0.149
(0.356)
0.148
(0.355)
A g40-U 0.127
(0.333)
0.13
(0.337)
0.134
(0.340)
0.145
(0.352)
0.154
(0.361)
0.157
(0.363)
0.159
(0.365)
0.160
(0.367)
0.145
(0.352)
0.138
(0.345)
0.136
(0.343)
0.133
(0.339)
0.134
(0.340)
0.134
(0.341)
0.134
(0.341)
0.138
(0.345)
0.138
(0.345)
0.145
(0.352)
0.150
(0.357)
Ag45-49 0.119
(0.324)
0.116
(0.321)
0.119
(0.323)
0.118
(0.323)
0.123
(0.329)
0.126
(0.332)
0.129
(0.336)
0.130
(0.337)
0.138
(0.345)
0.142
(0.349)
0.142
(0.349)
0.146
(0.353)
0.149
(0.356)
0.140
(0.347)
0.133
(0.340)
0.131
(0.337)
0.131
(0.338)
0.126
(0.331)
0.127
(0.333)
Ag50-54 0.113
(0.316)
0.113
(0.316)
0.111
(0.314)
0.113
(0.316)
0.115
(0.319)
0.118
(0.322)
0.12
(0.325)
0.121
(0.326)
0.111
(0.314)
0.109
(0.312)
0.111
(0.314)
0.116
(0.320)
0.119
(0.323)
0.129
(0.335)
0.139
(0.346)
0.141
(0.348)
0.14
(0.347)
0.142
(0.349)
0.136
(0.342)
Ag55-59 0.119
(0.324)
0.116
(0.320)
0.115
(0.319)
0.116
(0.321)
0.114
(0.317)
0.113
(0.316)
0.112
(0.315)
0.111
(0.314)
0.102
(0.303)
0.103
(0.304)
0.101
(0.302)
0.105
(0.307)
0.106
(0.308)
0.103
(0.304)
0.106
(0.308)
0.106
(0.308)
0.110
(0.313)
0.118
(0.323)
0.123
(0.329)
N o n - W hite 0.106
(0.308)
0.109
(0.312)
0.11
(0.313)
0.108
(0.310)
0.113
(0.316)
0.111
(0.314)
0.108
(0.311)
0.114
(0.318)
0.110
(0.313)
0.107
(0.310)
0.113
(0.317)
0.088
(0.283)
0.059
(0.236)
0.069
(0.253)
0.069
(0.254)
0.074
(0.261)
0.074
(0.262)
0.129
(0.335)
0.083
(0.275)
Region2 0.089
(0.284)
0.088
(0.284)
0.087
(0.281)
0.085
(0.279)
0.084
(0.277)
0.085
(0.279)
0.084
(0.277)
0.086
(0.281)
0.084
(0.278)
0.085
(0.279)
0.084
(0.278)
0.086
(0.281)
0.085
(0.278)
0.087
(0.282)
0.087
(0.282)
0.087
(0.281)
0.089
(0.285)
0.089
(0.285)
0.089
(0.285)
Region3 0.067
(0.251)
0.065
(0.246)
0.069
(0.253)
0.069
(0.253)
0.069
(0.254)
0.067
(0.251)
0.068
(0.252)
0.069
(0.254)
0.068
(0.252)
0.07
(0.255)
0.069
(0.254)
0.069
(0.253)
0.069
(0.253)
0.07
(0.256)
0.071
(0.257)
0.071
(0.256)
0.069
(0.254)
0.072
(0.258)
0.072
(0.259)
Region4 0.036
(0.186)
0.037
(0.188)
0.038
(0.190)
0.035
(0.184)
0.036
(0.186)
0.034
(0.182)
0.036
(0.185)
0.035
(0.183)
0.035
(0.184)
0.035
(0.184)
0.035
(0.183)
0.037
(0.189)
0.038
(0.190)
0.036
(0.186)
0.037
(0.190)
0.037
(0.189)
0.037
(0.190)
0.039
(0.193)
0.036
(0.185)
Regions 0.095
(0.293)
0.098
(0.297)
0.098
(0.297)
0.105
(0.307)
0.105
(0.307)
0.103
(0.304)
0.099
(0.299)
0.099
(0.299)
0.104
(0.305)
0.107
(0.310)
0.108
(0.310)
0.109
(0.312)
0.103
(0.304)
0.111
(0.314)
0.108
(0.311)
0.111
(0.314)
0.110
(0.313)
0.110
(0.312)
0.109
(0.311)
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Region6 0.175
(0.380)
0.175
(0.380)
0.178
(0.382)
0.178
(0.383)
0.176
(0.381)
0.172
(0.378)
0.176
(0.381)
0.177
(0.382)
0.184
(0.387)
0.185
(0.389)
0.184
(0.387)
0.187
(0.390)
0.186
(0.389)
0.186
(0.389)
0.189
(0.392)
0.187
(0.390)
0.186
(0.389)
0.193
(0.394)
0.197
(0.398)
Region7 0.074
(0.262)
0.076
(0.264)
0.073
(0.260)
0.072
(0.259)
0.075
(0.264)
0.082
(0.274)
0.078
(0.268)
0.074
(0.262)
0.078
(0.268)
0.078
(0.269)
0.078
(0.269)
0.081
(0.273)
0.077
(0.267)
0.079
(0.270)
0.08
(0.272)
0.0817
(0.274)
0.082
(0.274)
0.085
(0.279)
0.086
(0.280)
RegionS 0.088
(0.283)
0.086
(0.280)
0.089
(0.285)
0.087
(0.282)
0.081
(0.273)
0.086
(0.280)
0.087
(0.281)
0.085
(0.278)
0.089
(0.284)
0.085
(0.279)
0.066
(0.281)
0.088
(0.283)
0.088
(0.283)
0.091
(0.288)
0.091
(0.288)
0.0913
(0.288)
0.086
(0.281)
0.086
(0.281)
0.087
(0.281)
Region9 0.105
(0.306)
0.108
(0.310)
0.107
(0.309)
0.106
(0.307)
0.106
(0.308)
0.102
(0.303)
0.104
(0.306)
0.109
(0.311)
0.105
(0.306)
0.104
(0.306)
0.104
(0.305)
0.108
(0.311)
0.109
(0.312)
0.106
(0.308)
0.103
(0.304)
0.1032
(0.304)
0.103
(0.304)
0.096
(0.295)
0.096
(0.295)
Regionl 0 0.048
(0.213)
0.051
(0.219)
0.048
(0.213)
0.046
(0.209)
0.045
(0.208)
0.044
(0.204)
0.047
(0.211)
0.047
(0.212)
0.047
(0.212)
0.046
(0.209)
0.047
(0.211)
0.048
(0.215)
0.05
(0.217)
0.049
(0.215)
0.048
(0.214)
0.0474
(0.212)
0.049
(0.216)
0.048
(0.214)
0.049
(0.217)
Regionl 1 0.098
(0.297)
0.090
(0.287)
0.087
(0.282)
0.093
(0.291)
0.096
(0.295)
0.098
(0.297)
0.098
(0.298)
0.093
(0.290)
0.090
(0.286)
0.091
(0.288)
0.089
(0.285)
0.093
(0.291)
0.095
(0.293)
0.094
(0.291)
0.096
(0.294)
0.0952
(0.293)
0.094
(0.293)
0.094
(0.292)
0.091
(0.288)
Regionl 2 0.071
(0.256)
0.072
(0.258)
0.070
(0.255)
0.068
(0.251)
0.069
(0.254)
0.067
(0.251)
0.068
(0.251)
0.07
(0.256)
0.062
(0.241)
0.058
(0.234)
0.063
(0.244)
0.037
(0.189)
0.034
(0.182)
0.036
(0.187)
0.036
(0.185)
0.034
(0.182)
0.039
(0.193)
0.035
(0.185)
0.034
(0.182)
Edu2 0.056
(0.230)
0.055
(0.228)
0.069
(0.253)
0.072
(0.259)
0.084
(0.278)
0.089
(0.285)
0.087
(0.282)
0.077
(0.266)
0.080
(0.272)
0.073
(0.260)
0.095
(0.293)
0.106
(0.308)
0.1
(0.300)
0.112
(0.315)
0.111
(0.314)
0.112
(0.315)
0.108
(0.310)
0.105
(0.307)
0.100
(0.300)
EduS 0.041
(0.199)
0.043
(0.204)
0.046
(0.209)
0.04
(0.197)
0.043
(0.202)
0.044
(0.205)
0.043
(0.202)
0.041
(0.199)
0.047
(0.211)
0.048
(0.214)
0.055
(0.228)
0.06
(0.238)
0.044
(0.205)
0.047
(0.211)
0.047
(0.211)
0.043
(0.203)
0.043
(0.202)
0.041
(0.199)
0.041
(0.198)
Edu4 0.048
(0.213)
0.047
(0.211)
0.03
(0.171)
0.039
(0.193)
0.036
(0.187)
0.057
(0.233)
0.062
(0.241)
0.067
(0.250)
0.076
(0.265)
0.092
(0.288)
0.096
(0.294)
0.084
(0.277)
0.073
(0.260)
0.081
(0.272)
0.08
(0.272)
0.081
(0.273)
0.082
(0.274)
0.086
(0.278)
0.088
(0.283)
EduS 0.162
(0.369)
0.169
(0.375)
0.171
(0.376)
0.176
(0.381)
0.187
(0.390)
0.185
(0.388)
0.198
(0.398)
0.199
(0.399)
0.205
(0.404)
0.179
(0.384)
0.196
(0.397)
0.211
(0.408)
0.220
(0.415)
0.226
(0.418)
0.218
(0.413)
0.216
(0.411)
0.216
(0.411)
0.213
(0.410)
0.210
(0.407)
Edu6 0.007
(0.083)
0.008
(0.089)
0.007
(0.084)
0.007
(0.085)
0.009
(0.096)
0.013
(0.113)
0.015
(0.122)
0.015
(0.120)
0.019
(0.135)
0.017
(0.131)
0.018
(0.133)
0.017
(0.130)
0.019
(0.137)
0.026
(0.160)
0.029
(0.168)
0.034
(0.182)
0.037
(0.189)
0.040
(0.196)
0.045
(0.208)
Edu7 0.043
(0.204)
0.047
(0.211)
0.047
(0.211)
0.048
(0.213)
0.050
(0.219)
0.052
(0.222)
0.056
(0.230)
0.059
(0.235)
0.056
(0.231)
0.054
(0.225)
0.061
(0.239)
0.059
(0.235)
0.061
(0.240)
0.063
(0.244)
0.066
(0.247)
0.066
(0.247)
0.066
(0.248)
0.069
(0.253)
0.069
(0.254)
Edu8 0.048
(0.214)
0.051
(0.22)
0.053
(0.223)
0.051
(0.221)
0.052
(0.222)
0.052
(0.221)
0.052
(0.223)
0.053
(0.225)
0.064
(0.244)
0.073
(0.259)
0.079
(0.270)
0.078
(0.269)
0.081
(0.272)
0.079
(0.269)
0.082
(0.275)
0.083
(0.276)
0.084
(0.278)
0.085
(0.278)
0.085
(0.279)
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Edu9 0.078
(0.268)
0.083
(0.275)
0.084
(0.277)
0.083
(0.276)
0.083
(0.275)
0.087
(0.282)
0.091
(0.288)
0.092
(0.290)
0.103
(0.304)
0.110
(0.313)
0.111
(0.315)
0.115
(0.319)
0.117
(0.322)
0.123
(0.328)
0.128
(0.334)
0.139
(0.345)
0.146
(0.353)
0.151
(0.358)
0.161
(0.368)
NdepO-Z 0.18
(0.437)
0.184
(0.446)
0.178
(0.438)
0.177
(0.431)
0.179
(0.435)
0.175
(0.431)
0.173
(0.429)
0.176
(0.441)
0.171
(0.426)
0.172
(0.422)
0.171
(0.426)
0.163
(0.414)
0.16
(0.409)
0.156
(0.405)
0.157
(0.405)
0.152
(0.400)
0.153
(0.401)
0.144
(0.388)
0.137
(0.384)
Ndep3~4 0.123
(0.347)
0.123
(0.346)
0.120
(0.343)
0.118
(0.340)
0.120
(0.345)
0.120
(0.343)
0.120
(0.344)
0.122
(0.347)
0.114
(0.333)
0.119
(0.341)
0.117
(0.338)
0.119
(0.342)
0.112
(0.329)
0.110
(0.327)
0.109
(0.328)
0.106
(0.323)
0.108
(0.326)
0.105
(0.320)
0.102
(0.315)
Ndep5-10 0.338
(0.650)
0.346
(0.662)
0.348
(0.662)
0.345
(0.663)
0.345
(0.667)
0.359
(0.682)
0.358
(0.675)
0.351
(0.674)
0.324
(0.645)
0.338
(0.659)
0.337
(0.656)
0.337
(0.660)
0.34
(0.661)
0.338
(0.655)
0.334
(0.650)
0.333
(0.652)
0.337
(0.652)
0.332
(0.642)
0.325
(0.634)
N d e p ll-1 5 0.349
(0.659)
0.337
(0.641)
0.317
(0.618)
0.304
(0.604)
0.289
(0.592)
0.276
(0.575)
0.279
(0.581)
0.275
(0.579)
0.256
(0.565)
0.267
(0.575)
0.268
(0.580)
0.267
(0.576)
0.264
(0.573)
0.263
(0.673)
0.264
(0.573)
0.267
(0.575)
0.272
(0.576)
0.275
(0.583)
0.279
(0.588)
DdepO-2 0.159
(0.365)
0.161
(0.367)
0.157
(0.364)
0.157
(0.364)
0.159
(0.365)
0.155
(0.362)
0.153
(0.360)
0.154
(0.361)
0.152
(0.359)
0.154
(0.361)
0.153
(0.360)
0.147
(0.354)
0.144
(0.351)
0.141
(0.348)
0.141
(0.349)
0.137
(0.344)
0.137
(0.344)
0.13
(0.336)
0.123
(0.328)
Ddep3~4 0.118
(0.322)
0.118
(0.322)
0.114
(0.318)
0.112
(0.316)
0.113
(0.317)
0.114
(0.318)
0.114
(0.318)
0.116
(0.320)
0.109
(0.312)
0.113
(0.317)
0.112
(0.316)
0.113
(0.317)
0.107
(0.310)
0.106
(0.308)
0.104
(0.306)
0.101
(0.302)
0.102
(0.303)
0.101
(0.302)
0.098
(0.297)
D dep5-10 0.249
(0.432)
0.252
(0.434)
0.255
(0.436)
0.25
(0.433)
0.249
(0.432)
0.258
(0.438)
0.259
(0.438)
0.254
(0.435)
0.237
(0.425)
0.246
(0.431)
0.246
(0.431)
0.244
(0.430)
0.247
(0.431)
0.247
(0.431)
0.245
(0.430)
0.244
(0.429)
0.248
(0.432)
0.248
(0.432)
0.243
(0.429)
D d ep ll-1 5 0.258
(0.437)
0.253
(0.435)
0.243
(0.429)
0.234
(0.423)
0.223
(0.416)
0.216
(0.412)
0.218
(0.413)
0.213
(0.410)
0.197
(0.398)
0.204
(0.403)
0.204
(0.403)
0.204
(0.403)
0.203
(0.402)
0.202
(0.401)
0.202
(0.402)
0.205
(0.404)
0.211
(0.408)
0.211
(0.408)
0.213
(0.410)
Married 0.847
(0.360)
0.841
(0.365)
0.832
(0.373)
0.836
(0.379)
0.819
(0.385)
0.819
(0.385)
0.814
(0.389)
0.808
(0.394)
0.808
(0.394)
0.803
(0.398)
0.79
(0.407)
0.78
(0.414)
0.777
(0.416)
0.773
(0.419)
0.767
(0.422)
0.764
(0.425)
0.763
(0.425)
0.758
(0.428)
0.751
(0.432)
Em pP 0.708
(0.455)
0.697
(0.459)
0.686
(0.464)
0.679
(0.467)
0.686
(0.464)
0.696
(0.460)
0.700
(0.458)
0.68
(0.466)
0.667
(0.471)
0.652
(0.476)
0.644
(0.479)
0.642
(0.479)
0.639
(0.480)
0.636
(0.481)
0.637
(0.481)
0.635
(0.481)
0.637
(0.481)
0.636
(0.481)
0.629
(0.483)
EduP2 0.028
(0.164)
0.030
(0.170)
0.039
(0.194)
0.049
(0.216)
0.061
(0.239)
0.063
(0.243)
0.06
(0.238)
0.051
(0.219)
0.053
(0.224)
0.056
(0.230)
0.075
(0.264)
0.08
(0.271)
0.074
(0.261)
0.084
(0.277)
0.083
(0.276)
0.079
(0.270)
0.075
(0.263)
0.074
(0.262)
0.075
(0.263)
EduPS 0.019
(0.136)
0.019
(0.136)
0.02
(0.139)
0.015
(0.123)
0.021
(0.143)
0.017
(0.129)
0.017
(0.128)
0.017
(0.128)
0.021
(0.142)
0.023
(0.151)
0.025
(0.157)
0.027
(0.163)
0.019
(0.138)
0.022
(0.145)
0.022
(0.148)
0.023
(0.149)
0.021
(0.143)
0.023
(0.150)
0.022
(0.147)
EduP4 0.209
(0.406)
0.202
(0.401)
0.133
(0.339)
0.16
(0.367)
0.145
(0.352)
0.225
(0.417)
0.225
(0.418)
0.222
(0.415)
0.229
(0.420)
0.215
(0.411)
0.212
(0.409)
0.208
(0.406)
0.202
(0.401)
0.2
(0.400)
0.193
(0.395)
0.189
(0.391)
0.185
(0.388)
0.178
(0.382)
0.173
(0.378)
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
EduP5 0.076
(0.265)
0.080
(0.272)
0.080
(0.271)
0.069
(0.254)
0.083
(0.275)
0.072
(0.258)
0.076
(0.264)
0.075
(0.264)
0.079
(0.271)
0.074
(0.262)
0.08
(0.272)
0.082
(0.274)
0.083
(0.276)
0.085
(0.279)
0.084
(0.278)
0.083
(0.276)
0.084
(0.278)
0.087
(0.282)
0.088
(0.283)
EduP6 0.021
(0.143)
0.022
(0.147)
0.018
(0.134)
0.018
(0.131)
0.019
(0.138)
0.022
(0.147)
0.024
(0.153)
0.024
(0.153)
0.024
(0.153)
0.018
(0.132)
0.02
(0.139)
0.019
(0.135)
0.021
(0.142)
0.023
(0.150)
0.025
(0.157)
0.025
(0.157)
0.028
(0.165)
0.03
(0.171)
0.032
(0.176)
EduP7 0.034
(0.183)
0.037
(0.189)
0.036
(0.186)
0.036
(0.186)
0.036
(0.187)
0.035
(0.184)
0.038
(0.192)
0.041
(0.198)
0.038
(0.191)
0.037
(0.188)
0.041
(0.198)
0.039
(0.193)
0.041
(0.198)
0.042
(0.200)
0.041
(0.198)
0.042
(0.200)
0.043
(0.202)
0.043
(0.202)
0.043
(0.204)
EduP8 0.032
(0.177)
0.034
(0.182)
0.031
(0.172)
0.031
(0.174)
0.035
(0.183)
0.033
(0.180)
0.036
(0.186)
0.039
(0.194)
0.046
(0.209)
0.05
(0.219)
0.056
(0.230)
0.058
(0.233)
0.058
(0.235)
0.058
(0.234)
0.06
(0.238)
0.061
(0.239)
0.061
(0.240)
0.06
(0.238)
0.057
(0.233)
EduP9 0.091
(0.287)
0.097
(0.295)
0.102
(0.302)
0.099
(0.298)
0.097
(0.296)
0.096
(0.294)
0.100
(0.300)
0.102
(0.303)
0.112
(0.315)
0.121
(0.326)
0.116
(0.320)
0.119
(0.324)
0.118
(0.323)
0.119
(0.323)
0.122
(0.327)
0.128
(0.334)
0.133
(0.339)
0.134
(0.341)
0.135
(0.341)
HOHSingle 0.149
(0.356)
0.171
(0.376)
0.179
(0.384)
0.177
(0.381)
0.192
(0.394)
0.194
(0.395)
0.191
(0.393)
0.206
(0.405)
0.196
(0.397)
0.207
(0.405)
0.22
(0.414)
0.225
(0.418)
0.227
(0.419)
0.229
(0.420)
0.234
(0.424)
0.238
(0.426)
0.239
(0.426)
0.244
(0.429)
0.251
(0.434)
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Table 5.16: Marginal Effects on Probability of Female Participation in the UK: 1984-2002 
(Standard Errors in Brackets)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
A g l6 -19 -0.1977
(0.031)
-0.2575
(0.0319)
-0.2127
(0.0329)
-0.1476
(0.0354)
-0.2222
(0.0329)
-0.1317
(0.0376)
-0.2416
(0.039)
-0.2644
(0.0455)
-0.1937
(0.0337)
-0.2023
(0.0347)
-0.2512
(0.0353)
-0.2042
(0.0349)
-0.2256
(0.0341)
-0.2523
(0.0344)
-0.1366
(0.0325)
-0.2182
(0.0349)
-0.1881
(0.0362)
-0.2033
(0.0377)
-0.1621
(0.0378)
Ag20-24 -0.0422
(0.014)
-0.0725
(0.0139)
-0.0557
(0.0139)
-0.0545
(0.014)
-0.0816
(0.0142)
-0.0612
(0.0142)
-0.0828
(0.0151)
-0.1327
(0.0156)
-0.0711
(0.0133)
-0.0973
(0.0137)
-0.1281
(0.014)
-0.1044
(0.0141)
-0.1142
(0.0149)
-0.1283
(0.0149)
-0.1089
(0.0151)
-0.1504
(0.0156)
-0.1608
(0.0157)
-0.1568
(0.0162)
-0.1176
(0.0155)
Ag25-29 0.0114
(0.0114)
0.0051
(0.0112)
0.0099
(0.011)
0.022
(0.0109)
-0.0112
(0.0111)
-0.0006
(0.0109)
-0.0106
(0.0111)
-0.0263
(0.0113)
-0.0052
(0.0102)
-0.0147
(0.0102)
-0.0196
(0.0102)
0.0004
(0.0101)
-0.024
(0.0107)
-0.0296
(0.0106)
-0.0105
(0.0104)
-0.0207
(0.0105)
-0.0279
(0.0108)
-0.0475
(0.0114)
-0.0345
-0.0114
Ag30-34 -0.0129
(0.0104)
-0.0019
(0.0101)
0.018
(0.0097)
0.0292
(0.0097)
0.0189
(0.0097)
0.0172
(0.0097)
0.0115
(0.0098)
-0.0112
(0.0101)
-0.0019
(0.0093)
0.001
(0.0091)
-0.0033
(0.0091)
-0.0051
(0.0092)
0.0098
(0.0092)
0.0007
(0.0091)
0.0118
(0.009)
0.0112
(0.0089)
0.0039
(0.009)
-0.0019
(0.0092)
-0.007
(0.0092)
Ag40-44 -0.0463
(0.0109)
-0.0297
(0.0106)
-0.0323
(0.0104)
-0.0334
(0.0103)
-0.0294
(0.010)
-0.0327
(0.010)
-0.0361
(0.0101)
-0.0298
(0.0102)
-0.0245
(0.0098)
-0.037
(0.0099)
-0.0291
(0.0099)
-0.0274
(0.010)
-0.0207
(0.0101)
-0.0197
(0.0099)
-0.0147
(0.0098)
-0.0281
(0.0098)
-0.0153
(0.0097)
-0.0275
(0.0098)
-0.0251
(0.0096)
Ag45-49 -0.1007
(0.0118)
-0.0882
(0.0117)
-0.0884
(0.0116)
-0.0859
(0.0117)
-0.0951
(0.0116)
-0.0793
(0.0115)
-0.0957
(0.0118)
-0.0907
(0.0117)
-0.073
(0.0108)
-0.0983
(0.0109)
-0.0848
(0.0109)
-0.0752
(0.0108)
-0.0709
(0.011)
-0.082
(0.0111)
-0.0584
(0.0109)
-0.0574
(0.0109)
-0.065
(0.011)
-0.0691
(0.0113)
-0.0566
(0.0111)
Ag50-54 -0.1611
(0.0123)
-0.1781
(0.0121)
-0.1786
(0.0122)
-0.1628
(0.0123)
-0.1819
(0.0123)
-0.1589
(0.0123)
-0.1887
(0.0126)
-0.1781
(0.0126)
-0.1642
(0.0122)
-0.1765
(0.0124)
-0.1715
(0.0123)
-0.1616
(0.0124)
-0.1704
(0.0125)
-0.149
(0.012)
-0.1372
(0.0118)
-0.1455
(0.0117)
-0.137
(0.0118)
-0.1527
(0.012)
-0.132
(0.012)
AgS5-S9 -0.2898
(0.0119)
-0.2854
(0.0119)
-0.287
(0.012)
-0.2716
(0.0122)
-0.2807
(0.0123)
-0.2644
(0.0126)
-0.2965
(0.0128)
-0.2909
(0.0129)
-0.289
(0.0126)
-0.3085
(0.0126)
-0.2931
(0.0128)
-0.2668
(0.013)
-0.2867
(0.0131)
-0.2943
(0.013)
-0.2717
(0.0131)
-0.2673
(0.013)
-0.2545
(0.0131)
-0.2753
(0.0131)
-0.2585
(0.0129)
N on- White 0.0208
(0.0152)
-0.0348
(0.0149)
-0.0268
(0.0143)
-0.0563
(0.0144)
-0.0388
(0.0134)
-0.0362
(0.0132)
-0.066
(0.014)
-0.0924
(0.014)
-0.0439
(0.0121)
-0.0665
(0.0121)
-0.0745
(0.0123)
-0.0887
(0.0126)
-0.1764
(0.0126)
-0.2143
(0.0118)
-0.2169
(0.0119)
-0.2213
(0.0116)
-0.2299
(0.0118)
-0.1139
(0.0085)
-0.2205
(0.0114)
Regio2 -0.002
(0.0146)
0.0268
(0.0138)
0.0271
(0.0137)
0.0206
(0.0138)
0.0075
(0.0137)
0.0069
(0.0134)
0.0083
(0.0135)
0.0065
(0.0136)
0.0243
(0.0125)
0.0397
(0.012)
0.0262
(0.0126)
0.0265
(0.0123)
0.098
(0.0101)
0.0107
(0.0129)
0.0442
(0.0121)
0.016
(0.0127)
0.0324
(0.0123)
0.0337
(0.0124)
0.0097
(0.0129)
RegioS 0.012
(0.0153)
0.0436
(0.0145)
0.0284
(0.0143)
0.005
(0.0146)
0.0199
(0.0141)
0.0397
(0.0135)
0.0397
(0.0136)
0.0275
(0.0139)
0.0382
(0.0128)
0.0482
(0.0123)
0.0188
(0.0132)
0.041
(0.0126)
0.1044
(0.0103)
0.0447
(0.0127)
0.0554
(0.0123)
0.0397
(0.0126)
0.0542
(0.0124)
0.0449
(0.0126)
0.0362
(0.0128)
Regio4 -0.0432
(0.0187)
0.0181
(0.0173)
0.0063
(0.0171)
-0.0052
(0.0178)
0.0219
(0.0168)
0.0015
(0.0171)
0.0449
(0.0161)
0.0145
(0.017)
0.0165
(0.0158)
0.0264
(0.0154)
0.0349
(0.0155)
0.029
(0.0152)
0.0843
(0.0128)
0.0088
(0.0161)
0.0413
(0.0149)
0.0229
(0.0154)
0.0318
(0.0151)
0.0504
(0.0146)
0.032
(0.0155)
Regio5 0.0103
(0.0146)
0.0632
(0.0133)
0.02
(0.0137)
0.0024
(0.0137)
-0.005
(0.0136)
-0.0172
(0.0136)
0.0113
(0.0133)
0.0093
(0.0135)
-0.0064
(0.0128)
0.0215
(0.0122)
-0.0085
(0.013)
0.0171
(0.0123)
0.0987
(0.0098)
0.0387
(0.0121)
0.0557
(0.0117)
0.0408
(0.0119)
0.0464
(0.0119)
0.0074
(0.0128)
0.0195
(0.0126)
Regio6 0.0003
(0.0132)
0.029
(0.0125)
0.015
(0.0124)
0.0112
(0.0125)
0.0081
(0.0123)
0.0031
(0.012)
0.0214
(0.012)
0.0122
(0.0122)
0.0294
(0.0111)
0.0274
(0.011)
0.0175
(0.0115)
0.0309
(0.011)
0.0961
(0.0094)
0.024
(0.0114)
0.0493
(0.0109)
0.0241
(0.0113)
0.0416
(0.0111)
0.0422
(0.0111)
0.0319
(0.0113)
to
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Table 5.16: continued
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
R egiol -0.0325
(0.0154)
0.034
(0.0142)
-0.0056
(0.0146)
RegioS -0.0099
(0.0147)
0.0583
(0.0135)
0.0246
(0.0136)
Regio9 0.0122
(0.014)
0.0633
(0.0128)
0.0461
(0.0129)
RegiolO •0.0363
(0.0171)
-0.0052
(0.016)
-0.0182
(0.0164)
R egio ll -0.0403
(0.0146)
0.0127
(0.0139)
-0.0136
(0.0141)
Regiol 2 -0.0554
(0.0222)
0.0358
(0.0198)
0.0141
(0.0198)
EduS 0.0801
(0.0111)
0.0921
(0.0108)
0.1041
(0.0094)
Edu3 0.0632
(0.0137)
0.0719
(0.013)
0.0536
(0.0127)
Edu4 0.0713
(0.012)
0.0543
(0.0121)
0.1178
(0.0134)
Edu5 0.0967
(0.0077)
0.1227
(0.0072)
0.1159
(0.0072)
EduS 0.1825
(0.0255)
0.1626
(0.0241)
0.1599
(0.0246)
Edu7 0.073
(0.0129)
0.0796
(0.0122)
0.0971
(0.0116)
EduS 0.2067
(0.0097)
0.2056
(0.0092)
0.2077
(0.0087)
0.0124
(0.0144)
0.0062
(0.0141)
0.0082
(0.0135)
0.0141
(0.0138)
0.0124
(0.0138)
0.0094
(0.0138)
0.0092
(0.0133)
0.0185
(0.0133)
0.0333
(0.0131)
0.0376
(0.0127)
0.0225
(0.0127)
0.01
(0.013)
-0.0256
(0.0166)
-0.03
(0.0164)
-0.0302
(0.0163)
-0.007
(0.0158)
-0.01
(0.0139)
-0.023
(0.0138)
-0.0159
(0.0134)
0.0014
(0.0134)
0.0035
(0.0199)
-0.0066
(0.0192)
-0.0096
(0.019)
0.0391
(0.018)
0.1036
(0.0091)
0.0734
(0.0086)
0.0901
(0.0081)
0.1071
(0.0079)
0.0596
(0.013)
0.0548
(0.0124)
0.0823
(0.0114)
0.0717
(0.0118)
0.0937
(0.0121)
0.0807
(0.0123)
0.0739
(0.01)
0.0806
(0.0095)
0.1188
(0.0069)
0.1258
(0.0066)
0.1264
(0.0065)
0.1314
(0.0063)
0.164
(0.0234)
0.1722
(0.0187)
0.1748
(0.0155)
0.1766
(0.0139)
0.087
(0.0115)
0.1064
(0.0105)
0.1098
(0.0101)
0.1252
(0.0093)
0.2063
(0.0084)
0.1946
(0.0081)
0.2062
(0.0075)
0.1952
(0.0076)
0.0186
(0.0139)
0.0163
(0.0129)
0.0418
(0.0122)
0.0215
(0.0129)
0.0179
(0.0135)
0.0085
(0.0126)
0.0417
(0.012)
0.0267
(0.0125)
0.0093
(0.013)
0.0175
(0.0121)
0.0294
(0.0118)
0.004
(0.0125)
-0.0015
(0.0158)
-0.021
(0.0152)
-0.0069
(0.0148)
-0.0279
(0.0155)
-0.0181
(0.0139)
0.0032
(0.0128)
0.001
(0.0126)
-0.007
(0.0131)
0.0625
(0.0171)
0.0158
(0.0172)
0.018
(0.0169)
0.021
(0.0169)
0.1087
(0.0082)
0.1076
(0.0074)
0.0932
(0.0078)
0.0998
(0.0071)
0.0913
(0.0113)
0.0606
(0.0107)
0.0553
(0.0103)
0.0849
(0.0093)
0.0841
(0.0091)
0.0817
(0.0081)
0.0901
(0.0073)
0.1115
(0.0069)
0.1425
(0.0062)
0.1278
(0.0059)
0.1189
(0.006)
0.1267
(0.006)
0.1974
(0.0125)
0.1497
(0.0122)
0.1331
(0.0131)
0.1552
(0.0115)
0.1403
(0.0087)
0.1062
(0.0088)
0.1113
(0.0086)
0.1261
(0.008)
0.2060
(0.0071)
0.1872
(0.0064)
0.1840
(0.0061)
0.2003
(0.0055)
0.0378
(0.0123)
0.0934
(0.0104)
0.025
(0.0129)
0.0549
(0.0121)
0.0307
(0.0122)
0.0968
(0.01)
0.0211
(0.0125)
0.055
(0.0117)
0.0104
(0.0121)
0.0802
(0.0101)
-0.0034
(0.0127)
0.0255
(0.0122)
0.0039
(0.0145)
0.0582
(0.0125)
-0.0062
(0.0149)
0.0123
(0.0146)
0.0156
(0.0124)
0.0636
(0.0107)
-0.0086
(0.0131)
0.0259
(0.0123)
0.0516
(0.0171)
0.0304
(0.0147)
-0.0112
(0.0164)
0.0026
(0.0161)
0.1123
(0.0067)
0.1187
(0.0067)
0.1389
(0.0062)
0.1486
(0.0059)
0.0958
(0.0088)
0.1002
(0.0098)
0.1294
(0.0086)
0.122
(0.0086)
0.1019
(0.0074)
0.1262
(0.0073)
0.1316
(0.007)
0.1505
(0.0065)
0.1356
(0.0059)
0.1526
(0.0058)
0.1705
(0.0057)
0.1894
(0.0054)
0.1831
(0.0101)
0.1781
(0.0099)
0.2016
(0.0073)
0.2099
(0.0063)
0.1258
(0.0081)
0.1326
(0.0078)
0.1526
(0.0072)
0.1672
(0.0065)
0.1918
(0.0058)
0.2031
(0.0055)
0.2239
(0.0049)
0.2254
(0.0046)
0.0354
(0.0124)
0.047
(0.0122)
0.0443
(0.0123)
0.0354
(0.0125)
0.0459
(0.0119)
0.0532
(0.0118)
0.0426
(0.0122)
0.0308
(0.012)
0.0088
(0.0124)
0.0189
(0.0123)
0.0345
(0.0122)
0.0292
(0.0123)
-0.0134
(0.0152)
-0.0045
(0.015)
-0.0102
(0.0154)
-0.013
(0.0153)
0.0049
(0.0127)
0.0249
(0.0124)
0.0231
(0.0126)
0.018
(0.0127)
-0.0231
(0.0169)
-0.0319
(0.0166)
-0.0098
(0.0167)
-0.0204
(0.0172)
0.1535
(0.0057)
0.143
(0.0059)
0.1524
(0.0058)
0.1484
(0.0058)
0.1157
(0.0089)
0.135
(0.0082)
0.1463
(0.0079)
0.1311
(0.0083)
0.1535
(0.0062)
0.1652
(0.0069)
0.1673
(0.0058)
0.1686
(0.0056)
0.1725
(0.0055)
0.1787
(0.0054)
0.19
(0.0053)
0.1846
(0.0053)
0.2106
(0.0056)
0.2136
(0.0052)
0.2009
(0.0056)
0.2084
(0.0049)
0.1721
(0.0061)
0.183
(0.0057)
0.1877
(0.0055)
0.1679
(0.006)
0.2268
(0.0044)
0.2229
(0.0044)
0.2247
(0.0043)
0.2244
(0.0042)
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Edu9 0.2096
(0.0089)
0.2256
(0.0081)
0.2289
(0.0076)
0.2207
(0.0074)
0.2217
(0.0070)
0.2298
(0.0065)
0.2185
(0.0064)
0.2241
(0.0062)
0.2162
(0.0055)
0.2115
(0.0054)
0.2316
(0.0050)
0.2238
(0.0052)
0.2322
(0.0051)
0.2479
(0.0047)
0.2538
(0.0044)
0.2565
(0.0043)
0.2514
(0.0044)
0.2601
(0.0043)
0.2623
(0.0043)
NdcpO-2 -0.2195
(0.0211)
-0.2048,
(0.0195)
-0.1926
(0.0197)
-0.1958
(0.0201)
-0.1666
(0.0185)
-0.1863
(0.0186)
-0.1656
(0.0186)
-0.1359
(0.0179)
-0.1907
(0.0178)
-0.1929
(0.0181)
-0.1613
(0.0174)
-0.1555
(0.0183)
-0.1492
(0.0193)
-0.1565
(0.0196)
-0.1436
(0.0188)
-0.1171
(0.0188)
-0.1241
(0.0189)
-0.1664
(0.0208)
-0.1941
(0.0206)
Ndep3~4 -0.1317
(0.0367)
-0.1500
(0.0372)
-0.1642
(0.0349)
-0.0977
(0.0337)
-0.0625
(0.0317)
-0.0981
(0.0329)
-0.0798
(0.0308)
-0.0420
(0.0328)
-0.0664
(0.0331)
-0.1313
(0.0310)
-0.0933
(0.0316)
-0.1845
(0.0312)
-0.1604
(0.0368)
-0.1373
(0.0355)
-0.0767
(0.0330)
-0.0890
(0.0325)
-0.0671
(0.0317)
-0.0972
(0.0366)
-0.0957
(0.0365)
Ndep5-10 -0.0909
(0.0098)
-0.0802
(0.0092)
-0.0663
(0.0091)
-0.0688
(0.0091)
-0.0618
(0.0087)
-0.0586
(0.0083)
-0.0605
(0.0085)
-0.0522
(0.0085)
-0.0652
(0.0083)
-0.0753
(0.0080)
-0.0781
(0.0081)
-0.0437
(0.0081)
-0.0712
(0.0081)
-0.0783
(0.0083)
-0.0727
(0.0083)
-0.0780
(0.0082)
-0.0697
(0.0083)
-0.0676
(0.0086)
-0.0739
(0.0087)
N d ep ll-1 5 -0.0503
(0.0094)
-0.0346
(0.0097)
-0.0587
(0.0101)
-0.0415
(0.0105)
-0.0270
(0.0105)
-0.0465
(0.0109)
-0.0425
(0.0107)
-0.0389
(0.0109)
-0.0453
(0.0103)
-0.0522
(0.0101)
-0.0440
(0.0100)
-0.0371
(0.0102)
-0.0384
(0.0106)
-0.0513
(0.0103)
-0.0271
(0.0105)
-0.0439
(0.0103)
-0.0564
(0.0102)
-0.0775
(0.0101)
-0.0481
(0.0100)
DdepO-2 -0.1593
(0.0258)
-0.1602
(0.0244)
-0.1673
(0.0248)
-0.1437
(0.0253)
-0.1379
(0.0239)
-0.1123
(0.0238)
-0.1372
(0.0244)
-0.1498
(0.0240)
-0.0962
(0.0230)
-0.0711
(0.0228)
-0.1129
(0.0231)
-0.1146
(0.0242)
-0.1101
(0.0253)
-0.0844
(0.0250)
-0.1034
(0.0247)
-0.1202
(0.0253)
-0.1014
(0.0252)
-0.0539
(0.0260)
-0.0354
(0.0253)
Ddep3~4 -0.1226
(0.0413)
-0.0661
(0.0413)
-0.0614
(0.0391)
-0.1237
(0.0393)
-0.1596
(0.0379)
-0.0915
(0.0383)
-0.1289
(0.0372)
-0.1593
(0.0400)
-0.1322
(0.0404)
-0.0599
(0.0359)
-0.0985
(0.0381)
-0.0005
(0.0335)
-0.0054
(0.0393)
-0.0229
(0.0391)
-0.1153
(0.0406)
-0.0659
(0.0385)
-0.0912
(0.0389)
-0.0893
(0.0441)
-0.0870
(0.0441)
Ddep5-10 -0.0543
(0.0151)
-0.0686
(0.0146}
-0.0904
(0.0146)
-0.0630
(0.0146)
-0.0548
(0.0140)
-0.0605
(0.0136)
-0.0571
(0.0138)
-0.0537
(0.0139)
-0.0533
(0.0134)
-0.0440
(0.0130)
-0.0424
(0.0131)
-0.0741
(0.0135)
-0.0545
(0.0135)
-0.0335
(0.0133)
-0.0243
(0.0133)
-0.0144
(0.0130)
-0.0223
(0.0133)
-0.0377
(0.0137)
-0.0173
(0.0134)
D d ep ll-1 5 0.0142
(0.0142)
-0.0087
(0.0146)
0.0212
(0.0146)
0.0109
(0.0151)
-0.0127
(0.0153)
0.0186
(0.0152)
-0.0092
(0.0155)
-0.0086
(0.0157)
0.0083
(0.0149)
0.0045
(0.0146)
-0.0111
(0.0148)
-0.0157
(0.0151)
-0.0056
(0.0154)
0.0138
(0.0147)
-0.0123
(0.0153)
0.0093
(0.0148)
0.0132
(0.0145)
0.0475
(0.0139)
0.0051
(0.0145)
Married -0.2075
(0.0200)
-0.0956
(0.0211)
-0.0560
(0.0219)
-0.2233
(0.0252)
-0.0941
(0.0197)
-0.0536
(0.0223)
-0.0566
(0.0352)
0.0177
(0.0240)
-0.1125
(0.0180)
-0.1081
(0.0212)
-0.0726
(0.0230)
-0.1292
(0.0280)
-0.0959
(0.0385)
-0.0884
(0.0430)
-0.1819
(0.0427)
-0.1072
(0.0453)
-0.0804
(0.0546)
-0.1218
(0.0454)
-0.0280
(0.0602)
Em pP 0.2590
(0.0083)
0.2505
(0.0081)
0.2707
(0.0080)
0.2528
(0.0079)
0.2694
(0.0082)
0.2649
(0.0086)
0.2529
(0.0088)
0.2362
(0.0084)
0.2519
(0.0075)
0.2587
(0.0072)
0.2679
(0.0074)
0.2915
(0.0076)
0.2704
(0.0078)
0.2541
(0.0078)
0.2410
(0.0081)
0.2378
(0.0082)
0.2509
(0.0083)
0.2541
(0.0085)
0.2300
(0.0084)
EduP2 -0.0060
(0.0169)
•0.0218
(0.0162)
-0.0187
(0.0142)
-0.0062
(0.0127)
0.0054
(0.0113)
-0.0063
(0.0113)
-0.0009
(0.0117)
0.0076
(0.0124)
0.0068
(0.0116)
-0.0284
(0.0116)
-0.0293
(0.0109)
-0.0176
(0.0107)
-0.0180
(0.0112)
-0.0033
(0.0106)
-0.0274
(0.0111)
-0.0232
(0.0112)
-0.0418
(0.0118)
-0.0484
(0.0122)
-0.0333
(0.0119)
EduP3 0.0344
(0.0202)
0.0291
(0.0201)
0.0031
(0.0198)
0.0364
(0.0214)
0.0545
(0.0175)
0.0018
(0.0206)
0.0293
(0.0202)
0.0434
(0.0196)
0.0366
(0.0171)
0.0385
(0.0159)
0.0353
(0.0157)
0.0413
(0.0154)
0.0212
(0.0186)
0.0502
(0.0168)
0.0151
(0.0179)
0.0530
(0.0163)
0.0321
(0.0179)
0.0095
(0.0183)
0.0146
(0.0180)
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1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
EduP4 0.0161
(0.0076)
0.0086
(0.0077)
0.0086
(0.0087)
0.0128
(0.0082)
0.0126
(0.0083)
0.0224
(0.0074)
0.0054
(0.0077)
0.0248
(0.0075)
0.0127
(0.0073)
0.0138
(0.0073)
0.0123
(0.0079)
0.0121
(0.0082)
0.0106
(0.0083)
0.0188
(0.0085)
0.0197
(0.0087)
0.0159
(0.0088)
0.0103
(0.0090)
•0.0130
(0.0095)
0.0017
(0.0094)
EduPS -0.0193
(0.0114)
-0.0112
(0.0111)
-0.0215
(0.0110)
-0.0225
(0.0117)
-0.0038
(0.0106)
-0.0185
(0.0114)
-0.0126
(0.0113)
-0.0129
(0.0114)
-0.0001
(0.0105)
0.0180
(0.0105)
0.0066
(0.0107)
0.0101
(0.0109)
0.0215
(0.0108)
0.0206
(0.0108)
0.0017
(0.0113)
0.0113
(0.0111)
-0.0099
(0.0115)
-0.0136
(0.0118)
0.0133
(0.0112)
EduP6 -0.0079
(0.0199)
0.0352
(0.0187)
-0.0263
(0.0210)
0.0302
(0.0207)
-0.0039
(0.0197)
0.0102
(0.0184)
-0.0006
(0.0183)
0.0058
(0.0178)
0.0074
(0.0169)
0.0332
(0.0187)
0.0285
(0.0182)
0.0068
(0.0197)
-0.0025
(0.0191)
0.0164
(0.0177)
0.0131
(0.0175)
0.0278
(0.0169)
-0.0008
(0.0171)
-0.0156
(0.0174)
0.0129
(0.0162)
EduP7 -0.0797
(0.0164)
-0.0799
(0.0159)
-0.0949
(0.0160)
-0.1000
(0.0160)
-0.0764
(0.0156)
-0.0753
(0.0160)
-0.0676
(0.0157)
-0.0308
(0.0149)
-0.0158
(0.0146)
-0.0451
(0.0149)
-0.0327
(0.0147)
-0.0424
(0.0155)
-0.0433
(0.0152)
-0.0102
(0.0147)
-0.0489
(0.0156)
-0.0442
(0.0153)
-0.0750
(0.0160)
-0.0669
(0.0162)
-0.0420
(0.0155)
EduP8 -0.0440
(0.0165)
-0.0454
(0.0160)
-0.0330
(0.0167)
-0.0238
(0.0165)
-0.0208
(0.0154)
-0.0133
(0.0157)
-0.0143
(0.0156)
-0.0180
(0.0150)
-0.0233
(0.0136)
-0.0216
(0.0130)
-0.0133
(0.0127)
-0.0055
(0.0128)
-0.0107
(0.0130)
-0.0216
(0.0132)
-0.0146
(0.0131)
-0.0257
(0.0131)
-0.0397
(0.0135)
-0.0289
(0.0138)
-0.0286
(0.0138)
EduP9 -0.0907
(0.0121)
-0.1051
(0.0117)
-0.1264
(0.0114)
-0.1213
(0.0116)
-0.0917
(0.0115)
-0.0927
(0.0120)
-0.1143
(0.0121)
-0.1073
(0.0121)
-0.0954
(0.0113)
-0.0861
(0.0108)
-0.1018
(0.0117)
-0.0842
(0.0118)
-0.1052
(0.0121)
-0.1031
(0.0122)
-0.1130
(0.0124)
-0.1115
(0.0122)
-0.0970
(0.0122)
-0.1258
(0.0126)
-0.1073
(0.0124)
HOHSingle -0.0515
(0.0259)
0.0533
(0.0212)
0.0951
(0.0204)
-0.1248
(0.0367)
0.0647
(0.0197)
0.0910
(0.0207)
0.0650
(0.0349)
0.1209
(0.0195)
-0.0350
(0.0214)
-0.0318
(0.0251)
0.0191
(0.0241)
-0.0317
(0.0345)
-0.0080
(0.0438)
-0.0040
(0.0480)
-0.1365
(0.0638)
-0.0298
(0.0542)
0.0011
(0.0605)
-0.0525
(0.0570)
0.0468
(0.0583)
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Table 5.17: Decomposition of Female Participation Growth in the UK across Variables
Variables MgEffsA £ to 1 j* 00 * MgEffsA * (X 0 2  — -^84)
Agl6-19 -0.19775 -0.00364 0.00072
Ag20-24 -0.04224 -0.0314 0.00133
Ag25-29 0.01144 -0.03177 -0.00036
Ag30-34 -0.01289 0.00559 -0.00007
Ag40~44 -0.04632 0.02224 -0.00103
Ag45-49 -0.10072 0.00783 -0.00079
Ag50-54 -0.16106 0.02283 -0.00368
Ag55-59 -0.28978 0.00471 -0.00136
Non-White 0.02079 -0.02373 -0.00049
Region2 -0.00196 0.00049 0.0000
Region3 0.01196 0.0048 0.00006
Region4 -0.04317 -0.00021 0.00001
RegionS 0.0103 0.01365 0.00014
Region6 0.00033 0.02165 0.00001
Region7 -0.03255 0.01133 -0.00037
Region8 -0.00986 -0.00081 0.00001
Region9 0.01215 -0.00873 -0.00011
RegionlO -0.03628 0.00162 -0.00006
Regionll -0.04031 -0.0066 0.00027
Regionl2 -0.05545 -0.03638 0.00202
Edu2 0.08011 0.04409 0.00353
Edu3 0.06316 -0.00043 -0.00003
Edu4 0.07126 0.04004 0.00285
EduS 0.09669 0.04766 0.00461
Edu6 0.18249 0.03848 0.00702
Edu7 0.07297 0.02582 0.00188
Edu8 0.20667 0.03735 0.00772
Edu9 0.20962 0.08301 0.0174
NdepO-2 -0.21948 -0.04295 0.00943
Ndep3~4 -0.13167 -0.02187 0.00288
Ndep5-10 -0.09093 -0.01272 0.00116
Ndep 11-15 -0.05033 -0.07009 0.00353
DdepO-2 -0.15929 -0.03577 0.0057
Ddep3~4 -0.12257 -0.01993 0.00244
Ddep5-10 -0.05433 -0.00519 0.00028
Ddep 11-15 0.01417 -0.04455 -0.00063
Married -0.20749 -0.09574 0.01986
EmpP 0.25902 -0.07971 -0.02065
EduP2 -0.00598 0.04685 -0.00028
EduP3 0.03444 0.00337 0.00012
EduP4 0.01614 -0.03585 -0.00058
EduPS -0.01934 0.01241 -0.00024
EduP6 -0.00791 0.01105 -0.00009
EduP7 -0.07971 0.0088 -0.0007
EduP8 -0.044 0.02499 -0.0011
EduP9 -0.09075 0.04374 -0.00397
HOHSingle -0.05149 0.10238 -0.00527
Sum of the MgEffsA  * (^ 02  — X sa) for all variables 0.05311
Table 5.18: Predicted Sample: Percentage of Female Participation using Coefficients for Year j  and Sample for Year i, Linear 
Probability Model
Sample
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Coefficient Year 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1984 62.1 62.5 63.6 65.0 65.5 65.7 66.1 66.2 67.4 68.5 67.2 66.9 65.7 63.8 63.6 63.4 63.5 63.9 62.8
1985 62.0 62.6 63.8 64.8 65.7 65.8 66.2 66.5 67.4 68.4 67.3 66.9 65.7 64.0 63.5 63.5 63.6 64.0 63.0
1986 62.3 62.8 63.9 64.9 65.8 65.9 66.5 66.6 67.6 68.5 67.4 67.0 65.8 64.1 63.6 63.6 63.8 64.3 63.2
1987 62.5 63.0 64.1 65.2 65.9 66.0 66.6 66.8 67.5 68.7 67.6 67.2 66.1 64.4 64.0 64.0 64.1 64.6 63.5
1988 62.9 63.4 64.6 65.6 66.5 66.6 67.2 67.4 68.3 69.2 68.2 67.9 66.7 65.1 64.7 64.7 64.8 65.4 64.3
1989 63.5 64.1 65.4 66.3 67.2 67.5 68.0 68.4 69.1 70.0 69.1 68.8 67.6 66.2 65.8 65.9 66.1 66.5 65.4
1990 63.9 64.5 65.8 66.9 67.8 67.9 68.5 68.9 69.7 70.6 69.7 69.5 68.4 67.0 66.8 66.8 67.0 67.4 66.3
1991 63.6 64.2 65.5 66.4 67.4 67.6 68.1 68.7 69.2 70.1 69.3 69.0 67.9 66.5 66.2 66.3 66.5 67.0 65.9
1992 64.7 65.2 66.5 67.5 68.4 68.6 69.1 69.5 70.3 71.2 70.4 70.1 69.1 67.8 67.8 67.8 67.9 68.4 67.4
1993 64.2 64.6 66.0 67.0 67.9 68.1 68.6 69.0 69.7 71.3 69.8 69.4 68.6 67.3 67.2 67.3 67.5 67.9 67.0
1994 64.8 65.3 66.7 67.7 68.6 68.9 69.4 70.0 70.5 70.6 70.7 70.4 69.6 68.5 68.4 68.6 68.7 69.3 68.3
1995 65.2 65.7 67.0 68.2 69.1 69.3 69.8 70.3 70.9 71.8 71.1 70.9 70.4 69.4 69.5 69.6 69.8 70.1 69.4
1996 65.3 65.9 67.2 68.4 69.3 69.5 70.1 70.6 71.1 72 71.4 71.2 70.8 69.9 70.0 70.2 70.3 70.4 69.9
1997 65.9 66.5 67.8 69.0 69.9 70.1 70.7 71.3 71.8 72.7 72.1 71.9 71.6 70.8 70.9 71.1 71.3 71.4 70.8
1998 66.0 66.6 67.9 69.1 70.0 70.3 70.9 71.5 71.9 72.8 72.3 72.1 71.8 71.0 71.2 71.3 71.5 71.7 71.1
1999 66.5 67.0 68.3 69.5 70.4 70.7 71.2 71.9 72.3 73.2 72.7 72.5 72.2 71.4 71.6 71.8 72.0 72.2 71.6
2000 64.5 67.0 68.3 69.5 70.5 70.8 71.3 72.0 72.4 73.2 72.8 72.6 72.2 71.5 71.7 72.0 72.1 72.4 71.8
2001 66.9 67.2 68.5 69.6 70.7 70.9 71.3 71.8 72.5 73.2 72.8 72.5 71.8 70.9 71.1 71.4 71.5 72.3 71.2
2002 67.3 67.8 69.0 70.2 71.2 71.5 71.9 72.6 73.0 73.8 73.5 73.3 72.9 72.2 72.4 72.7 72.9 73.3 72.6
Pii1 62.1 62.6 64.1 65.2 66.5 67.5 68.5 68.7 70.3 71.3 70.7 70.9 70.8 70.8 71.2 71.8 72.1 72.3 72.6
1 Pii stands for the mean of the predicted probability for year i using the coefficients estimated for the same year L
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Table 5.19: Forecasting Female Participation in the UK with an Adjusting Factor1,2
Year t + 2 Pt+2Xt+2 PtXt+2 T E t+ 2 Forecast with 
Adjustment
Error for the 
Adjusted Forecast
1992 70.3 69.7 0.6
1993 70.6 69.4 1.2
1994 70.6 71.1 -0.4
1995 70.9 70.6 0.3 71.1 -0.2
1996 70.8 71.6 -0.8 72.0 -1.2
1997 70.8 71.4 -0.6 71.4 -0.6
1998 71.2 72.3 -1.1 71.9 -0.7
1999 71.8 72.3 -0.5 71.0 0.8
2 0 0 0 72.1 72.3 -0.2 71.6 0.5
2 0 0 1 72.3 72.9 -0.6 72.3 0.0
2 0 0 2 72.6 72.7 -0.1 72.3 0.3
2003 72.8 72.5
2 0 0 4 73.3 73.0
1We adjust the forecast adding the average of the last three forecasting errors. 
The adjustment for 2004 consists of adding the average error of 2001 and 2002 . 
2Measure of fit: MSE =  0.41
5.8.2 The Em ploym ent of Married M others in Great Britain: 
1974-2000
Table 5.20: History of Maternity Rights in Great Britain: Statutory Requirements and Type of Payment Received1,2
Year Statutory requirements Duration of Leave and Payments
1979
RofR • 2 years/16 hours pw or 5 years/8-16 hours pw continuous 
employment with same employer into the l l f/l prior EWC
return to work at any time up to 29 
weeks after confinement
MP • 2 years/16 hrs pw or 5 years/8-16 hours pw continuous 
employment with same employer into the l l </l prior EWC
6 weeks maternity pay at 90% salary less 
flat-rate MA; and 18 weeks flat-rate MA
RofR •  2 years/16 hours pw or 5 years/8-16 hours pw continuous 
employment with same employer into the 15th prior EWC
return to work at any time up to 29 
weeks after confinement
1987
MP
• 2 years/16 hours pw or 5 years/8-16 hours pw continuous 
employment with same employer into the 15th prior EW C
• 6 months of insured employment with same employer in 
previous 12 months into the 15th week before EWC
•  6 months of insured employment in previous 12 months, 
prior to the 15</l week before EWC
6 weeks SMP pay at 90% of the salary 
18 weeks of flat-rate SMP (£32.85 pw) 
18 weeks flat-rate state MA (£30.05 pw)
•  Most employers use CMP to ‘top-up’ SMP, many of them attached return-to-work conditions to its receipt
RofR • All pregnant women regardless of their hours of work
• 2 years continuous service have additional leave
14 weeks of leave 
28 weeks of leave
1994
MP
• 26 weeks insured employment with same employer in 
previous 12 months into the 15th week before EWC
6 weeks paid at 90% of average weekly earnings 
and 12 weeks of flat-rate SMP (£52.50 pw)
• 52 weeks of insured employment in previous 66 weeks, 
which precede their EWC
18 weeks flat-rate state MA (£52.20 pw)
RofR •  All pregnant women regardless of their hours of work
• 1 year continuous service have additional leave
18 weeks of leave 
29 weeks of leave
2000
MP
• 26 weeks insured employment with same employer in 
previous 12 months into the 15th week before EWC
6 weeks paid at 90% of average weekly earnings 
and 12 weeks of flat-rate SMP (£75 pw)
•  52 weeks of insured employment in previous 66 weeks, 
which precede their EWC
18 weeks MA depending on average earnings 
standard rate (£75 pw)
RofR •  All pregnant women regardless of their hours of work
• 1 year continuous service have additional leave
26 weeks of leave 
52 weeks of leave
2003
MP
•  Employed without a break for at least 26 weeks into the 
15th week before EW C  and earning at least £77 pw
• Employed or self-employed and earning at least 
£30 pw
6  weeks paid at 90% of average weekly earnings 
and 20 weeks of flat-rate SMP (£100 pw)
26 weeks MA up to a standard weekly rate 
(£ 100), depending on your earnings
1Source: McRae (1991), Callender et al. (1996), Palmer (1996), Department of Trade and Industry  and Department for Work and Pensions.O
RofR  stands for Right of Reinstatement; E W C  means expected week of childbirth; MP  denotes any form of maternity pay; MA stands for 
Maternity Allowance; SMP  means Statutory Maternity Pay; CMP  denotes Contractual Maternity Pay.
to
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Table 5.21: Chronological Evolution of Financial Support for Children in the UK: 1970-20001
Years Non-Means Tested 
Payments
Support through Tax 
System
Means-tested Benefits In- Work Benefits
1971 Family Income Supplement (FIS) 
introduced as a means-tested
1977 Child benefit introduced Child tax allowances 
abolished (1977-79)
Family allowance 
abolished
1988
Family Credit (FC) replaced FIS 
with increased generosity and 
lower marginal withdrawal rates 
24 hours’ work pw to qualify
1991 Higher rate for eldest child
1992 Cut to 16 hours pw to qualify
1995 Extra credit for working more than 30 hours pw
1996
1998 Rates of child premiums 
equalised for children < 1 6
Rates of child credits 
equalised for children < 1 6
1999
Working Families’ Tax Credit 
(WFTC) replaces FC, with 
increased generosity and 
childcare support
2000
Children’s tax credit 
replaced married couple’s 
and related allowances
Increase in real 
value
WFTC increase in generosity 
Credit paid through wage-packet
1 Source: Brewer, Myck and Reed (2001) and Brewer (2001).
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5.9 A ppendix C: Graphs
5.9.1 Fem ale Labour Force P artic ip a tion  in th e  UK : E volv in g  
C h aracteristics or C hanging B ehaviour?
Figure 5.5: Trends in Female Characteristics in the UK
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5 .9 .2  T h e E m p loym ent o f M arried M oth ers in  G reat B ritain: 
1974-2000
Figure 5.6: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Employment: 1974-20001,2 — Married 
Females in Britain
o  Y oungest Child <1 a  Y o ungest Child 1 -3  □ Y oungest Child 4
* Y oungest Child 5 - 1 0  .  Y oungest Child 1 1 -1 5
-.2
-.6
1974-76 1977-79  1980-82  1983-85  1986-88  1989-91 1992-94  1995-97  1998-01
Years
M arried
1 Married =  both married and women in cohabitation aged 16-59.
2 Reference group in the probit estimation is married women without children.
Figure 5.7: Employment Rates After Birth — Married Mothers in Britain
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Figure 5.8: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Employment, By Children’s Birth 
Cohorts and Age, Only First Birth1 — Married Females in Britain
o  1974-79 a  1980-82 □ 1983-85 * 1986-88
o 1989-91 o 1992-94 1995-97 o 1998-01
0 -
<2 - .1
- .3  -
- .4  -
- .5  -
-.6  -
13 14 15
Age Child
1 Comparison group are all married childless women.
Figure 5.9: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Employment, By Children’s Birth 
Cohorts and Age, Second and Higher Order Birth1 — Married Females in Britain
o  1974-79 a  1980-82 □ 1983-85 ♦ 1986-88
o 1989-91 ° 1992-94 1995-97 o 1998-01
0 -
- .2  -
E> -  3  -
- .4  -
- .5  -
-.6  -
10 14 15
Age Child
1 Comparison group are all married childless women.
CHAPTER 5. FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN  THE UK: 1974-2002 235
Figure 5.10: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Employment, By Children’s Birth 
Cohorts and Age1,2 — Married Females with High Education in Britain
o 1974-79 a 1980-82 □ 1983-85 . 1986-88
o 1989-91 o 1992-94 1995-97 o 1998-01
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CO
£  ~ 2
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03s
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1 High education means A level and superior.
2 Comparison group are all married childless women with high education.
Figure 5.11: Marginal Effects on the Probability of Employment, By Children’s Birth 
Cohorts and Age1,2 — Married Females with Low Education in Britain
O  1974-79 A  1980-82 □ 1983-85 ♦ 1986-88
o 1989-91 o 1992-94 1995-97 o 1998-01
-.1
- .2
- .4
- .5
- .6
10 12 13 14 15
Age Child
1 Low education means below A level.
2 Comparison group are all married childless women with low education.
Chapter 6 
Overall Conclusions
This thesis addresses how women reconcile family and work in Belgium, West-Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and Great Britain. In Europe, it is a common pattern that women 
have increased their educational qualifications and their employment rates during the 70s, 
80s and 90s. This means that nowadays young couples across share similar questions re­
garding family and work. When is the right timing for childbearing? When (if ever) is it 
optimal or possible to go back to paid work after motherhood?
This thesis focuses on these two questions. On the one hand, it investigates how the 
labour markets conditions and employment status matter for deciding when partnering 
or having children (Chapter 3). On the other hand, it analyses the employment trajecto­
ries after birth for those women who became mothers (Chapters 4 and 5).
Couples decide both their fertility and employment on a simultaneous basis. Because 
of the difficulty of the interrelationship, this research concentrates on the two questions 
independently. Nevertheless, each decision process is studied extensively to take into ac­
count this mutual link and the results offer a reliable picture of the relevant factors for 
these choices.
The thesis contemplates the effect of individual characteristics, family and work poli­
cies, labour markets and social aspects on these two issues. For this reason, European 
country comparison is important since individuals face rather different settings surround­
ing their decisions.
This thesis offers some suggestions on the type of instruments that may facilitate com­
bining family and work. The overall contribution to this subject can be summarised as 
follows:
236
CHAPTER 6. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 237
Theoretical considerations on combining family and work
First, this thesis describes some theoretical thoughts on how to reconcile women’s cur­
riculum vitae and motherhood. There is evidence that female labour supply rises with 
wages. If fertility reacts also positively to increases in wages, then we would expect that 
female employment and fertility are positively correlated. Bu contrast, if fertility responds 
negatively to wages, we anticipate a negative correlation between the two.
Chapter 2 points to the policies that make it more likely that rises in female wages 
increase fertility (or at least, reduce it less), which facilitates a positive (or weaker nega­
tive) correlation between female labour supply and number of children. These are: higher 
subsidies for bought-in childcare, separate taxation, provision of free childcare time and 
more flexible working hours. The model also suggests that a positive correlation between 
female wages and fertility is more likely to occur, the smaller the gap between female and 
male wages.
The timing of cohabitation and births
Chapter 3 aims to provide more information about what matters in the decision process 
of family formation. The exercise is undertaken in Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Sweden.
These countries have in common that precarious labour markets (i.e. high female un­
employment rates) result in postponing cohabitation and motherhood. If governments 
are interested in increasing fertility, they must tackle female unemployment.
We find universal evidence that being at work accelerates cohabitation (or marriage), 
except for Spanish women born between 1945 and 1960. The latter is an indication of 
their previously traditional society.
Results also show that, excluding Sweden, being employed delays maternity. This means 
that, in general, women in paid work wait longer since they perceive a higher opportunity 
cost of childbearing. Family-friendly policies in Sweden (i.e. soft eligibility conditions for 
maternity leave and public childcare) have managed to reverse this effect and females at 
work are actually speeding up their motherhood.
How are women’s employment trajectories after motherhood?
Chapters 4 and 5 address female employment trajectories after motherhood in six Euro­
pean countries.
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Women choose to be in paid work or remain at home after a birth depending on the 
net benefits of selecting one alternative or the other. Chapter 4 empirically investigates 
labour force transitions in connection with a birth in Belgium, West-Germany, Italy, Spain 
and Sweden. Chapter 5 explores the growth in employment of women with newborns in 
Britain. Both chapters relate mothers’ employment to those factors (i.e. family-friendly 
policies and labour markets) that influence their decision.
From Chapter 4 we learn that higher education significantly raises the probability of 
staying-on employed after motherhood, except for Sweden. Chapter 5 also finds that 
the big increase in post-birth employment in Britain only occurs amongst well-educated 
women. Thus, unless the state offers more public childcare facilities, as in Sweden, being 
at work after childbearing only pays off for mothers with higher potential earnings.
The Spanish analysis suggests that holding a fixed-term contract reduces the likelihood 
of staying at work after motherhood. Moreover, data show a significant number of tran­
sitions to unemployment around birth in this country.
This thesis also shows that moving from a joint to a separate taxation system has led to 
a general increase in post-birth employment. One lesson is that West-Germany (the only 
country under analysis which still has a joint taxation system) would probably experience 
a rise in mothers’ employment if it adopted an individual taxation rule.
Chapter 5 determines the importance of the right of reinstatement for the rise in em­
ployment of mothers with children under schooling age in Britain. Interestingly, evidence 
in Chapter 4 suggests that, once women are entitled to reasonable maternity leave, further 
increases in its generosity do not lead to more mothers working, but the opposite.
Furthermore, Chapters 4 and 5 examine the aggregate growth in employment rates and 
find that, amongst all female population characteristics, the rise in education levels plays 
the most fundamental role.
Both chapters provide evidence that removing barriers to part-time work are extremely 
helpful for raising employment after motherhood. First, Chapter 4 shows that post-birth 
employment rates are higher in those countries with higher transitions to part-time jobs 
after childbearing. Second, Chapter 5 emphasises that the increase in mothers’ employ­
ment in Britain is mainly through part-time jobs.
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Concluding Remarks
In the analysis of the employment trajectories after motherhood, we find significant evi­
dence that precarious labour markets (e.g. fixed-term contracts) have a negative impact 
on the probability of staying-on employed after motherhood. Since anticipated post-birth 
employment behaviour conditions family formation decisions, countries with high insta­
bility in the labour markets will be more likely to postpone the fertility process.
Similarly, results show that facilitating part-time work may increase post-birth employ­
ment in those countries with low employment rates. This is because more mothers would 
move from full-time employment before birth to part-time employment after birth, instead 
of shifting to non-employment. If potential mothers expect the prospect of part-time em­
ployment after birth, this may also encourage them to have children in the first place.
Finally, this thesis reveals that educational differences are less relevant in both the deci­
sion of fertility and post-birth employment in those countries with more generous family- 
friendly policies (i.e. Sweden). That is, on the one hand, these policies manage to relax 
female opportunity cost of childbearing. On the other hand, they provide childcare to 
mothers with any sort of qualifications, which enable them to be employed after birth.
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